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Multiple Voices and the Single Individual:
Kierkegaard’s Concept of Irony as a Tool for Reading
The Great Gatsby, The Sun Also Rises, Mrs. Dalloway, and Ulysses
Thomas P. Smith
ABSTRACT
The central issue in the works of Danish philosopher and religious thinker Soren
Kierkegaard (1813-1855) takes the form of a question: “What does it mean to become a
Christian?” However, Kierkegaard’s ideas exerted influence well beyond Christian
circles and have been important to many notable philosophical and literary figures, some
of whom chose not to concern themselves primarily with this question (Sartre, Camus,
Heidegger, Buber), and some of whom did choose to concern themselves primarily with
this question (Tillich, Bonhoeffer, Berdyaev, Marcel). Even though Kierkegaard died in
relative obscurity, thanks to posthumous translation of his works into German and to
those translations then being embraced by thinkers as diverse as the atheist Sartre and the
Hasidic rabbi Martin Buber, Kierkegaard’s writings evolved into a great shaping force in
twentieth century philosophy, theology, and literature.
Extending slightly Kierkegaard’s influence, the present study draws upon his
concept of irony as indirect communication and upon his concept of the three spheres of
existence to engage in close readings of four masterpieces of literature: The Great
Gatsby, The Sun Also Rises, Mrs. Dalloway, and Ulysses. The four close readings then
become a point-of-departure for considering how Kierkegaard’s concept of irony—more
iv

specifically, its three spheres of existence--might apply to the world of present-day
scholarship and pedagogy. The close readings of the four novels thus serve to establish
the context for the final chapter, which considers how Kierkegaard’s concept of the three
spheres of existence might apply to a broader understanding of scholarship and
pedagogy.
In addition to offering literary analysis (conventional close readings) of the four
novels, the present study also serves as a primer to the theology of Kierkegaard in that the
close readings of the novels illustrate various aspects of what Kierkegaard believed to be
the three spheres of existence. The study also forwards the action of scholarship and
pedagogy by inviting the reader to consider how the three spheres of existence might
apply to contemporary scholarship and pedagogy.
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CHAPTER 1
AN OVERVIEW OF IRONY
AND
INTRODUCTION OF KEY TERMS
IN THE STUDY
The central issue in the works of Christian thinker and religious writer Soren
Kierkegaard (1813-1855) takes the form of a question: “What does it mean to become a
Christian?”1 However, Kierkegaard’s ideas exerted influence well beyond Christian
circles and have been important to many notable philosophical and literary figures, some
of whom chose not to concern themselves primarily with the above question (Sartre,
Camus, Heidegger, Buber), and some of whom did choose to concern themselves
primarily with the above question (Tillich, Bonhoeffer, Berdyaev, Marcel). Even though
Kierkegaard died in relative obscurity, thanks to posthumous translation of his works into
German and to those translations then being embraced by thinkers as diverse as the
atheist Sartre and the Hasidic rabbi Martin Buber, Kierkegaard’s writings evolved into a
great shaping force in twentieth century philosophy, theology, and literature. Slightly
extending Kierkegaard’s influence, the present study draws upon his concept of irony as

1

In The Point of View of My Work as an Author, Kierkegaard states clearly, “I am and
was a religious author, the whole of my work as an author is related to Christianity, to the
problem ‘of becoming a Christian,’ with a direct or indirect polemic against the
monstrous illusion we call Christendom, or against the illusion that in such a land as ours
all are Christians of a sort” (6).
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indirect communication and—more specifically—upon his concept of the three spheres
of existence to engage in close readings of four modern masterpieces of literature: The
Great Gatsby, The Sun Also Rises, Mrs. Dalloway, and Ulysses. The four close readings
that are offered from a Christian point of view then become a point-of-departure for
considering how Kierkegaard’s concept of irony—more specifically, its three spheres of
existence2--might apply to present-day scholarship and pedagogy. Metaphors drawn
from the close readings of the four novels thus serve to establish the context for the final
chapter, which proposes that scholarship and pedagogy might benefit from applying
distinctions relevant to Kierkegaard’s three spheres of existence.

Defining Irony
In Sincerity and Authenticity, Lionel Trilling asserts, “Irony is one of those words,
like love, which are best not talked about if they are to retain any force of meaning”
(120). Similarly, in The Compass of Irony, D.C. Muecke asserts, “Getting to grips with
irony seems to have something in common with gathering the mist; there is plenty to take
hold of if only one could” (3). Even though irony has been defined in various ways
according to both context3 and the period in which the definition occurred, it is

2

Kierkegaard argues that human existence takes shape qualitatively in relation to the
“single individual’s” subjective experience within either the “aesthetic,” the “ethical,” or
the “religious” sphere of existence. Kierkegaard believes that by making a “leap to
faith” from either the aesthetic to the ethical or from the ethical to the religious sphere,
the individual experiences a qualitative shift in subjectivity that makes life richer than it
was before the leap to faith occurred.
3
Katharina Barbe, in Irony in Context, divides the difficulty of defining irony into
various contexts in which irony takes shape, including “conversational” contexts (33-60),
“irony and jokes” (93-110), and “traditional and literary approaches to irony” (61-72).
(Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1995)
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nonetheless useful here, as a point-of-departure, to attempt to define irony in a general
sense and then to move on to consider definitions of various forms of irony.
Incongruity—or disparity—between what is said or written and what is meant is
the primary issue in most general definitions of irony. The Oxford English Dictionary
uses this approach by defining irony as “a figure of speech in which the intended
meaning is the opposite of that expressed by the words used” (Second Edition, Volume
VIII: 87). The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics offers a more
differentiated definition of general irony in that it does not use the specific term
“opposite,” but defines “verbal irony” as an expression in which “one meaning is stated
and another, usually antithetical, meaning is intended” (635). Again, the primary issue is
disparity between what appears on the surface and what the speaker or writer intends.
M.H. Abrams, in his Glossary of Literary Terms, also cites disparity between what is said
and what is meant; he claims that “in most of the diverse uses of the term ‘irony’ there
remains the root sense of dissimulation, or of a difference between what is asserted and
what is actually the case” (80). The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics
asserts also that verbal irony might include understatement—that it might include a
situation in which “the expressed meaning is mild and the intended meaning often
intense, e.g. Mercutio’s comment on his death wound, ‘No, ‘tis not so deep as a well, nor
so wide as a church door; but ‘tis enough, ‘twill serve’” (635). The New Princeton
Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics also notes that irony as overstatement (hyperbole)
can be used to the reverse effect of irony as understatement, as in the “tall tale” of
“American folk humor” (635). The context in which the ironic expression occurs thus
defines the content for the auditor of the expression. “Inherently, instances of irony can
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be either more language-related (verbal irony) or situation-oriented (situational irony)”
(Irony in Context 3). The context defining the reception of irony might be one in which
the act of speaking is highlighted, or it might be a context in which the act of observing
the situation is highlighted, as when an individual observes the irony of a particular set of
circumstances in light of what one might have expected. “Irony can arise from explicit or
implicit contradiction” (The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics 635).
Whether the contradiction is implicit or explicit, then, will define the context within
which the irony occurs. The casual inside joke in conversation occurs in an entirely
different context than does a serious project of irony created by someone such as a
Socrates or a Kierkegaard.
As D.J. Enright observes in his study on irony, the paradox in trying to conduct a
study on irony is that the writer on irony risks being misunderstood. “The writer on irony
is in a fair way to be disliked for setting himself up as smarter than other people
(primarily his valued readers) whereas in reality not only are his intentions inoffensive
but, by virtue of their earnestness, more often than not they deter him from being clever
at all” (The Alluring Problem: An Essay on Irony 4). In short, irony is often a complex
psychological phenomenon, one that lends itself to ambiguity by highlighting the
complexity of the relationship between speaker/writer and auditor/reader. Although to be
totally misunderstood is rarely a desirable situation, to intentionally and in a controlled
way rely upon ambiguity in order to be partially misunderstood can be seen as the
ironist’s gift: In being partially misunderstood, she might be able to create a dynamic
interaction (dialectical movement), whereas a purely didactic approach might not.

5
Tragic Irony
Tragic irony is a form of irony that is more “situational” than “verbal.” The term
“tragic irony” came into currency in 1833 when Connop Thirwall (1797-1875)
introduced the distinction in relation to his broader idea of “practical irony,” which is a
form of irony “present throughout life in individuals as well as in the history of states and
institutions, and constitutes the basis for tragic irony” (The New Princeton Encyclopedia
of Poetry and Poetics 634). For Thirwall, the “proper sphere of tragic irony” is a
situation which presents, on the one hand, “the contrast of the individual and his hopes,
wishes and actions,” and, on the other hand, “the workings of the dark and unyielding
power of fate” (634). For Thirwall, the poet who conceives of tragic irony uses it as a
means to exert “absolute power”: “The tragic poet is the creator of a small world in which
he reigns with absolute power over the imaginary persons to whom he gives life and
breath according to his own plan” (634). Shakespeare’s King Lear and Beckett’s Waiting
for Godot are arguably two archetypal examples of the tragic poet exerting such an
absolute power over imaginary persons. The protagonists of these two plays are crafted
in such a way that they appear to be paralyzed before the power of tragic irony exerted by
the poet over his creations. Among the classical playwrights employing the technique
that Thirwall defines as tragic irony was Sophocles. “Sophocles in particular was master
of a searing irony which focused attention on the incomprehensible and unjustifiable
caprices of fate, and yet the rightness of suffering imposed on the hero is somehow
affirmed…Sophocles’ tragic vision traces the working of the will of the gods as it
affected the actions of men” (Ironic Vision in Literature 27). Although Sophocles sought
to portray the will of the gods in relation to the actions of men, in the tragic irony of
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Sophocles, the gods are immune from the judgment of men: “If he presents characters
who are unjustly punished, he does not presume to judge the ways of the gods” (27).
Tragic irony addresses the riddle of the individual’s relationship to fate—to
circumstances beyond the individual’s control. Characters that take shape within the
context of tragic irony take shape in a way which foregrounds their failure to overcome
circumstances that fall within the framework of happenstance and the unpredictable.

Dramatic Irony
Dramatic performances offer unique opportunities for irony in the way that they
play upon the relationship between audience and character. In Irony and Drama: A
Poetics, Bert O. States claims that dramatic irony concerns primarily “the sets of
expectations that drama arouses in us as a result of our being creatures of the world
before we are ever creatures sitting at a play” (xiv). From Shakespeare’s meta-drama to
Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, dramatic irony incorporates the idea that an audience sits
before a “staged” 4 performance. “Dramatic irony is a plot device according to which (a)
the spectators know more than the protagonist; (b) the character reacts in a way contrary
to that which is appropriate or wise; (c) characters or situations are compared or
contrasted for ironic effects, such as parody; (d) there is a marked contrast between what
the character understands about his acts and what the play demonstrates about them”
(New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics New Princeton Encyclopedia of
Poetry and Poetics 635). Dramatic tension arises from the contrast between what the

4

Though dramatic irony is most often associated with the theater and the performance of
plays, it can also occur outside of that realm, as when in Genesis 42:7 “Joseph, unknown
to his brothers, entertains them in Egypt” (The Compass of Irony 105).
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audience knows and what the character in question does not know. “Irony is more
striking when an observer already knows what the victim has yet to find out” (The
Compass of Irony 104). In contrast to “Irony of Events, which needs to be completed by
the discomfiture of the victim,…dramatic irony...is immediately ironical and not
dependent upon any subsequent ‘reading of the results’” (104-05). Dramatic irony thus
presumes predictable knowledge on the part of the audience. “The difference between
the effect of Dramatic Irony and the effect of Irony of Events resembles the difference
between suspense and surprise” (105). With dramatic irony, the suspense arises from
what the audience already knows about the situation at-hand.

Cosmic Irony
In contrast to dramatic irony, which deals with shared knowledge in relation to a
staged event, cosmic irony deals with what D.C Muecke calls “Irony of Events” (The
Compass of Irony 102-ff). As with irony of events, in cosmic irony “the incongruity is
between the expectation and the event,” and “some unforeseen turn of events reverses
and frustrates our expectations or designs” (102).

Even so, to extend the definition

beyond mere irony of events, it is important to consider also that cosmic irony is a more
global—more universal—phenomenon. Regarding cosmic irony’s historical and
religious dimension, The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics associates
the concept of cosmic irony with the philosophy of Hegel and the religious thought of
Kierkegaard. Specifically, The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics
observes that in The History of Philosophy (1837), Hegel identifies cosmic irony as the
“‘crowding of world historical affairs,’ in the trampling down of ‘happiness of peoples,
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wisdom of states, and virtue of individuals’” (634). Hegel in his “comprehensive view
of history” considers cosmic irony to be “an ironic contrast between the absolute and the
relative, the general and the individual” (634). Hegel refers to this contrast as the
‘general irony of the world’ (634). Hegel identifies cosmic irony with an unfolding and
necessary dialectical process that moves toward an unfolding of the “Ideal” as it moves
from “Thesis,” to “Antithesis” and then to “Synthesis.” Hegel sees cosmic irony as part
of the cosmic process that unfolds within the context of a necessary dialectical movement
of the “System”—the world-historical process of Mind (the Absolute) recognizing itself.
Kierkegaard’s perspective on cosmic irony varies considerably from Hegel’s:
Kierkegaard rejects Hegel’s “comprehensive view of history” (including Hegel’s notion
of the Absolute unfolding in a necessary dialectical movement from thesis to antithesis
and then to synthesis). For Kierkegaard, cosmic irony represents “an absolute and
irreconcilable opposition between the subjective and the objective” (634). Hegel’s
“comprehensive view of history” is for Kierkegaard a view that unwittingly overlooks the
existence of the individual in favor of an overly abstract, contemplative, and detached
view of history. As Kierkegaard notes ironically in his journals, “The System [Hegel’s
System] ‘goes forward by necessity,’ so it is said. And look, it never for a moment is
able to move as much as an inch ahead of existence, which goes forward in freedom”
(Journals and Papers, Volume II: 225). Kierkegaard addresses the freedom of the
existing individual in order to reject Hegel’s idea of the Absolute as an abstract Ideal in
which history, by necessity, unfolds in a dialectical movement. As Steven Emanuel
observes, Kierkegaard’s view of Hegel’s dialectical System is that “by viewing
Christianity without reference to the existence of the individual, and hence without
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reference to the importance of making ethical and religious decisions—that is, by
attempting to explain Christianity as a necessary development in the historical process in
which the absolute idea realizes itself—Hegel removes what is essential to the possibility
of being Christian, and thereby creates the illusion that faith can be reduced to an
intellectual exercise, a form of rational comprehension” (Kierkegaard and the Concept of
Revelation 31). In contrast to Hegel who considers cosmic irony in terms it being an
unfolding of “necessity” as necessity takes the form of a dialectical system, Kierkegaard
likens God to a poet who has set the creation free: “The greater the contrasts in the
movement [of the poetic creation], the more is irony required to direct and control the
spirits that willfully want to change forward. The more irony is present, the more freely
and poetically the poet floats above his artistic work” (The Concept of Irony 324).
Kierkegaard does not see cosmic irony as an unfolding of a necessary dialectical process;
Kierkegaard sees cosmic irony as occurring as an expression of the individual
personality’s freedom before the Creator: Kierkegaard sees cosmic irony as the
individual’s subjectivity coming to grips with its freedom before the Creator. For
Kierkegaard, the individual remains grounded in freedom before God; God “as ironist is
the eternal I for which no actuality is adequate” (283). Thus, in contrast to Hegel,
Kierkegaard associates cosmic irony with freedom rather than with necessity. In
presenting his comprehensive view of history as a dialectical unfolding of Mind, “Hegel
could not demonstrate the crucial point: how I, an empirical thinker, am to transform
myself into [an] absolute subject thinking pure thought and thus become ‘theocentric’”
(Kierkegaard: An Introduction 8). In Kierkegaard’s view, Hegel unwittingly abstracted
the individual out of existence: For Kierkegaard whose project was to answer the
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question what it means to become a Christian, “as soon as we abstract from the category
of the individual, Christianity is abolished” (Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation
31). Kierkegaard’s famous parable aimed polemically at Hegel’s abstract philosophical
System is the parable of the palace in which the thinker does not and cannot live:
A thinker erects an immense building, a system, a system which embraces
the whole of existence and world history, etc.—and if we contemplate his
personal life, we discover that he himself personally does not live in this
immense high-vaulted palace, but in a barn alongside of it, or in a dog
kennel, or at the most in the porter’s lodge. If one were to take the liberty
of calling his attention to this by a single word, he would be offended. For
he has no fear of being under a delusion, if only he can get the system
completed…by means of the delusion. (The Sickness unto Death 176-77)
Kierkegaard takes issue with Hegel and the Neo-Hegelians, arguing that their abstract
dialectical system that explains all of history forgets to include the individual existing
subject. In contrast to Hegel’s ambitious dialectical system, Kierkegaard, a religious
thinker above all else, believes that the freedom reflected in his notion of “God as the
poet par excellence” (Rasmussen 55) finds its resolution in the “Absolute Paradox” of the
incarnation of Jesus as the Christ:
Generally the poet, the artist, etc. is criticized for introducing himself into
his work. But this is precisely what God does; this he does in Christ. And
precisely this is Christianity. Creation is really fulfilled only when God
has included himself in it. Before Christ, God was included, of course, in
the creation but as an invisible mark, something like a water-mark in
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paper. But in the Incarnation creation is fulfilled by God’s including
himself in it. (Journals and Papers, Volume II: 117)
God relinquishes freedom in relation to creation, for a time, and inexplicably (in terms of
logic and reason) enters time so that the Absolute Paradox (the Incarnation) might
become a means of salvation for the individual5. As Joel Rasmussen notes in Between
Irony and Witness: Kierkegaard’s Poetics of Faith, Hope and Love, Kierkegaard’s
poetics is “Christomorphic”: “Kierkegaard considers God a poet in the ‘eminent’ sense, a
paradigm in comparison to which every human poet appropriately experiences some
anxiety…In Christ, God ‘fulfills’ the poetic production of creation by becoming a part of
it in the sense that human poets cannot” (80, 82). Kierkegaard’s specific expression for
this paradox of God’s poetic production occurs in the words of Johannes Climacus, the
narrative persona of Philosophical Fragments: “The god poetized himself in the likeness
of a human being” (Philosophical Fragments 36).

In contrast to Hegel’s concept of

cosmic irony as part of a necessary unfolding of the dialectic of history, Kierkegaard
advocates a concept of irony in which the individual is paradoxically both free and
responsible before God. The individual ultimately strives toward freedom with the help
(grace) of God as manifest in the Incarnation. In that sense, Kierkegaard’s poetics is
indeed “Christomorphic.”

5

In reference to the Apostle Paul’s claim that in the race of faith “all the runners run the
race, though only one attains the goal” (1 Corinthians 9:24), Kierkegaard notes that
salvation through faith is available by God’s grace to all, but it is available to only one
individual at a time: “God in heaven who in the bliss of that sublime tranquility [of
eternity] holds in survey, without the least sense of dizziness at such a height, these
countless multitudes of men and knows each single individual by name—He, the great
Examiner, says that only one attains the goal. That means, every one can and every one
should be this one—but only one attains the goal” (The Point of View for My Work as an
Author 111-12).

12

Romantic Irony
In her work Fictions of Romantic Irony, Lilian Furst claims that one “one must
come to grips with irony and with romantic irony too if [one is] to understand modern
literature” (1). In response to this assertion, D.J. Enright counters with the paradoxical
observation, “It could be said that we must come to grips with modern literature if we are
to understand irony” (The Alluring Problem: An Essay on Irony 15). Paradoxical
qualifications aside, the concept of romantic irony finds itself associated most often with
German literary theorist Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829). Although others such as Karl
Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger (1780-1819) and Johann Ludwig Tieck (1773-1853) were also
influential, Schlegel was the “prophet” of German romantic irony and exerted the widest
influence amongst those who advocated the practice of romantic irony. “If Schlegel
didn’t invent romantic irony, he made it an eminently respectable research topic by
giving it a ‘wholly new metaphysical status’ and investing it with ‘an epistemological and
ontological function’” (Enright 15). Ernst Behler sees Schlegel as a transitional figure
between antiquity and literary modernity: “In varying formulations, Schlegel attempted to
rescue the Socratic-Platonic irony of a configurative, indeterminable, self-transcending
process of thinking and writing and to integrate it with the modern style of self-reflection
and self-consciousness as the decisive mark of literary modernity” (Irony and the
Discourse of Modernity 82). Lilian Furst notes also that many twentieth century literary
critics who deal with irony, such as D.C. Muecke and Wayne Booth, follow the influence
of Schlegel in that their broad definitions of what constitutes irony owe at least a little to
the influence of Schlegel and his broad concept of what constitutes romantic irony (1).
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Furst observes, “Muecke devotes a whole chapter [of his book The Compass of Irony] to
romantic irony which he regards as an adjunct to General Irony, concerned principally
with the ironic contradictions of art” (Fictions of Romantic Irony 5). Schlegel ‘s concept
of irony is one that moves beyond considering irony as merely a rhetorical figure:
“Schlegel explicitly transcends rhetorical irony and…elevates Socratic irony not only as a
play of wit and cunning ignorance, but chiefly as evoking and containing simultaneous
feeling for inextricable opposites science and art, the absolute and the relative,
impossibility and necessity of a complete communication, freedom and law” (Romantic
Irony 17). Muecke also tries to situate romantic irony within the larger context of the
history of irony: “The first discovery one makes about Romantic Irony, if one starts out
with a concept of Romanticism derived from a reading of the French or English
Romantics and a concept of irony derived from the corrective ironies of La Rochefoucald
and Swift, Voltaire and Fielding is that it has nothing to do with any simple conventional
concept of Romanticism or with ordinary satiric or comic irony” (The Compass of Irony
181). Muecke’s notion that romantic irony is “concerned principally with the ironic
contradictions of art” is consistent with Schlegel’s view that romantic irony should be
associated with the autonomous aspect of both art and artist. As The New Princeton
Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics notes with regard to the influence of Schlegel, “The
most significant change in [the] meaning [of the term irony] took place in 1797, when
Schlegel observed in his Fragments: ‘there are ancient and modern poems which breathe
throughout, in their every detail, the divine breath of irony’” (634). Schlegel’s influence
as literary theorist is arguably linked to his keen insights as to the function of irony within
the whole of a work of art: “Schlegel’s most constant description of irony in its literary
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and poetic forms is that of a consistent alternation of affirmation and negation, of
exuberant emergence from oneself and self-critical retreat into oneself, of enthusiasm and
skepticism” (634). For Schlegel and his fellow practitioners of romantic irony (such as
Tieck, Jean Paul, Hoffman, and Heine), “irony becomes a conscious form of literary
creation, although its prototype was seen, as is now fully recognized, in older European
authors such as Boccacio, Cervantes, and Shakespeare. Particular points of ironic
contrast, of creation and annihilation, were the relationships of illusion and reality,
subjective and objective, self and world, the inauthenticity and authenticity of self, the
relative and the absolute” (634). Claire Holbrook notes also of romantic irony that it
“argues that life is a process of creation, flux, and becoming and that any perception or
representation we have of life must be partial and at odds with the absolutely fluid nature
of life” (Irony 183). In terms of how they relate irony to broader issues in both art and
life, Schlegel and his entourage conceive of irony also as a defining aspect of art, a sort of
dialectical tension within which works of art take shape and by which they assume their
place within literary history. As Lowry Nelson Jr. notes in his essay “Romantic Irony
and Cervantes,“ “One of the great achievements of those we call Romantics was to
envisage a general history of literature: a conspectus from Homer to Dante to
Shakespeare on up to the very present. The most radical such scheme in its departure
from the rhetorical and genre-oriented practice of Neoclassicism was that of Friedrich
Schlegel in section “Epocden der Dichtkunst” of his Gesprach uber die Poesie (17991800)” (Romantic Irony 15). Schlegel, in “Fragment 116” of the Athenaeum Fragments,
identifies romantic poetry with art that is both free and playful:
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Romantic poetry is a progressive, universal poetry: its aim isn’t merely to
reunite all the separate species of poetry and put poetry in touch with
philosophy and rhetoric. It tries to and should mix and fuse poetry and
prose, inspiration and criticism, the poetry of art and the poetry of nature;
and make poetry lively and sociable, and life and society poetical…It
alone is infinite, just as it alone is free; and it recognizes as its first
commandment that the will of the poet can tolerate no law above itself.
The romantic kind of poetry is the only one that is more than a kind, that
is, as it were, poetry itself: for in a certain sense all poetry is or should be
romantic. (Schlegel, Schlegel’s “Lucinde” and the Fragments 175-76)
Schlegel’s influence extended beyond his immediate circle of enthusiasts since the idea
of romantic irony extended beyond Schlegel’s initial idea of ‘artistic playfulness” to
incorporate also “melancholy and sadness as the mal du siecle (French romanticism), the
transitoriness of life (Keats), [and] the perishing of the divine in this world (Solger)”
(634). In A Rhetoric of Irony, Wayne Booth says that Kierkegaard shares with the
romantic ironists the view that irony is ‘absolute infinite negativity’ (93). However, the
difference that Kierkegaard sees in his concept of irony from that of the romantics is what
he considers to be the “poetic arbitrariness” of German romantic irony as practiced
especially by Schlegel in Lucinde.

Kierkegaard’s Differences with Romantic Irony
Although Kierkegaard admired Schlegel’s innovative approach to aesthetics and
theology, Kierkegaard was critical of Schlegel’s view of the relationship of art to
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freedom, especially in what Kierkegaard, drawing upon the teachings of his professor
Paul Moeller6, considered to be “poetic arbitrariness” 7 in the form of the abstract
detachment of practitioners of romantic irony. Kierkegaard saw romantic irony as a
flight from the actual into the world of the imagination, and though he valued the place of
imagination in shaping existence, Kierkegaard thought it important to avoid appropriating
imagination in an escapist manner, to avoid using imagination to take flight into fantasy
and away from actuality. In The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard provides a summary
review of Schlegel’s Lucinde in which Kierkegaard sees in Julius, the male protagonist,
“’a personality trapped in reflection” (293). According to Kierkegaard, this being trapped
in reflection creates a world where “fantasy alone prevails” (292n). For Kierkegaard,
romantic irony constitutes a tragic development in its ignoring of the actual in favor of
the fantastic—it prefers to the actual a detached and fantastic view of the world that also
exaggerates the importance of poet’s “freedom’:
The tragedy of romanticism8 is that what it seizes upon is not actuality.
Poetry awakens; the powerful longings, the mysterious intimations, the
inspiring feelings awaken; nature awakens; the enchanted princess
awakens—the romanticist falls asleep. He experiences all this in a dream,
and whereas everything was fast asleep around him before, now
everything is awakening—but he is sleeping. But dreams do not satisfy.
He wakes up tired and torpid, un-refreshed, only to lie down, only to lie

6

(Between Irony and Witness 21)
(The Concept of Irony 305)
8
In The Critical Mythology of Irony, Joseph A. Dane notes that Kierkegaard sees the
terms “romanticism” and “[German] romantic irony” as being “virtually
interchangeable” (74).
7
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down to sleep again, and soon he needs to produce the somnambulant state
artificially, but the more exaggerated also becomes the ideal that the
romanticist evokes.
Romantic poetry moves between two poles. On the one side stands
the given actuality with all its paltry philistinism; one the other, the ideal
actuality with its dimly emerging shapes. These two elements are
indispensable to each other. The more actuality is caricatured, the higher
the ideal wells up, but the fountain that wells up does not well up into
eternal life9. The very fact, however, that this poetry moves between two
opposites shows that in a deeper sense it is not true poetry. (The Concept
of Irony 304-05)
Kierkegaard thus rejects Schlegel’s ideal that romantic poetry be a play of opposites, “of
illusion and reality, subjective and objective, self and world, the inauthenticity and
authenticity of self, the relative and the absolute” (The New Princeton Encyclopedia of
Poetry and Poetics 634). For Kierkegaard, the playfulness that Schlegel advocates as the
ideal of romantic irony finds itself unwittingly cut off from the actual. Kierkegaard
scholar Vincent McCarthy summarizes nicely Kierkegaard’s position on the matter of
romantic irony and poetic arbitrariness: The romantic poet “lives in a dream world, at
best in a cycle of waking and sleeping. His fault is that he seeks content for his existence
in the dreams which are his only actuality; he is never satisfied, and cannot be”

9

Kierkegaard alludes here to the incident of Jesus’ conversation with the Samaritan
woman at Jacob’s Well: “Everyone who drinks this water will be thirsty again, but
whoever drinks the water that I shall give him will never suffer thirst any more. The
water that I shall give him will be an inner spring always welling up for eternal life”
(John 4:14).
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(Phenomenology of Moods in Kierkegaard 10). The dream world of the romantic is for
Kierkegaard a retreat from the actual.
In contrast to Schlegel’s view of irony that includes infinite playfulness of
opposites such as the absolute and the relative, Kierkegaard’s view of irony is one in
which the poet must “master” or control the situation in which the irony takes shape, so
that the irony might serve some higher purpose in relating truth indirectly. “According to
Kierkegaard, the Romantic abuse of poetry is perpetrated through a deficient
understanding of the appropriate use of irony” (Between Irony and Witness:
Kierkegaard’s Poetics of Faith, Hope, and Love 23). Kierkegaard views both irony and
“living poetically” in terms of the religious possibilities that he feels life might hold:
“Instead of the freewheeling form of irony espoused by Schlegel, Kierkegaard thinks
irony and the corresponding concept of ‘living poetically’ need to be re-contextualized in
terms of the religious life-view. In such a re-contextualization, irony is ‘mastered’ by
being applied in service of a higher ethical earnestness, rather than providing merely idle
diversions for the poet’s fancy” (23). In Kierkegaard’s view, “living poetically” includes
that concrete actualization of self within an ethical framework; this concrete actualization
of self involves a consciously adopted and ongoing choice between good and evil (the
individual becoming conscious of self in terms of ethical responsibility toward the other).
As Sylvia Walsh notes, Kierkegaard’s expression “living poetically” begins as a critique
of the German romantic poets but grows into a concept that includes both the ethical and
the religious:
“Living poetically” is an intriguing phrase that Kierkegaard first uses in
his early writings to characterize what he regards as an attempt by the
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German romantic poets to construct their personal lives in the same
manner as they create works of art. Through the exercise of a boundless
artistic freedom, he claims, they seek to construct their self-identities
through experimentation and play with an infinity of possibilities
concocted by the imagination and tried out in a variety of roles and
personal experiences with others. Kierkegaard finds this romantic mode
of living poetically to be ironic, or negative and non-serious, in its attitude
toward actuality, and destructive, rather than constructive, or up-building,
in its consequences for the development of human personality and
personal relation to others. He thus rejects it in favor of an alternative
understanding of living poetically construed in an ethical and religious
framework. Unlike its romantic counterpart, this mode of living poetically
is one that affirms both possibility and actuality, a sense of our historical
situatedness and finite limitations as well as freedom, and the construction
of human personality through a process of self-development, rather than
self-creation, in relation to the infinite or divine. (Living Poetically 2)
For Kierkegaard, poetry and art ought ideally never to be divorced from the actual, but
ought ultimately to serve some higher purpose in helping the individual on the way
through challenges presented by the actual conditions of her or his existence.

Socratic Irony
Most broad studies of irony refer at least in part to the classical form of ironic
discourse practiced by Socrates as he is portrayed in the works of Plato. “The classical
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image of irony as a lofty, urbane mode of dissimulation, practiced in conversation and
public speech and without one’s own advantage in mind, finds its origin in the Platonic
Socrates” (The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics 633). The Platonic
Socrates works by means of “dissimulation”: “In front of his conversational partners
who claim to know, Socrates professes not to know, but through insistent questioning
proves them also not to know, thereby finding a common basis for their quest for
knowledge. Hence, Socrates dissimulates not for his own advantage, but for the sake of
truth” (633-34). It is this commitment to using irony for the sake of truth that makes
Socrates an especially important figure for Kierkegaard:
Why did Socrates compare himself to a gadfly? Because he wanted his
influence only to be ethical. He didn’t want to be an admired genius
standing apart from the rest, who therefore simply makes life easier for
them, for they say, “Yes, it’s all very well for him, he’s a genius.” No, he
did only what everyone can do; understand only what everyone can
understand. That’s where the epigrammatic quality lies. He dug his teeth
hard into the individual, constantly compelling and teasing him with the
commonplace. It was thus he was a gadfly, causing irritation through the
individual’s own feelings, not letting him go on leisurely and weakly
admiring, but demanding of him his very self. If a person has ethical
powers, people will gladly make a genius out of him just to be rid of him,
for his life contains a demand. (Journals and Papers: Volume 4: 210)
Kierkegaard saw the Platonic Socrates as the model for the project of “indirect
communication” in the adopting of pseudonymous voices for his works. By adopting
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pseudonymous narrative voices and thus distancing himself from his works, Kierkegaard
sought to replicate within a Christian framework the sting he identified with Socrates:
“By following such a method, which [Kierkegaard] termed one of ‘indirect
communication’ and which was Socratic in inspiration, he sought to enable his readers to
acquire a more perspicuous insight into their own situation and motivation, but without
the didacticism that was characteristic of ‘objective’ modes of discourse” (Gardiner 38).
Kierkegaard took very seriously the observation made in his journals that the Platonic
“Socrates’ maieutic skill makes the reader or hearer himself active, and therefore [the
dialogues of Plato] do not end in a result but in a sting” (Journals and Papers: Volume 4:
210). Socrates of the dialogues of Plato thus became the inspiration for Kierkegaard’s
own project of indirect communication. Not only was the Platonic Socrates the topic of
Kierkegaard’s doctoral dissertation (The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to
Socrates), the Platonic Socrates was also the model after which Kierkegaard fashioned
himself in his attempt to “sting” the lukewarm Christendom of his day into considering
what it means to become a Christian. In explaining his method of “indirect
communication,” Kierkegaard refers to this method as having been derived from Socrates
but with the ultimate aim of serving Christianity in light of what it had become as
“Christendom”:
Although ever so many parsons were to consider this method [of indirect
communication] unjustifiable, and just as many were unable to get into
their heads (in spite of the fact that they all of them, according to their own
assertion, are accustomed to use the Socratic method), I for my part
tranquilly adhere to Socrates. It is true, he was not a Christian; that I

22
know, and yet I am thoroughly convinced that he has become one. But he
was a dialectician, he conceived of everything in terms of reflection. And
the question which concerns us here is a purely dialectical one; it is the
question of the use of reflection in Christendom. We are reckoning here
with two qualitatively different magnitudes, but in a formal sense I can
very well call Socrates my teacher—whereas I have only believed, and
only believe, in One, the Lord Jesus Christ. (The Point of View for My
Work as an Author 41)
Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication was Socratic, but he appropriated it in
the service of his ultimate concern: what it means to become a Christian in Christendom.
He thus thought of himself as being “like a spy in a higher service, the service of the
idea” of what it means to become a Christian in Christendom (The Point of View for My
Work as an Author 87). Like Socrates, Kierkegaard made himself into a negative (a
persona assumed ironically) to bring about the positive (an active engagement on the
individual’s part with the question of truth). Socrates was for Kierkegaard the model for
his authorship, but Jesus as the Christ was the “ultimate concern” 10of his life as a
religious writer.

Changing Notions of Irony
The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics notes that prior to the
late-eighteenth/early-nineteenth centuries, irony was considered primarily as a rhetorical
10

Paul Tillich’s distinction concerning what constitutes faith, as represented in Dynamics
of Faith. To open his study in the dynamics of faith, Tillich claims, “Faith is the state of
being ultimately concerned; the dynamics of faith are the dynamics of ultimate concern”
(New York: Harper and Row, 1957:1).
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device: “From the middle ages through the Renaissance and neo-classicism, irony was
considered primarily in terms of ‘rhetorical forms,’” and “the basic meaning remained the
same,” as is represented by the 1765 definition from a French encyclopedia in which
irony was defined as ‘a figure of speech by which one indicates the opposite of what one
says’” (634). It wasn’t until the last two centuries that irony became the complex area of
study that it has now become with the relatively recent developments such as de Man’s
deconstruction and the broader notions of irony offered by critics such as Lionel Trilling
and Wayne Booth. Quintilian (circa 35-85 AD) believed that “the common feature of all
rhetorical forms of irony is that the intention of the speaker is different from what he
says, that we understand the contrary of what he says” (634). In both Rhetoric, Book III
and Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle conceives of irony in terms of it being a rhetorical
device. “The jests of the ironical man are at his own expense’ (Rhetoric, Book III
1419b7). As ‘the contrary to boastful exaggeration, [irony] is a self-deprecating
concealment of one’s powers and possessions; it shows better taste to deprecate than to
exaggerate one’s virtues’ (Nicomachean Ethics 1108.19-32). For Aristotle, the prototype
of this self-deprecating, “genuine” form of irony was Socrates (New Princeton
Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics 633). It was arguably the advent of German
Romantic notions of irony—particularly those of Friedrich Schlegel—that largely
initiated the revolution in the way that irony was liberated from being considered
primarily as a rhetorical device to it being considered as a dominant concern of both
literature and poetics. “Schlegel explicitly transcends rhetorical irony and…elevates
Socratic irony not only as a play of wit and cunning ignorance, but chiefly as evoking and
containing simultaneous feeling for inextricable opposites science and art, the absolute
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and the relative, impossibility and necessity of a complete communication, freedom and
law” (Romantic Irony 17). It was also, in a sense, in reaction to Schlegel and the German
Romantics (including Solger and Tieck) that Kierkegaard fine-tuned his own theory of
irony, and, in reacting to and arguably surpassing Schlegel’s notion of irony, Kierkegaard
became not only a significant force in modern philosophy and theology but also a
significant force in shaping modern thought in general with regard to the power and
importance of irony and indirect communication. Although Kierkegaard’s concept of
irony follows Schlegel and romantic irony, Kierkegaard’s concept of irony is more than a
reactionary joust with romantic irony; it is an even broader view than Schlegel’s of the
place of indirect communication in service of inquiry and artistic expression.

The Unique Contribution of the Present Study
The particular contribution of this study is that it presents in close readings
paradoxically positive aspects of four modernist novels that have sometimes been
considered to be metaphysically pessimistic—“death of God” literature11, if you will, and
it does so with the ultimate goal of explication for religiously-curious scholars as to the
11

In Literary Terms: A Dictionary, Karl Beckson and Arthur Ganz claim that literary
Modernism includes “the existential vision of an absurdly meaningless universe, the
sense of man as trapped at an end-point in history” (165). And, in A Dictionary of
Literary and Thematic Terms, Edward Quinn asserts, ”Perhaps the distinguishing feature
of modernism is its determination to dispense with the past, in Ezra Pound’s phrase, ‘to
make it new.’…Modernism was a response to the shift in thought an belief precipitated
by intellectual developments and discoveries associated with, but not limited to, the
names Charles Darwin, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, and Albert
Einstein. Darwin’s Origin of the Species (1859) uprooted the traditional view of ‘man
made in the likeness of God,’ replacing it with one of man as the descendent of an ape.
Marx’s view of the economic determinism that governed western history and culture
directly challenged the idealist philosophy of its time, [and] Nietzsche’s declaration of
‘the death of God’ summarized the dismissal of the very ground of the Hebraic/Christian
tradition…” (200).
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nature of Kierkegaard’s concept of the three spheres of existence. The present study
strives to illustrate and then to apply the concept of the three spheres in a way that
encourages the reader toward concrete actualization of Kierkegaard’s ideas. I hope that
this emphasis on applying the three spheres to everyday scholarship and pedagogy is
something that enthusiasts of Kierkegaard will regard with esteem, since Kierkegaard so
strongly emphasized the importance of one’s ideas being actualized in a concrete way to
shape one’s destiny and the well-being of others (especially in relation to God). In
performing the close readings of the four novels, the study also serves as a primer for
Kierkegaard studies in that it replicates, at least in part, the process that Kierkegaard uses
in his authorship: indirect communication. The readings of the four novels make use of
the ambiguity of modernist irony and symbolism in a way that communicates indirectly
various aspects of Kierkegaard’s three spheres of existence. This study adopts this
strategy not to argue whether the four novels are “religious’ or “non-religious” in
character, but to illustrate indirectly various aspects of Kierkegaard’s three spheres of
existence. The study thus presents an original approach to representing Kierkegaard’s
three spheres of existence. More specifically, the study seeks to replicate—at least in
part—Kierkegaard’s own method of indirect communication, by achieving a positive
close reading of the symbolism of four great works of modernist fiction. The irony is that
four novels that have sometimes been read as almost-codified representations of the
“death of God” and of the godless state of modern humanity12—through the ambiguity

For example, in Colonial Odysseys: Empire and Epic in the Modernist Novel (Ithaca:
Cornell UP, 2003), post-colonial theorist David Adams, citing among other works James
Joyce’s Ulysses, identifies twentieth century colonialism and the British modernist novel
with the “metaphysical” problem of the “death of God.” Adams asserts, “Any analysis of
the [modernist] novel's involvement in national and imperial culture must also eventually

12
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inherent to their ironic construction—I read symbolically not as representing the death of
God, but as works that can be interpreted in a way that ultimately serves Christian
theological discourse. Thus, the unique contribution of the study is that it exploits the
ambiguity of the texts ultimately to serve optimistic theological discourse in the hope that
the present study might make a concrete difference in the world. As Kierkegaard does
with his appropriation of irony to comment on what it means to be a Christian, the
present study attempts to turn an extreme negative13 into a positive. Although some
scholars might believe in “codified” readings of modernism—readings that are fixed in
place to somehow represent the death of God--, I do not ascribe to that point-of-view and
thus move forward in what is my ethical right—namely, to appropriate the ambiguous
symbolism of the novels in this study in a way that turns an extreme negative14 into a
positive15 in the way that the study illustrates and supplements Kierkegaard’s theory of
the three spheres of existence. The unique contribution of the present study to both
account for the way the genre responds to metaphysical questions" (48). In a review of
Adams’s book, Jonathan Greenberg summarizes Adams’s position on “metaphysical
questions”: “From where, [Adams] asks, do people derive a deep sense of meaning or
value when traditional religious answers have been abandoned or discredited? What
kinds of human activity can fill this void, which Adams calls, after Salman Rushdie, a
‘god-shaped hole?’” (http://www.brynmawr.edu/bmrcl/Spring2005/Adams.htm). In
elaborating upon Adams’s’ book, Jonathan Greenberg explains Adams’s term
“reoccupation”: “‘Reoccupation,’ in brief, is the process by which we compensate for the
lost totality of a theological worldview with human constructs such as adventure, empire,
or indeed fiction itself. As such it is a peculiarly modern process and one that, for Adams
at least, seems destined to fail. The recognition of this failure is the primary function of
the modernist colonial odyssey”
(http://www.brynmawr.edu/bmrcl/Spring2005/Adams.htm).
13

Irony that arguably represents metaphysical doubt symbolically in the form of
dilemmas faced by characters such as Jake Barnes, Clarissa Dalloway, and Stephen
Dedalus
14
(the irony expressed in the novels in representation of metaphysical doubt)
15
(the proposal in Chapter 6 that the three spheres be applied in a concrete, actualized
way that might make a difference for others)
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Kierkegaard studies and to the criticism of the four novels in question is not to achieve a
“definitive reading” of the novels or of literary modernism—is not to discover what the
novels “mean”: I attempt, rather, to approach the process of close reading in an original
way that proves uplifting from a Christian perspective. I also hope that at the same time
that the close readings offer those who are curious about Kierkegaard’s three spheres of
existence a unique way of better understanding them. Obviously, then, I do not
believe—as do Sartre and others of a more metaphysically pessimistic character—that
literary modernism somehow announces symbolically the death of God and a human
need to move beyond the Christian interpretation of existence16; rather, I move forward in
the belief that an optimistic embracing of life in the face of ambiguity such as that
represented in many aspects of literary modernism (and postmodernism) is not only
possible but might also prove to be a vital part of a Christian’s psychologically healthy
response to the world of twentieth century (and twenty-first century) literature and art. It
is thus important here to supplement this optimistic position by offering a few rhetorical
questions with regard to literary modernism and the so-called “death of God.”

I hope

that these rhetorical questions might offer at least a few individuals the possibility of
arriving at a positive way of perceiving the despair so characteristic of modernism and
the twentieth century:
Rhetorical Question 1: Is it not at least possible that the despair represented by
literary modernism (and sometimes postmodernism) is—as Kierkegaard’s disciple
Nicolas Berdyaev asserts—a projection of the malaise of the age that resulted from

16

In his Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion, William Reese observes that “Sartre held
God to be an unthreatened awareness, an impossible ideal which humans would like to
have for themselves” (265).
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individuals, one-by-one, having unwittingly rejected and moved away from God, not of
individuals having outgrown the need for God? As J. Norris Beam remarks in the essay
“Nicolas Berdyaev’s Critique of Sartre’s Betrayal of Existentialism,” Berdyaev criticizes
Sartre for “betraying existentialism” by erecting an ontology of non-being to replace the
possibility of an open relationship toward the possibility of transcendence. According to
Beam, Berdyaev believes that “‘self-sufficiency’ and ‘self-assertion’ over against God
has resulted in a widespread feeling of forlornness in the twentieth century, which
[Berdyaev] regards as really the experience of ‘God-forsakenness’” (Beam 2-3;
Berdyaev, The Divine and the Human 148).
Rhetorical Question 2: Is it not at least possible—as Martin Buber asserts—to
reject any number of objectified (“I-it”) ideas about God yet still believe at the heart of
one’s being that one can find deeper meaning in life and can find personal experience of
the transcendent by relating to God as “Thou,” by relating to God as Infinite Subject (I
and Thou 99-120)? The spiritually optimistic approach of the present study is consistent
with Kierkegaard’s thought, since he held that even the phenomenon of despair might be
interpreted optimistically: Kierkegaard perceives of despair optimistically, since he
asserts that the phenomenon of despair affirms the possibility that human freedom and
the human ability to acknowledge God are valid: “Kierkegaard said that man’s despair
even indicates his spiritual worth, unlike the animals, because of man’s capacity to
exercise freedom in [either] affirmation or defiance of God” (Beam 7). More
specifically, in The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard affirms man’s “spiritual worth” and
freedom in the face of despair by stating, “The possibility of this sickness [despair] is
man’s superiority over the animal, and this superiority distinguishes him in quite another
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way than does his erect walk, for it indicates infinite erectness or sublimity, that he is
spirit. The possibility of this sickness [despair] is man’s superiority over the animal; to
be aware of this sickness is the Christian’s superiority17 over the natural man; to be cured
of this sickness is the Christian’s blessedness” (15). The paradox for Kierkegaard is that
an extreme negative (despair in the face of freedom and the infinite) can bring about a
positive (the individual’s acceptance of the eternal and of deeper self-actualization by
way of God’s grace). This study also hopes to turn negative into positive—to offer a
Christian perspective on works that might sometimes be considered as “death of God”
literature. The study thus moves from the assertion based upon faith that it is at least
possible that the individual’s ability to arrive at despair in the face of freedom, as literary
modernism so often portrays, ultimately affirms the dignity of the individual as an
existing spirit capable of relating to the eternal—of the individual’s freedom and
“spiritual worth” before God, as Kierkegaard believes. Important to Kierkegaard’s belief
in the spiritual worth of the individual is his notion that the power of reason, in and of
itself, is insufficient for arriving at Christian faith, that to do so, one must make the “leap
to faith” that occurs in the face of the limits of reason. 18

17

(The term “superiority” is used here paradoxically, since in Kierkegaard’s view this
occurs by way of God’s grace in correlation with the individual’s acknowledgment of
God and denial of self.)
18
This resembles William James’s idea (expounded upon in “The Will to Believe”) that
the religious experience, in the deeper sense, includes not only a rational assent to a set of
ideas but also a more differentiated sense of sentiment and will (The Will to Believe,
Human Immortality, New York: Dover Publications, 1967). In his work A Kierkegaard
Handbook, Frederick Sontag also notes that Kierkegaard’s “appreciation of the limited
range of the intellect, and its powerlessness to deal with the ultimate problems of life,
increasingly permeated the philosophy of the twentieth century” (12).
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Subjectivity and Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Self
According to Kierkegaard, all manifestations of human reason and all aspects of
irony and of faith take shape within the broader reality of three paradoxically-interrelated spheres of existence. These three spheres take shape relative to human
subjectivity with respect to one’s existential awareness of both self and self’s place and
responsibility toward decisive action within the world. Kierkegaard’s notion of
subjectivity resembles Claire Colebrook’s definition: For both Kierkegaard and
Colebrook, “whereas individuals are selves with a specific identity and are perceivable as
part of the world, the subject is the condition or process of consciousness from which the
world or self is constituted. Subjectivity is therefore different from the social, embodied
and specific individual; the subject is the point from which society and self is viewed and
effected, but not itself an effect” (Irony 184). Kierkegaard’s notoriously challenging
expression for this idea of subjectivity is that “the self is a relation that relates itself to
itself or is the relation’s relating itself to itself” (The Sickness unto Death 13).
Kierkegaard’s challenging way of expressing his idea of the self is actually ironic. The
unusual language is Kierkegaard’s way of engaging in parody of Hegel’s obtuse way of
expressing ideas. The passage in its movement from one point to the next parodies the
synthetic nature of Hegel’s dialectic:
Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self?
The self is a relation that relates itself to its own itself, or it is the
relation’s relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation
but is the relation’s relating itself to itself. A human being is a synthesis
of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom
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and necessity. A synthesis is a relation between two. Considered in this
way, a human being is still not a self (13).
Kierkegaard’s obtuse way of expressing the dynamic quality of self is actually a riddle
that he introduces before launching into The Sickness unto Death: The key point in the
riddle is that the passage ends with the observation that “considered in this way, a human
being is still not a self.” J. Preston Cole explains, ”If we are to grasp [Kierkegaard’s]
understanding of the self, we must unravel that riddle, we must take seriously both the
dialectical logic and the ironic fillip” (The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud
11). Cole follows this observation by pointing out also that Kierkegaard’s claim “‘the
self is a relation’ implies that self is comprised of at least two elements, and for
Kierkegaard these basic components are the classical concepts of body and soul. Here
body signifies the physical aspect of human being, and soul the affective or psychological
aspect” (12). But, for Kierkegaard, the self is more than merely body and soul: “as such
he is not yet a self” (12). He is not yet a self because “such a being is only an ‘it,’ or at
best a ‘me’—a self ‘in the dative case’” (12). For Kierkegaard, the individual ought
ideally to become “spirit” to be a self.

The self “in the dative case” is a self that remains

confined to the aesthetic sphere. As Kierkegaard states later in The Sickness unto Death,
“The man of immediacy is only psychically [soulishly] qualified…His self, he himself, is
an accompanying something within the dimensions of temporality and secularity, in
immediate connection with ‘the other,’ and has but an illusory appearance of anything
eternal in it. The self is bound up in immediacy with the other in desiring, craving,
enjoying, yet passively” (51). For Kierkegaard, such a soulish existence, one that
remains confined to the aesthetic sphere of existence—remains “bound up in
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immediacy”—, remains also in a state of perpetual childhood: “In its craving, this self is
dative, like the ‘me’ of a child. Its dialectic is: the pleasant and the unpleasant; its
concepts are: good luck, bad luck, fate” (51). Although for Kierkegaard it is not “wrong”
to exist in this state when one is a child, to remain in the state of immediacy—to remain
confined to the aesthetic sphere—might ultimately lead to an existence that does not
reach what is possible for it in either the ethical or the religious sense. “The immediate
body-soul relation is not really a relation, but a unity—a psychosomatic unity, so to
speak. It is a ‘negative unity,’ as Kierkegaard terms it, but selfhood requires a positive
relationship of body and soul, one posited by the self itself’” (Cole 12). “If, however, [in
contrast to a negative unity], the relation relates itself to itself, this relation is the positive
third, and this is the self” (The Sickness unto Death 13). The personality taking it upon
itself to act consciously and decisively upon the world in the face of freedom is what
constitutes the positive third. Further, Kierkegaard believes that for a self to become
qualified as spirit and not merely remain confined to a soulish existence, the self ought to
arrive at the “limit” of self as merely body and soul (in Cole’s “psycho-somatic”
sense)—the self ought to arrive at the limit of “self in the dative case” in order to reach
the point at which a qualitative “leap to faith” might occur. And, both the limit and “the
leap” occur with regard to the self’s relationship to “despair.”

Kierkegaard’s Concept of Despair
For Kierkegaard, the phenomenon of despair is an extension of anxiety, the
natural state of the human being which arises from the individual being unconsciously
aware of the finite nature of existence while at the same time longing for the infinite,
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longing for the eternal. Kierkegaard believes there is anxiety, tension, in human
consciousness that arises in a dialectical movement in relation to freedom. In The
Concept of Anxiety, “Kierkegaard as Vigilius Haufniesis describes how the possibility of
freedom, with its accompanying sense of responsibility for action, creates anxiety
(Angest) in the individual. The individual undergoes a state of gradual awakening,
described as ‘dreaming,’ then ‘awakened’ spirit, in which the possibility of freedom,
choice, and action ambiguously attracts and repels the individual through the scope of
action opened (as the individual gradually becomes aware of the object of the choice and
that there is a choice) and the accompanying sense of responsibility” (Historical
Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy 17). Kierkegaard believes also that the
individual’s confronting freedom can lead to a qualitative shift (“leap”) in consciousness
(existential self-awareness) that occurs in relation to the individual having chosen a
concrete course of action: “Kierkegaard sees the transition to concrete (good or bad)
action as occurring in a ‘leap; that is, concrete choices occur through free volition and are
not an inevitable product or outcome of the previous state by some kind of natural
transition, even though he accepts that individuals are burdened to a greater or lesser
extent by the ‘necessity’ of factors of environment and heredity which are beyond their
control” (17). Kierkegaard believes that anxiety reflects the inherent tension that arises
from the individual’s freedom to choose one course of action at the exclusion of all
others: Kierkegaard believes that “anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which emerges
when the spirit wants to posit a synthesis and freedom looks down into its own
possibility, laying hold of finiteness to support itself” (The Concept of Anxiety 61). With
Kierkegaard, as with Sartre, freedom is prior to being-itself. Freedom is the “abyss”
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down into which the spirit looks when facing its own possibility: “Anxiety may be
compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look down into the yawning abyss
becomes dizzy” (61). The dizziness of which Kierkegaard speaks is the dizziness of
freedom, without which no choice of concrete action would be possible, without which
no choice of “good” or “evil” would be possible. This anxiety, however, differs from
“despair,” which Kierkegaard calls “the sickness unto death.”
In the pseudonymous work The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard creates the
narrative persona Anti-Climacus to explain the dialectical nature of despair. According
to Anti-Climacus, despair (Fortvivlelse) arises as an advanced form of anxiety, and
Kierkegaard believes that despair is “the further state of the individual who fails to
develop a relationship to the eternal God19” (Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s
Philosophy 64). As Julia Watkin explains, Anti-Climacus’ dialectic of despair progresses
in various manifestations from unconscious to totally conscious: “An individual can go
astray in various levels of despair, beginning with unconscious despair, in which a person
is, for a time, superficially happy in a life directed solely toward temporal goals such as
19

It should be noted here that for Kierkegaard one who has made the leap to faith that
takes shape within the ethical sphere “develops a relationship with the eternal God”
indirectly in the sense of honoring others as she honors herself—the “first and great
commandment” (Matthew 22:35-40). As Julia Watkin notes, “Judge William (of
Either/Or) sees the initial choice of the ethical life as something that purifies, matures
and unifies the personality. It even brings the individual into contact with what Bishop
Nikolai Balle in his catechism calls the ‘Eternal Power’ (den evige Magt = God)
underlying all existence” (Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy 78).
Although for Kierkegaard one ought to ultimately be delivered from the power of despair
by appealing to God’s grace as manifest in the Incarnation, one is not necessarily
consigned to the flames of hell for failing to do so. Even so, “Kierkegaard makes it clear
that it is possible to relate to God only by way of ethics” (79). One could argue that it is
from Kierkegaard’s influence in this respect that Martin Buber developed his concept of
the “I-Thou” relationship and that Kierkegaard is in some measure indebted to Kant’s
Categorical Imperative, as Ronald M. Green argues in Kierkegaard and Kant: The
Hidden Debt (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992).
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making money or achieving political power. When the goals begin to fail to satisfy, the
person tries to deal with the problem as something external needing to be fixed” (64).
This, however, is destined to fail, and “it is not until she or he begins to be really unhappy
that the despair begins to manifest itself at a conscious level” (64). As Mark Dooley
observes in The Politics of Exodus: Kierkegaard’s Ethics of Responsibility, Kierkegaard
believes that “the despairing individual is one who believes that he or she has the
capacity to come into possession of the truth without having recourse to God as the
ethical prototype and ideal” (87). According to Kierkegaard, to merely act in conformity
with what one thinks are the conventions of society is not in Kierkegaard’s view to
consciously adopt an ethical stance, as one can conform to the norms of society and still
see oneself as an “it”, as “self in the dative case.” In a passage from The Sickness unto
Death, the narrative persona Anti-Climacus defines the complex dynamic of the
relationship of the failure to become self as actualized personality, as is the case with the
despairing individual, who is in a state in which the will is divided, because the
despairing individual cannot be something other than himself but still wills to be
something other than himself—or despairs over being himself:
A person in despair despairingly wills to be himself. But if he
despairingly wills to be himself, he certainly does not want to be rid of
himself. Well, so it seems, but upon closer examination it is clear that the
contradiction is the same. The self that he despairingly wants to be is a
self that he is not (for to will to be a self that he is in truth is the very
opposite of despair); that is, he wants to tear his self away from the power
that established it. In spite of all his despair, however, he cannot manage
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to do it; in spite of all his despairing efforts, that power is the stronger and
forces him to be the self he does not want to be. (20)
Despair relates more to the individual’s possibility of becoming (and longing to become)
a fulfilled personality—relates more to the personality’s potential to act in affirmation of
its own potential to be defined as an individual—than it does to an “ontological”
condition: “It is important not to interpret despair as a feature of the ontological condition
of the human being. It is, rather, a possibility that lies in the synthesis [of self]” (Dooley
88). Anti-Climacus thus refers to despair both in terms of “possibility” and in terms of it
being a “misrelation”:
Despair is the misrelation in the relation of a synthesis that relates itself to
itself. But the synthesis is not the misrelation; it is merely the possibility,
or in the synthesis lies the possibility of the misrelation. If the synthesis
were the misrelation, then despair would not exist at all, then despair
would be something that lies in human nature as such. That is, it would
not be despair; it would be something that happens to a man, something he
suffers, like a disease to which he succumbs, or like death, which is
everyone’s fate. (15-16)
The paradoxical nature of despair is that it occurs dialectically between the poles of
finitude and infinitude, it occurs dialectically as a part of the self being a synthesis of the
finite and the infinite, of necessity and freedom. There is a “despair of ‘infinitude,’ in
which a person loses contact with the real world. The imagination is essential in helping
the individual deal emotionally and intellectually with the world in an insightful way. Yet
when it becomes fantastic, the individual may become distorted with respect to the
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emotions” (Watkin 64). The despair of infinitude might thus find the personality under
the sway of fantastic ideas that lack connection with the actual conditions of her
existence: “Infinitude’s despair is to lack finitude…When feeling becomes fantastic in
this way, the self becomes only more and more volatized and finally comes to be a kind
of abstract sentimentality that inhumanly belongs to no human being but inhumanly
combines sentimentally, as it were, with some abstract fate—for example, humanity in
abstracto” (The Sickness unto Death 30, 31). Kierkegaard believes that the individual
might thus flee from finitude and away from self: “The fantastic is generally that which
leads out into the infinite in such a way that it only leads him away from himself and
thereby prevents him from coming back to himself” (31). A personality under the sway
of this form of the despair of infinitude might seek refuge from self in the false comfort
of abstract ideas: “The law for the development of the self with respect to knowing,
insofar as it is the case that the self becomes itself, is that the increase of knowledge
corresponds to the increase of self-knowledge, that the more the self knows, the more it
knows itself. If this does not happen, the more knowledge increases, the more it becomes
a kind of inhuman knowledge, in the obtaining of which a person’s self is squandered,
much the way men were squandered on building pyramids, or the way men in Russian
brass bands are squandered on playing just one note, no more, no less” (31). The despair
of infinitude is thus a despair that brings with it a loss of meaningful connection with the
physical and practical circumstances of one’s existence.
Whereas infinitude’s despair is to lack finitude, “finitude’s despair is to lack
infinitude” (33). As Anti-Climacus expresses, Kierkegaard believes that the personality
under the sway of this form of despair will tend to become narrow and indifferent to
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issues that ought ideally to be of ultimate concern: “To lack infinitude is despairing
reductionism, narrowness. Of course, what is meant here is only ethical narrowness and
limitation…the secular mentality is nothing more or less than the attribution of infinite
worth to the indifferent” (33). According to Anti-Climacus, this form of despair involves
remaining indifferent to whether or not one’s individual existence might have a purpose.
Anti-Climacus includes in this form of despair an indifference to one’s individual
existence that might manifest itself in one becoming a people-pleaser: “Every human
being is primitively intended to be a self, destined to become himself, and as such every
self is certainly angular, but that only means that it is to be ground into shape, not that it
is to be ground down smooth, not that it is utterly to abandon being itself out of fear of
men” (33). In contrast to the despair of infinitude that risks losing itself in abstraction,
the despair of finitude risks losing itself in the crowd: “Surrounded by hordes of men,
absorbed in all sorts of secular matters, more and more shrewd about the ways of the
world—such a person forgets himself, forgets his name divinely understood, does not
dare to believe in himself, finds it too hazardous to be himself and far easier and safer to
be like the others, to become a copy, a number, a mass man” (33-34). Whereas
infinitude’s despair might lead the potential self to disappear into the ether of abstraction,
finitude’s despair might lead the potential self to disappear into the crowd.
Kierkegaard believes that it is God who provides the condition in which the
personality might exist with an ultimate sense of freedom between the poles of finitude
and infinitude, between the poles of necessity and freedom, and thus reach fulfillment in
truth. As Mark Dooley explains, “By refusing to accept the condition that God provides
in order that truth be realized, a misrelation in the synthesis is formed; that is, the human
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being fails to become self-reflective by relating itself to itself in the manner prescribed”
(The Politics of Exodus 88). Dooley also notes that Kierkegaard’s term for despair “the
sickness unto death” refers not to physical death, but to the “death of the ‘purely human’
self. Repetition [concrete actualization of self], as a process of being born anew to the
world, can only come into effect after such a death, or a crucifixion of human
understanding, has taken place” (88). For Kierkegaard, the phenomenon of despair
ultimately finds resolution in the individual’s repenting of the “purely human” self and
turning toward God, first in the ethical sphere (by making a qualitative leap to lead one’s
existence within a consciously-chosen ethical perspective which chooses good over evil),
then in the religious sphere (by making the qualitative leap that repents of one’s earlier
self in appealing continually to God’s grace to be freed of guilt [sin consciousness] while
choosing good over evil). This is consistent with Kierkegaard’s assertion (in the words
of Judge William) that “in relation to God, [one is] always in the wrong” (Either/Or II:
351). “The solution to the problem of despair is always, as is pointed out by both Judge
William in Either/Or and Anti-Climacus in The Sickness unto Death, is to face up to the
despair, since the attempt to evade it only leads the individual more deeply into it”
(Watkin 65). Since Kierkegaard’s ultimate concern is what it means to be a Christian in
Christendom, Kierkegaard’s answer for the problem of despair is the Incarnation of Jesus
as savior. Anti-Climacus claims that the ultimate answer to the problem of despair is
found in the “blessedness” of the Christian, which is to be reconciled to God by way of
the sacrifice of Jesus as the Christ: “The possibility of this sickness [despair] is man’s
superiority over the animal, and this superiority distinguishes him in quite another way
than does his erect walk, for it indicates infinite erectness or sublimity, that he is spirit.
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The possibility of this sickness is man’s superiority over the animal; to be aware of this
sickness is the Christian’s superiority over the natural man20; to be cured of this sickness
is the Christian’s blessedness” (The Sickness unto Death 15). Anti-Climacus’ assertion
that “to be cured of this sickness is the Christian’s blessedness” stands consistent with
Kierkegaard’s ultimate concern of what it means to be a Christian in Christendom in
since the Apostle Paul claims in his letter to the Colossians that the blessedness of the
Christian is that she or he is reconciled to God: “Once you were alienated from God and
were enemies in your minds because of your evil behavior. But now He has reconciled
you by Christ’s physical body through death to present you holy in His sight” (Colossians
1:21-22). Thus, in contrast to Hegel’s abstract concept of Christianity, Kierkegaard’s
view of Christianity situates the Absolute Paradox of the Incarnation as the key issue in
what it means to be a Christian in Christendom: In Kierkegaard’s “Christomorphic
poetics,” the incarnation of Jesus as the Christ becomes the means by which the
individual is saved from the power of despair: “The formula that describes the state of
the self when despair is completely rooted out is this: in relating itself to itself and in
willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it” (The
Sickness unto Death 14). For Kierkegaard, the problem of despair and of how one
ultimately attains reconciliation with existence finds its solution in the “blessedness” of
being delivered from despair. The ultimate possibility for concrete actualization of self,
for Kierkegaard, amounts to the Christian making an appeal to God’s grace in a
passionate act of will that involves the entire personality. Kierkegaard believes that for
the individual to move beyond despair, she or he must make the leap to faith.
20

The “natural man” (“psycho-somatic” man, in J. Preston Cole’s terminology) is in
Kierkegaard’s view confined to the aesthetic sphere of “self in the dative case.”
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Kierkegaard’s Concept of the Leap to Faith
As M. Jamie Ferreira comments in the essay “Faith and the Kierkegaardian leap,”
the phrase that is popularly associated with Kierkegaard, “the leap of faith,” is actually a
misnomer: “The popular association of the [concept of] the leap with Kierkegaard is
often couched in terms of the leap of faith. It is worthwhile, however, and interesting to
observe, that Kierkegaard never uses any Danish equivalent of the English phrase ‘leap of
faith,’ a phrase that involves circularity insofar as it seems to imply that the leap is made
by faith” (The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard 207). Even so, Ferreira notes also
that Kierkegaard, does “clearly and often” use the Danish term for “leap” [Spring], and
Kierkegaard also makes use of “the concept of a transition [Overgang] that is qualitative
[qvalitativ]” (208). Kierkegaard makes use of the concept of a qualitative transition
especially as it concerns the idea of transition to religiousness, especially to Christian
faith. Thus, Ferreira concludes: “even if the concept of a leap of (made by) faith is
foreign to the terminology of Kierkegaard, the concept of a leap to faith [Troen] remains
central to his writings” (209). The leap to faith is a qualitative transition. Further, the
qualitative transition of the leap to faith is one that occurs in the face of objective
uncertainty: “When, in his journals of 1848, he speaks of faith as ‘immediacy (or
spontaneity) after reflection,’ he makes a clear distinction between an unreflective
commitment to ideas and a faith commitment in which the believer has chosen to follow
the religious path despite full knowledge of the intellectual problems presented by
particular doctrinal statements. Initially faith lies in the certainty of one’s persistence in a
faith commitment to God, even though it is impossible to prove that God exists” (Watkin
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83). That faith occurs in the face of objective uncertainty, however, does not mean that
the individual making the leap to faith is being arbitrary or completely non-rational; it
means that one cannot arrive at the leap to faith strictly on rational grounds, one cannot
arrive at faith as an accretion of facts to which one assents by having proven them to be
true merely by means logic and reason. “Kierkegaard aims to show that faith has two
important elements: the subjective element of personal commitment to a particular path in
life, that path is indicated by the intellectual content of the idea or philosophy in question,
and the objective element presented by the content of the idea or philosophy.
Kierkegaard shows that belief in the former sense, of following a path in life, does not
necessarily follow from intellectual commitment to propositions about things, however
wholehearted the commitment to their truth” (82). As Kierkegaard remarks in a journal
entry from 1842, “If faith is regarded merely as knowledge of historical matters, one
quite consistently and simply falls into such ridiculousness as thinking that the question
whether the earth is round or flat is a matter of faith” (Journals and Papers: Volume 2:
6). And, in a journal entry from 1846, Kierkegaard also claims, “Faith is always related
to that which is not seen—in the context of nature (physically contrasted) to the invisible
[Usynlige], in the spiritual context (spiritually) to the improbable” (10). In the context of
Kierkegaard’s ultimate concern of what it means to be a Christian in Christendom, the
“improbable” finds its ultimate manifestation in the “Absolute Paradox,” the Incarnation:
“The historical [condition that is received from God and] that can be an object only for
faith and cannot be communicated by one person to another—that is, one person can
communicate it to another, but, please note, not in such a way that the other believes
it…The heart of the matter [of the absolute paradox] is the historical fact that the god has
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been in human form, and the other historical details are not as important as they would be
if the subject were a human being instead of a god” (Philosophical Fragments 103-04).
As Joel Rasmussen explains, Kierkegaard believes that one can arrive at belief in such a
paradox only by way of a “leap”:
When confronted by the absolute paradox the understanding cannot
simply ignore it because…the understanding is drawn toward what it
cannot think.21 However, because in its absolute expression the paradox
of the incarnation is a blatant contradiction—it ‘specifically unites the
contradictories’—the understanding is offended but, to think with Kant, is
an outrageous contradiction of the rules of the understanding. In order to
think, one must employ the understanding. The attempt to think a concept
that is self-contradictory is a violation of one of understanding’s
fundamental rules. Nonetheless, while the dualism of Kant’s idealism is
indeed presupposed as one of the interpretive structures of Philosophical
Fragments, the figure upon which the whole book turns—the figure of the
absolute paradox—defies Kant’s fundamental distinction. Consequently,
it is impossible to incorporate the absolute paradox within “rational faith”
as envisioned by Kant. (Between Irony and Witness 90-91)
In Kierkegaard’s view, the absolute paradox of the Incarnation cannot be explained in
terms of “rational faith” because its “historicity” cannot be explained in terms of rational
faith. As Johannes Climacus observes, the absolute paradox of the Incarnation involves
21

According to Immanuel Kant, ”Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species
of its knowledge it is burdened by questions, which as prescribed by the very nature of
reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also
not able to answer” (Critique of Pure Reason 7).
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the person exhibiting faith to “seek historical certainty for that which is absurd, because it
involves the contradiction that something which can become historical only in direct
opposition to all human reason, has become historical” (Concluding Unscientific
Postscript 189). Hence, in terms of Kierkegaard’s ultimate concern of what it means to
become a Christian in Christendom, the leap to faith is a leap to faith in the face of the
absurd, a leap to faith that occurs at the limit of rational understanding of the historical
event of the Incarnation—the Absolute Paradox. In Kierkegaard’s view, one does not
become a Christian merely by accumulating an externally imposed set of a rationally
ordered facts and details. Further, Kierkegaard also rejects the idea that Christian faith
involves a piling-up of good works in hopes of winning favor before God:
Good works in terms of meritoriousness are naturally an abomination to
God. Yet good works are required of a human being. But they shall be
and yet shall not be; they shall be and yet one ought humbly to be ignorant
of their being significant or that they are supposed to be of any
significance. Good works are something like a dish which is that
particular dish because of the way it is served—good works therefore
should be done in humility, in faith. Or it is like a child’s giving his
parents a present, purchased, however, with what the child has received
from the parents; all the pretentiousness which otherwise is associated
with giving a present disappears when the child received from the parents
the gift which he gives to the parents. (Journals and Papers: Volume 2:
10)
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As with Luther, with Kierkegaard, good works follow from—not lead to—faith, which is
seen as a gift from God (as in Ephesians 2:8). Even so, for Kierkegaard, there is also a
leap to faith—a qualitative shift—from self constituted within the “aesthetic sphere of
existence” (the psychosomatic self in the dative case) to a faith that takes shape within
the “ethical sphere,’ where one experiences that qualitative shift in relating to God
indirectly by means of what Kierkegaard calls “first ethics,” “genuine ethics” that
contain “an eternal element” in that they “transcend the community” (Watkin 78). For
Kierkegaard, the three spheres of existence—the aesthetic, the ethical, and the
religious—take shape in relation to the single individual’s making the leap to faith in
acting decisively in relation to walking on an ethical-religious path in life.

Kierkegaard’s Concept of the Aesthetic Sphere of Existence
As mentioned earlier, Kierkegaard conceives of the aesthetic sphere of existence
as the sphere of the “natural man”: the “psychosomatic self,” as J. Preston Cole’s states in
his interpretation of the “self as dative” (The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud
16-20). Another term that Kierkegaard uses in relation the aesthetic sphere is
“eudemonism,” an approach to life that sees its value merely in terms of the individual
attaining happiness in the immediate sense. “The aesthetic element in a person is…the
spontaneous and immediate character of a person as it is, un-pruned and undirected,
unless of course, like Johannes the Seducer in Either/Or, a person tries to consciously
direct his or her life solely in aesthetic categories—that is, without reference to moral
rightness of action” (Watkin 14). Kierkegaard also believes that such an attempt to live
in merely aesthetic categories is not only doomed to fail, but is also “demonic”: “For
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Kierkegaard, it is…impossible to live a purely aesthetic life in which the aesthetic itself is
the steering feature of one’s existence. Not only is the aesthete doomed to fail in his or
her attempt to eternalize what is temporal, but from the point of view of ethics, it is also a
life based unjustifiably on natural selfishness” (14). In Kierkegaard’s view, such an
attempt to live merely in terms of the what Cole refers to as the “psychosomatic self”
would amount to one’s developing a self that is missing a critical aspect of what self
might be in terms of self becoming a fully developed personality. “From the point of
view of the way the psyche is actually structured, it means one in fact operates on the
basis of only one side of the self, since the self in its proper functioning utilizes the
possibilities of the ethical and religious life” (14). Kierkegaard defines the “demonic” as
being caught up in a prison of one’s own design, and that this prison, this “inclosing
reserve” [det Indesluttede], is actually a flight from freedom. In The Concept of Anxiety,
narrative persona Vigilius Haufniensis describes the dynamic relationship between
enclosing reserve and freedom: “The demonic is unfreedom that wants to close itself off.
This, however, is and remains an impossibility. It always retains a relation, and even
when this has apparently disappeared altogether, it is nevertheless there, and anxiety at
once manifests itself in the moment of contact [with the good]” (123). For Kierkegaard,
for the aesthete to willfully choose to remain shut up within “enclosing reserve” leads, in
the end, to a loss of freedom: “The demonic is inclosing reserve [det Indesluttede] and
the unfreely disclosed. The two definitions indicate, as intended, the same thing, because
inclosing reserve is precisely the mute, and when it is to express itself, this must take
place contrary to its will, since freedom, which underlies unfreedom or is its ground, by
entering into communication with freedom from without, revolts and now betrays
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unfreedom in such a way that it is the individual who in anxiety betrays himself against
his will” (123). As Haufniensis also explains, his use of the term “inclosing reserve” is
meant to express the opposite of freedom, in the sense that freedom offers the individual
an expansive opportunity for the personality (self) to find expression in relation to the
other, whereas, “inclosing reserve’ chooses to remain shut up within itself and therefore
betrays its own possibility for expansive self-actualization in relation to the other:
“Freedom is precisely the expansive. In opposition to this, I maintain that…in an
eminent sense ‘inclosing reserve’ can be used for unfreedom. Generally, a more
metaphysical expression is used for evil, namely, the negative. The ethical expression for
it, when the effect is observed in the individual, is precisely this inclosing reserve” (12324). Haufniensis asserts that the demonic personality, by willfully clinging to an
erroneous concept of freedom (as a total lack of ethical commitment) arrives at a position
of self-betrayal: “The demonic does not close itself up with something, but closes itself
up within itself, and in this lies what is profound about existence [Tivalaerselsen],
precisely that unfreedom makes itself a prisoner. Freedom is always communicating
[communicerende] (it does not harm even to take into consideration the religious
significance of the word); unfreedom becomes more and more inclosed [indeslutte] and
does not want communication” (124). Kierkegaard’s demoniac, in a sense, remains
trapped in a hall of mirrors of his own design.
As George Bedell observes, Kierkegaard’s demoniac also shows a tendency to
become “actively destructive in an attempt to obliterate the good” (Kierkegaard and
Faulkner 50). Bedell’s observation rings true in the sense that Johannes the Seducer of
Either/Or I sees the other (the seduced) as a means to an end, as an object to be
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dominated and manipulated, and in so doing, engages in an act of destructive defiance
aligned with his rejection of the idea of the validity of marriage and the validity of a life
cast within the consciously adopted framework of ethical commitment. Thus, in reacting
to the idea of ethical commitment, Johannes the Seducer becomes both actively
destructive toward the other and actively self-destructive toward his own possibility of
becoming a self who is engaged in communicative interaction with the other.
In addition to the aesthetic sphere involving the possibility of self becoming
demonic in willfully reacting to the possibility of making the leap to faith to the ethical
sphere, Kierkegaard’s idea of the aesthetic sphere includes also the possibility of the
individual engaging in a passive distancing of self from both actuality and possibility.
“The person in the aesthetic [sphere] finds meaning for his existence outside himself”
(Kierkegaard and Faulkner 81). Aside from the pursuit of sensual pleasure and of seeing
oneself as a passive victim of external forces such as fate and bad luck, this “outside
himself” might also include creating aesthetic distance from actuality by fabricating an
abstract philosophical system such as Hegel’s.

For Kierkegaard, such a comprehensive,

abstract system tends to overlook the issue that the individual exists in a given historical
context—for Kierkegaard, “the individual cannot possibly exist in isolation from his
environment” (83). For Kierkegaard, abstract, rationalistic philosophy tends to remain
confined to the aesthetic sphere, in the sense that “life is something to be lived, not
something to be studied” (Williamson 6). Quaker scholar William Hubben summarizes
this aspect of Kierkegaard’s concept of the philosophy within the aesthetic sphere by
stating, “Existence is emphatically not a system of philosophy, or a new view taken of
life. Man’s intelligence can never remain outside the totality of life and look upon it as a
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spectator may look at something outside himself. ‘Pure thinking,’ says Kierkegaard, ‘is a
phantom.’ Man who merely contemplates a truth is apt to become a ‘traitor like Judas’”
(Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Kafka 37). Though he does not deny that
human reason has a value, Kierkegaard believes that decisive action plays the key role in
constituting a qualitative shift in self—in the personality’s awareness of both self and
self’s place in the world. Passive reflection—in and of itself—is incapable of bringing
about such a shift.

Kierkegaard’s Concept of the Ethical Sphere of Existence
Kierkegaard believes that for the individual to make the leap to faith that takes
shape within the ethical or religious possibilities that life might hold, she must with
passion and as a centered act of the personality take it upon herself to act decisively on
her own behalf in relation to casting her individual existence within an ethical
framework. As Judge William states of this initial decision in Either/Or II, it is not a
question of whether or not one values the aesthetic as enjoyment of pleasure or artistic
production; it is a matter of deciding to choose oneself and thus allowing the aesthetic to
assume its proper place within one’s existence: “In choosing itself, the personality
chooses itself ethically and absolutely excludes the esthetic22; but since he nevertheless
chooses himself and does not become another being by choosing himself, all the esthetic
returns in its relativity…The Either/Or I advance is, therefore, in a certain sense absolute,
for it is between choosing and not choosing” (177). For Kierkegaard, the qualitative
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Judge William equates the aesthetic sphere with “the indifferent,” with the individual
remaining indifferent to the choice of organizing his existence within a consciously
adopted ethical framework (177).
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shift in subjectivity that occurs from the aesthetic to the ethical —the leap to faith that
takes shape within the ethical sphere—occurs not in relation to the individual deciding
rationally upon one ethical code versus another, but in the individual deciding to decide
upon an ethical path (an ethical Either/Or) toward which one constantly strives to perfect
oneself: Judge William continues:
Since the choice is an absolute choice, the Either/Or is absolute. In
another sense, the absolute Either/Or does not make its appearance until
the choice, because now the choice between good and evil appears. I shall
not concern myself here with this choice posited in and with the first
choice; I wish only to force you to the point where the necessity of making
a choice manifests itself and therefore to consider existence under ethical
qualifications. I am no ethical rigorist, enthusiastic about a formal,
abstract freedom. If only the choice is posited, all the esthetic returns, and
you will see that only thereby does existence become beautiful, and this is
the only way a person can save his soul and win the whole world, can use
the world without misusing it. (178)
As Judge William explains, the qualitative shift in subjectivity amounts to deciding to
decide upon a walk in life that gives (either) the ethical (or the religious) a place of
ultimate concern. In doing so in relation to the ethical “Either/Or,” the personality who
makes the leap to faith that takes shape within the ethical sphere might become liberated
from a slavish relationship with the aesthetic and from a false conception of self and its
place in the world. Judge William speaks of a qualification of the aesthetic in its
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proper—re-qualified—place, not of a shunning of aesthetic pleasure in favor of a
monastic withdrawal from life.
In qualifying what constitutes the ethical sphere of existence and in differentiating
the ethical sphere from the religious sphere, Kierkegaard makes use of two distinctions
with regard to ethics (“first ethics” and “second ethics”), and two distinctions with regard
to religious life (“Religiousness A” and “Religiousness B”). “In Kierkegaard’s writings,
the ethical (det Ethiske) path is explained both in terms of how one sets about it and also
in terms of what types of ethical code can be followed” (Watkin 77). For Kierkegaard,
the person who has made the leap to faith that takes shape within the ethical sphere has
experienced a qualitative shift “from a life lived in light of what one finds pleasurable or
otherwise and one lived in light of what is right and wrong” (Watkin 77). “First ethics”
belongs to the ethical sphere in that it involves the personality freely choosing to live and
act in accordance with an ethical code that relates to God as Eternal/Infinite—“ Entirely
Other,” in the sense that “in relation to God [one] is always in the wrong” (Either/Or II:
327). The eternal and God are for Kierkegaard related in the sense that the self is capable
of transcending self by acting decisively in relation to an ethical reality that exists beyond
self and beyond the limitations of an individual existing in time: “The [decisive] moment
(Oieblikket) is an atom of time, but it can also become an atom of eternity, in the sense in
which the individual, situated in the temporal, but relating to the realm of the eternal, can
use each temporal moment in striving to develop the initial potentiality of the eternal or
spiritual self, through the ethical-religious choices she or he makes. The individual can
also have a code of ethical values that is, by virtue of its transcendence of cultural
contexts, eternally valid” (Watkin 76). Kierkegaard believes that first ethics are ethics
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that transcend time since first ethics belong to the eternal: they transcend cultural
contexts since the individual strives to understand ethics in a way that surpasses
conformity to socially imposed conventions (fitting in with the crowd). First ethics are
not imposed from without by means of intimidation and fear of punishment or by means
of thoughtless conformity to the “tradition of men” (Colossians 2:8). First ethics might
be considered a primordial ethical choice, as an “Either/Or” that no longer wills to be its
former, psychosomatic self: For the aesthete making the leap to faith that takes shape
within the ethical sphere, the “act of choosing oneself is possible…only when the rising
tide of despair brings the individual to the ‘Either/Or,’ that explosive point where he
passionately wills to be his true self and recognizes that such a wish entails the extinction
of his old, sick self” (Palmer 99). By deciding to decide upon an ethical path in life, the
individual who makes the leap to faith passes judgment upon the psychosomatic self and
thus “repenting oneself” in an act of “absolute [infinite] resignation” that results in “the
abandonment of the self with respect to the validity of one’s previous way of life”
(Watkin 78). In Either/Or II, Judge William explains this paradox of receiving a new self
in return for the old self:
The person who chooses himself ethically has himself as his task, not as a
possibility, not as a plaything for the play of his arbitrariness. Ethically he
can choose himself only if he chooses himself in continuity, and then he
has himself as a multiply defined task. He does not try to blot out or
evaporate this multiplicity; on the contrary, he repents himself firmly in it,
because this multiplicity is himself, and only by penitently immersing
himself in it can he come to himself, since he does not assume that the
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world begins with him or that he creates [skabe] himself. The latter has
been branded with contempt by language itself, for we always speak
contemptuously of a man when we say: He is putting on airs [skabe sig].
Bit in choosing himself penitently he is acting—not in the direction of
isolation but in the direction of continuity. (258)
The ethical self involves a concrete actualization of personality in the way that it differs
markedly from the aesthetic self in terms of orientation within the world. Judge William
claims that the difference between an ethical and an aesthetic individual is that the ethical
individual (acting within repetition of ethical action while seeing himself as a task within
the ethical) “knows himself, but this knowing is not merely a contemplation, for then [in
contemplation] the individual comes to be defined according to necessity. It is a
collecting of oneself, which itself is an action, and this is why I have with aforethought
used the expression ‘to choose oneself’ instead of to ‘know oneself’ [in contemplation]”
(258). In contrast to the aesthete, in contrast to the “self as dative,” the ethical self, in
making the conscious choice of self, moves beyond the tendency to view life primarily in
terms of the accidental and fate; rather, he tends to see life in terms of the authentic self
that might emerge: “When the individual knows himself, he is not finished; but this
knowing is very productive, and from this knowing emerges the authentic individual”
(258-59). This striving toward self in terms of actualizing truth is what Kierkegaard
identifies as Religiousness A. “Religiousness A…can be found in any culture” and “is
seen [by Kierkegaard] as a universal religiosity in which humans are aware of the divine
and strive to fulfill its promptings. Thus, Religiousness A might even be found in the life
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of a godly pagan23” (Watkin 212). As Johannes Climacus expresses it in Concluding
Unscientific Postscript, “Religiousness A can exist in paganism, and in Christianity it can
be the religiousness of everyone who is not decisively Christian, whether he be baptized
or no” (495). An assumption of Religiousness A is that the individual can reach God
within temporality and fulfill the ethical-religious demand through personal striving”
(Watkin 212).

The failure to reach God through personal striving, however, Judge

William, in Either/Or II, identifies with the idea of every individual being guilty before
God (“in relation to God, [one is] always in the wrong” (357). As one whose ultimate
concern is what it means to be a Christian in Christendom, Kierkegaard sees the idea of
“fulfilling the ethical-religious demand through personal striving” to be the limit24 of the
ethical sphere since what it means to be a Christian is to participate in “Religiousness B”
and in “second ethics.” For Kierkegaard, Religiousness B and second ethics involve the
individual making the leap to faith that takes shape within the religious sphere, and this
occurring at the limit of the ethical sphere means that “the individual finds it impossible
to fulfill the ethical demand and is refereed to Christ in his capacity as Savior” (Watkin
78). As Johannes Climacus states with regard to Religiousness A and Christianity,
“Religiousness A…is not the specifically Christian religiousness” because it is not “the
paradoxical religiousness” (Concluding Unscientific Postscript 493, 494). Even so,
Johannes Climacus goes on to note that Religiousness A must precede the leap to
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Socrates as represented in the dialogues of Plato arguably embodies Religiousness A in
the sense that he dedicates his life to moving in the direction of “Truth.”
24
As the Apostle Paul states with regard for the Christians need for the grace of God in
fulfilling the ethical-religious demand, “For all alike have sinned, and are deprived of the
divine splendor, and all are justified by God’s free grace alone, through his act of
liberation in the person of Christ Jesus. For God designed him to be the means of
expiating sin by his sacrificial death, effective through faith” (Romans 4:23-25).
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Religiousness B and that there is a difference in the dialectic of Religiousness A and the
dialectic of Religiousness B: “Religiousness A must first be present in the individual
before there can be any question of becoming aware of the dialectic of [Religiousness] B.
When the individual is related to an eternal happiness by the most decisive expression of
the existential pathos, then there can be question of becoming aware how the dialectic in
the second instance (secundo loco) thrusts a man down into the pathos of the absurd”
(494). The leap to faith that takes shape within the religious sphere occurs in correlation
with an “existential pathos” that is a centered act of the entire personality but that is
paradoxically brought about by God: God [as Christ] becomes the condition by which
the individual might make the leap to faith beyond the limit of the ethical sphere of
existence: As Johannes Climacus puts it, “Sin-consciousness…is the expression for the
paradoxical transformation of existence,” and “this is the consequence of the Deity’s
presence in time, which prevents the individual from relating himself backwards to the
eternal [by way of recollection], since now he comes forwards into being in order to
become eternal by relationship to the Deity in time” (517). Kierkegaard believes that
Religiousness A is initiated from within, and he believes that Religiousness B is initiated
ultimately by the Deity, who breaks into time as the Absolute Paradox. As Kierkegaard
notes in a journal regarding the limit of the ethical sphere, “The highest expression of an
ethical view of life is repentance [striving to act beyond one’s former self], and I must
always repent—but precisely this is a self-contradiction of the ethical, whereby the
paradox of the religious breaks through, that is, atonement, to which faith corresponds.
Speaking purely ethically, I must say that even the best that I can do is only sin;
consequently I will repent of it, but even then I cannot actually get around to acting,
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because I must repent” (Journals and Papers, Volume 1: 402). Thus, the limit of the
ethical for Kierkegaard is the point at which the “religious breaks through” as
“atonement” in the sense that the individual in becoming a Christian makes the leap to
faith to the religious sphere by appealing to God’s grace. In making clear this need for
the individual who would make the leap to faith that takes shape within the religious
sphere to appeal to God’s grace, Kierkegaard rests squarely in the Christological tenets of
Christian faith in answering the question of what it means to be a Christian in
Christendom.

Kierkegaard’s Concept of the Religious Sphere of Existence
The ultimate concern of Kierkegaard’s writings, the question of what it means to
be a Christian in Christendom, finds its deepest expression in Kierkegaard’s distinction of
the religious sphere of existence and the way in which it places emphasis on the Christian
way of life as a walk, not a set of logically coherent postulates. Kierkegaard emphasizes
the point that “the individual must choose the Christian way of life as an existential
venture” (Watkin 83). Whereas Religiousness A of the ethical sphere involves an
individual striving toward concrete actualization of self within the context of a primordial
choice that prefers good to evil and that acknowledges the place of at least one other
individual25, Religiousness B—which Kierkegaard identifies specifically with
Christianity—involves the individual accepting God’s grace, involves her or him
accepting that “the individual’s inability to fulfill the ethical demand requires God’s
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Religiousness B acknowledges the place of at least one other individual, as in ethical
dimension of the life-long marriage commitment mentioned by Judge William in “On the
Aesthetic Validity of Marriage” (Either/Or II ppppp)
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saving grace and forgiveness” (Watkin 79). In contrast to the abstract idea of Christianity
represented by Hegel and the Neo-Hegelians, Kierkegaard emphasizes the concrete issue
of the incarnation of Jesus as the Christ: As Julia Watkin explains, “Initially [within the
ethical sphere] faith lies in the certainty of one’s persistence within a faith commitment to
God[/the Eternal], even though it is impossible to prove that God exists. Where
Christianity is concerned, there is the added burden of the fact that personal salvation is
linked to claims made about a historical person, Jesus, of whom it is stated that he is the
eternal God now become temporal in the human life of Jesus” (83). Thus, the leap to
faith that takes shape in the religious sphere is a leap to faith that occurs in the face of
absurdity. Narrative persona Frater Taciturnus claims that such faith in the face of
absurdity is like being out upon the “seventy thousand fathoms”: “The believer lies
constantly out upon the deep with seventy thousand fathoms of water under him.
However long he may lie out there, there is no assurance that little by little he will find
himself lying upon land, stretched out at his ease” (Stages on Life’s Way 402). This faith
in the face of the absurd Kierkegaard also identifies with sin-consciousness, with the
individual responding to the sense of indebtedness to God’s grace: For Kierkegaard,
The paradox of the religious life…is that the closer a person comes to
God, the greater the sense of guilt or sinfulness and the apparent distance
from God. The individual acquires a deepened consciousness of sin. In
Christianity, the individual thus discovers, unlike the Greek [who refers to
recollection], that the eternal truth is not to be found within. For
Kierkegaard, Christianity as Religiousness B provides an amelioration in
that the striving individual is referred to the grace of God through the
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work of Christ, though the individual now has to face the intellectual
challenge presented by Christian doctrine. (Watkin 213)
Kierkegaard believes that the individual in appealing to God’s grace meets “the
intellectual challenge” of the high calling of imitating the Christian ideal as set forth in
the Gospel—the high calling of putting others before self. As Sylvia Walsh observes, for
Kierkegaard, Christ becomes the prototype for human existence:
Christ serves as the criterion and goal for human existence by being a
model for imitation (Efterfolgelse)…In Kierkegaard’s view, the relation to
the Christian ideality through imitation of Christ as paradigm is a
complex, dialectical one characterized by inversion and a need for reliance
on Christ as redeemer. In contrast to the medieval conception of the
imitation of Christ, which in Kierkegaard’s view held up Christ literally
and directly as a prototype for humanity and assumed that we could
actually achieve the ideal of resembling him, Kierkegaard maintains that
the primary function of the prototype is to teach us how greatly we are in
need of grace. (Living Poetically 237)
In referring in this manner to Christ as the prototype, Kierkegaard is likely referring to
basic Pauline theology, specifically, to the Letter of Paul to the Colossians, in which
Christ is declared to be the prototype (prototokos) for the church:
[God] rescued us from the domain of darkness and brought us away into
the kingdom of his dear Son, in whom our release is secured and our sins
forgiven. He is the image of the invisible God; his is the primacy over all
things. In him everything in heaven and on earth was created, not only
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things visible but also the invisible orders of thrones, sovereignties,
authorities, and powers: the whole universe has been created through him
and for him. And he exists before everything, and all things are held
together in him. He is, moreover, the head of the body, the church. He is
its origin, the firstborn (prototokos26) from the dead, to be in all things
alone supreme. For in him the complete being of God, by God’s own
choice, came to dwell. Through him God chose to reconcile the whole
universe to himself, making peace through the shedding of his blood upon
the cross—to reconcile all things, whether on earth or in heaven, through
him alone. (Colossians 1:13-20)
For Kierkegaard, the individual who makes the leap to faith that takes shape within the
religious sphere is both referred to and empowered by Christ as redeemer: “In
Kierkegaard’s understanding…Christ is the prototype for human existence, but not
simply or directly a prototype. Insofar as he is humanity’s redeemer, he is not in this
respect an object for imitation at all. Moreover, in his fulfillment of the ideal, Christ
stands at such an infinite distance from all human striving that all direct efforts at
resemblance fall infinitely short and are reduced to nothing” (Living Poetically 237-38).
Both second ethics and Religiousness B deal directly with Kierkegaard’s ultimate
concern: what it means to be a Christian in Christendom. Kierkegaard believes that
within the realm of second ethics and Religiousness B one ought to strive toward Christ’s
ideal of putting others before oneself, but in doing so, one is referred to God’s grace for
empowerment.

26

New Strong’s Exhaustive Biblical Concordance entry number 4416: “firstborn”
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In several journal entries, Kierkegaard elaborates upon this idea of Christ as the
prototype. In an entry from 1851, Kierkegaard speaks of the Christian’s striving toward
ethical perfection being a matter of recognizing in humility the place of grace: “…Just
because grace has been shown to me and I am reprieved, precisely in this lies the
requirement to exert myself all the more…If I were to define Christian perfection, I
should not say that it is a perfection of striving but specifically that it is the deep
recognition of the imperfection of one’s striving, and precisely because of this a deeper
and deeper consciousness of the need for grace, not grace for this or that, but the infinite
need infinitely for grace” (Journals and Papers, Volume 2: 170).

In the religious sphere

and with second ethics, the “mild altruism” of Judge William of Either/Or gives place to
”acute New testament altruism” and paradoxical affirmation of self through self-denial
(“dying to the world”) as the believer gives place in gratitude to Christ as prototokos:
“Christianity requires everything, and when you have done this, it requires that you shall
understand that you are nevertheless saved simply and solely by grace. This is divine
grace, different from the human conception of grace” (169-70). For Kierkegaard, the
individual Christian ought never to forget his indebtedness to grace: “Christianity
actually begins there where the most enthusiastic person, almost in despair over his sin,
with the most intensified zeal stands prepared to sacrifice everything—and lest his zeal
become either presumption or actual despair (presumption, as if a man had achieved
something himself; despair, that he still is achieving nothing), Christianity wants to
humble this zeal and also to bring peace, and now it says: A man is capable of nothing at
all—it is grace alone” (171). In the religious sphere, sin-consciousness (an awareness of
one’s need for grace), self-denial, and striving toward ethical perfection form the
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complex dialectic as “”despair is…rooted out” and “the self rests transparently in the
power that established it” (The Sickness unto Death 14). The paradox of both the ethical
and the religious spheres is that one strives toward the ethical while remaining in the
ethical (Watkin 79). Kierkegaard advocates a view of Christianity wherein one strives
toward perfection of self, but not in an attitude of pride over one’s accomplishments;
grace is given by God, but not as a license to sin or to give up on oneself and one’s
possibilities.
In elaborating upon faith that takes shape within the religious sphere, Kierkegaard
in persona as Johannes Climacus of Concluding Unscientific Postscript addresses the
“problem” of how to relate inwardly to Christ who actually existed before one’s time as
the historical individual Jesus of Nazareth. For Kierkegaard, inwardness comprises the
central aspect of faith in the religious sphere with regard to the individual’s subjectivity.
“The concept of inwardness is an important, indeed the central, element in Kierkegaard’s
answer to the question of what is required of subjectivity for it to grasp ‘the’ problem of
the Postscript: the subject’s relationship to Christianity” (Hannay, Kierkegaard 128).
Kierkegaard scholar Alastair Hannay explains also that inwardness as conceived by
Kierkegaard is dynamic, involving tension and conflict—it is not a passive state of
withdrawal: “The inwardness itself…is clearly a mental state involving…some form of
conflict. Indeed Kierkegaard says that it is the ‘tension of the conflict form’
(Modaestningens-Formens Spaendstighed) that is the measure of the strength of the
inwardness, and not any direct ‘outpouring’ (Udgydelse)” (126). In Concluding
Unscientific Postscript, Johannes Climacus explains in more detail the conflict and
tension to which Hannay refers—the conflict of inwardness that confronts the individual
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who has reached the limit of the ethical sphere and chooses with “infinite passion” to
make the leap to faith that takes shape within the religious sphere. Kierkegaard expresses
through the narrative persona Johannes Climacus the holy dread of one who first with
infinite passion chose the ethical over the aesthetic but who now chooses to let go of the
ethical in infinite passion in making the leap to the religious:
The ethicist had with the passion of the infinite in the moment of despair
chosen himself out of the fearful plight of having his self, his life, his
reality in aesthetic dreams, in melancholy, in concealment. Fear [dread]
from this side can therefore no more be in question; the scene is now the
ethical inwardness in an ethical individual. The new fear [dread] must be a
new determination of inwardness, whereby the individual in a higher
sphere comes back again to the point of revelation, which is the very life
of the ethical, which formerly helped to bring about a revelation (while the
aesthetic hindered), is now the hindrance, and that which helps the
individual to a higher revelation beyond the ethical is something else.
Whoever has had inwardness enough to lay hold of the ethical with
infinite passion, and to understand the eternal validity of duty and the
universal, for him there can neither in heaven or on earth or in hell be
found so fearful a plight, as when he faces a collision where the ethical
becomes the temptation. (231)
The individual making the leap to faith that takes shape within the religious sphere is
called to make the leap to the “new paradigm” in the face of objective uncertainty: “This
collision confronts everyone [who makes the leap to the religious sphere], if not
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otherwise, then through the fact that he is religiously referred to the religious paradigm;
that is to say, through the fact that the religious paradigm is an irregularity and yet is
supposed to be the paradigm (which is like God’s omnipresence being evidenced by His
invisibility, and a revelation through being a mystery). The religious paradigm expresses
not the universal but the particular (the irregular, the exceptional, as for example by
appealing to dreams, visions, and so forth), and yet it is assumed to be paradigmatical”
(231). For Kierkegaard, the “moment of decision” at the leap to the religious sphere is
one that requires “divine assistance”: “When I despair [at the limit of the ethical sphere],
I use myself to despair, and therefore I can indeed by myself despair of everything; but
when I do this, I cannot by myself come back. In this moment of decision it is that the
individual needs divine assistance, while it is quite right to say that one must first have
understood the existential relationship between the aesthetic and the ethical in order to be
at this point; that is to say, by being there in passion and inwardness one will doubtless
become aware of the religious—and of the leap” (230-31). In contrast to the leap to faith
that takes shape within the ethical sphere in which one chooses oneself, the leap to faith
that takes shape in the religious sphere “needs divine assistance.” In terms of his
ultimate concern of what it means to be a Christian in Christendom, Kierkegaard’s view
on divine assistance being necessary for the leap to the religious sphere is consistent with
the teachings of the Apostle Paul in his Letter to the Romans:
Now all of the words of the law are addressed, as we know, to those who
are within the pale of the law, so that no one may have anything to say in
self-defense27, but the whole world may be exposed to the judgment of
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God. For (again from Scripture) “no human being can be justified in the
sight of God” for having kept the law: law brings only the consciousness
of sin.
But now, quite independently of law, God’s justice has been
brought to light. The Law and prophets both bear witness to it: it is God’s
way of righting wrong, effective through faith in Christ for all who have
such faith—all, without distinction. For all alike have sinned, and are
deprived of the divine splendor, and all are justified by God’s free grace
alone, through his act of liberation in the person of Christ Jesus. For God
designed him to be a means of expiating sin through his sacrificial death,
effective through faith. (Romans 3:19-25)
For Kierkegaard, to have faith in Christ as redeemer and savior is the ultimate answer to
what it means to be a Christian in Christendom. This he identifies with religiousness B
and the Absolute Paradox of the Incarnation: “For Kierkegaard the external historical
factors of the life of Christ would be just as paradoxical for the first disciples as for those
later in history; in either case, the eternal element of Christ’s divinity must be a matter of
faith and not empirical or historical observation” (Watkin 56). Kierkegaard also speaks
of faith and the paradoxical nature of the Christ event in terms of the assertion that there
is no Christianity without “offense”:
Just as the concept "faith" is an altogether distinctively Christian term, so
in turn is "offense" an altogether distinctively Christian term relating to
faith. The possibility of offense is the crossroad, or it is like standing at
the crossroad. From the possibility of offense, one turns either to offense
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or to faith, but one never comes to faith except from the possibility of
offense.... Offense...relates to the God-man and has two forms. It is either
in relation to the loftiness that one is offended, that an individual human
being claims to be God, acts or speaks in a manner that manifests God...or
the offense is in relation to lowliness, that the one who is God is this lowly
human being, suffering as a lowly human being.... The God-man is the
paradox, absolutely the paradox. Therefore, it is altogether certain that the
understanding must come to a standstill on it. (Practice in Christianity 81)
The leap to faith that takes shape within the religious sphere concerns the Absolute
Paradox specifically in terms of Kierkegaard’s appropriation of the words of Jesus, as in
the Gospel of Luke: “Blessed is he, whosoever shall not be offended in me” (Luke 7:23).
Jesus’ words were a response to John the Baptist’s followers who asked, “Art thou he that
should come [the Messiah]? or look we for another?” (Luke 7:20). In a journal entry
from 1847, Kierkegaard also identifies the idea of the “offense” with Jesus’ suffering:
“The various occasions on which Christ himself says: Blessed is the one who is not
offended in me. These passages could be gathered together to show how Christ himself at
various points sets the possibility of offenses alongside. For example, as soon as he
speaks of his glory, he promptly adds an antidote that he must suffer, and then adds
again: Blessed is he who is not offended” (Journals and Papers, Volume 3: 365).
Kierkegaard identifies the idea of suffering and the “offense” in the sense that the person
who makes the leap to faith that takes shape within the religious sphere Kierkegaard
believes will suffer inward tension from the Absolute Paradox: “Christ is the paradox;
everything Christian is marked accordingly, or as the synthesis it is such that it is marked
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by the dialectical possibility of offense…Because of the possibility of offense,
Christianity in any case has only single individuals to deal with dialectically, for the
possibility of offense separates and isolates each one as the channel to becoming
Christian” (370, 371). The possibility of offense confronts the individual believer who
would make the leap to faith in that the Absolute Paradox and the inability to prove
logically that God exists face the one who would make the leap: “The prospective
believer already encounters the problem of not being able to prove definitely that God
exists. This is followed by the difficulty that claims concerning divinity are ascribed to a
historical person, and historical claims by their very nature are also subject to objective
uncertainty” (Watkin 182-83). Julia Watkin goes on to explain that Kierkegaard believes
that the historical person Jesus presents additional difficulties: “The matter is made
worse, however, in that Jesus of Nazareth does not resemble the human conception of
God as being a power. The historical ‘God-Man’ is the one who lived in poverty and
died as a criminal” (183). Kierkegaard sees that possibility at offense over the historical
person of Jesus as being two-fold: the first aspect of is that the ‘God-Man’ would live in
poverty and die as a criminal; the second, “more serious” aspect “is the claim that Jesus is
also the eternal God” (183). The problem presented as the dialectical tension in the walk
of faith for the believer is that she cannot communicate in strictly rational terms what it is
she believes: “The one who would believe must therefore also be able to stay with
commitment to the Christian way of life in the face of the offense caused to feeling and
reason” (183). Kierkegaard believes that the individual cannot communicate directly the
paradoxical nature of Jesus as God-Man any more than Jesus could explain to John’s
disciples who the God-Man is. The “doctrine of the God-Man is for [Kierkegaard] the
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Absolute Paradox. But the important question for Kierkegaard is the existential meaning
of this doctrinal content; the subjective significance which it has in the life of the
believer. How does the Paradox determine the mode of existence of the believer”
(Kierkegaard Studies 129)? For Kierkegaard, then, the inwardness of the individual’s
walk in the religious sphere remains crucial to the dynamic of faith.
Kierkegaard identifies this inward dialectical tension in the religious sphere with
the concept of “sin-consciousness”: the awareness given by “the Deity in time” of one’s
indebtedness to God: As Johannes Climacus puts it, “Sin-consciousness. This
consciousness is the expression for the paradoxical transformation of existence” (516).
Climacus also identifies sin-consciousness with God’s grace: “…The individual is unable
to acquire Sin-Consciousness by himself, as he can guilt-consciousness28 [within the
ethical sphere]; for in guilt-consciousness the identity of the subject with himself is
preserved, and guilt-consciousness is an alteration of the subject within the subject
himself; sin-consciousness, on the other hand, is an alteration of the very subject himself”
(Concluding Unscientific Postscript 517). For Kierkegaard, the individual is not mired in
morbid self-loathing, because the sin-consciousness amounts to humble awareness of the
need for God’s grace: “The opposite of sin is not virtue, but faith” (Watkin 71). Thus,
faith within the religious sphere becomes the means by which one is delivered from
despair. Kierkegaard’s disciple Paul Tillich refers to this type of faith as “the courage to
accept acceptance”—the courage to accept that one is accepted by God: “It is the
experience of…the acceptance of the unacceptable sinner into judging and transforming
communion with God. The courage to be in this respect is the courage to accept the

28

Awareness that “in relation to God [one] is always in the wrong” (Either/Or II: 351).
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forgiveness of sins, not as an abstract assertion but as the fundamental experience in the
encounter with God” (The Courage to Be 165). In contrast to “recollection” as a
backwards movement toward the eternal as a recalled ideal, Climacus asserts, “sinconsciousness” (as an awareness of God’s grace) creates the condition for the individual
to “come forwards into being in order to become eternal by relationship to the Deity in
time” (Concluding Unscientific Postscript 517). Consistent with his ultimate concern of
what it means to be a Christian in Christendom, Kierkegaard believes that the individual
who makes the leap to faith that takes shape within the religious sphere responds to the
Deity in time by moving in faith to embrace forgiveness and respond to the movement of
grace. As Paul Tillich states, “Self-affirmation in spite of the anxiety of guilt and
condemnation presupposes participation in something which transcends the self” (The
Courage to Be 165). Kierkegaard identifies this participation in something that
transcends the self with the Absolute Paradox: The individual “come[s] forwards in
order to become eternal by relationship to the Deity in time” (Concluding Unscientific
Postscript 517). The leap to faith that takes shape in the religious sphere is one that
occurs in the face of objective uncertainty and is made in “infinite passion.” As Paul
Tillich explains in A History of Christian Thought, “The religious stage [sphere] is
beyond both the aesthetic and the ethical and is expressed in relation to that which
interests us infinitely or which produces infinite passion…Kierkegaard makes the
following statement which gives the gist of all his philosophical and theological
authorship: ‘Truth is the objective uncertainty held fast in the most passionate experience.
This is the truth, the highest truth attainable for the existing individual.’ Here he defines
faith as well as truth, for this is just the leap [to] faith” (468, 469). For Kierkegaard, the
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leap to faith that takes shape within the religious sphere involves the individual accepting
God’s grace in infinite passion, and in this sense, it focuses on the Incarnation to address
concretely the question of what it means to be a Christian in Christendom.

Brain McHale’s Rendering of Roman Jakobson’s Concept the “Dominant”
The present study offers close readings of the four novels by examining
Kierkegaard’s concept of irony in relation to self-discovery within the context of the
three spheres of existence. Deriving from ambiguity within the texts, the study examines
individual characters and themes in terms of their relationship to Kierkegaard’s three
spheres of existence. In doing so, the study also appropriates and elaborates upon
distinctions from Brain McHale’s critical work Postmodernist Fiction.29 Specifically, the
present study occasionally appropriates as a tool McHale’s idea that when literary critics
typically refer to fiction as being either a “modernist” or “post-modernist,” they
distinguish differences in the dominant30 mode of inquiry presented by the fiction with
regard to human subjectivity. McHale believes that the concept of the “dominant” within
literature and culture can serve as a “tool for describing how one set of literary forms
emerge from a historically prior set of forms” (6). McHale derives his rendering of the
term “dominant” from Roman Jakobson, who wrote in 1939 that
the dominant may be defined as the focusing component of a work of art;
it rules, determines, and transforms the remaining components. It is the
dominant which guarantees the integrity of the structure…a poetic work
[is] a structured system, a regularly ordered hierarchical set of artistic
29

McHale, Brian. Postmodernist Fiction. New York: Routledge, 1991.
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devices. Poetic evolution is a shift in this hierarchy…The image
of…literary history substantially changes; it becomes incomparably richer
and at the same time more monolithic, more synthetic and ordered, than
were the membra disjecta of previous scholarship. (Jakobson, quoted in
Postmodernist Fiction 6)
McHale qualifies—or, “deconstructs”—Jakobson’s definition of the dominant by
agreeing that the general idea but also introducing the issue of human subjectivity:
“Different dominants emerge depending upon which questions we ask the text” (6). In a
broader sense, McHale agrees with and appropriates Jakobson’s basic distinction to assert
that what we ordinarily refer to as modernist fiction tends to emphasize—to see as being
a dominant concern—the issue of how human subjectivity knows and comprehends the
world. McHale refers to this mode of inquiry as the “epistemological dominant” (9).
Texts that exhibit an epistemological dominant present the reader with “problems in
knowing” (10). McHale cites the detective story as the “epistemological genre par
excellence” (9). In a detective story, the reader must “sift through the evidence of
witnesses of different degrees of reliability in order to reconstruct and solve a ‘crime’”
(9). To illustrate his point about modernist fiction tending to exhibit an epistemological
dominant, McHale offers as an example Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! (1936).

McHale

claims that “the semantic aspects” of Absalom, Absalom! “are organized around issues of
epistemological doubt and meta-lingual self-reflection” (8). To illustrate this, he points
out that in Absalom, Absalom!, “the story of the Sutpen family comes down to Quentin
Compson and his roommate Shreve in a state of radical incompleteness and
indefiniteness—‘a few old mouth-to-mouth tales,’ as Quentin’s father says, ‘letters
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without salutation or signature’—its indefiniteness only heightened by the successive
interpretations imposed upon it by biased or under-informed or otherwise unreliable
informants (Mr. Compson, Miss Rosa Coldfield, ultimately Thomas Sutpen himself)” (8).
As with the reader of a detective story, the reader of Absalom, Absalom! faces a text that
represents “problems in knowing.” The text tends to “simulate for the reader the very
same problems of accessibility, reliability, and limitation of knowledge that plague
Quentin and Shreve” (10). As with the detective story, the dominant of modernist fiction
such as Absalom, Absalom! presents the reader with a riddle to solve.
In contrast, with postmodernist fiction, the reader faces a text that represents not
problems in knowing, but “problems in modes of being” (10). McHale designates this
phenomenon as the “ontological31 dominant of postmodernist fiction” (10). To illustrate
his point, McHale offers the example of the science fiction story—the “ontological genre
par excellence” (16): “Science fiction, we might say, is to postmodernism what detective
fiction was to modernism: it is the ontological genre par excellence (as the detective story
is the epistemological genre par excellence), and so serves as a source of materials and
models for postmodernist writers (including William Burroughs, Kurt Vonnegut, Italo
Calvino, Pynchon, even Beckett and Nabokov)” (16). Like science fiction,
postmodernist fiction tends to take shape within the context of a dominant concern that
asks the question “what type of world is this?” McHale claims that “postmodernist

31

Ontology is the mode of philosophical inquiry that attempts to present a systematic
account of existence. It asks the question, “What is the nature of things (phenomena) as
they exist?” Whereas epistemology strives to better understand how one understands per
se (it deals with the limits of reason), ontology strives to better understand the conditions
of existence. The two modes of inquiry are not mutually exclusive—one will always
contain an element of the other—, and it is a matter of emphasis as to whether the inquiry
in question is to be considered either epistemological or ontological.
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fiction differs from modernist fiction just as a poetics dominated by ontological issues
differs from one dominated by epistemological issues” (xii).
In order to elaborate upon subjectivity and the narrative voices of the four novels,
the present study employs Brian McHale’s distinction between the epistemological
dominant of modernist fiction and the ontological dominant of post-modernist fiction.
McHale’s distinction between the dominant of modernist fiction and the dominant of
post-modernist fiction provides a useful tool for discussing shifts in narrative voices
within the novels. More specifically, the present study applies McHale’s distinction as a
tool for analyzing the qualitative shift in subjectivity that occurs from the aesthetic sphere
to the ethical sphere and from the ethical sphere to the religious sphere. McHale’s
distinction thus serves as a point of reference for discussing how shifts in subjectivity
find expression in the narrative voices of the novels. Since Kierkegaard’s theory sets
forth the view that there are qualitative shifts in the individual’s subjectivity from one
sphere of existence to the next, McHale’s distinction regarding the qualitative shift in
narrative voice from modernist to postmodernist fiction provides a scaffold from which to
make points regarding subjectivity and narrative voice.
The following diagram (Figure 1) represents visually a synopsis of McHale’s
rendering of Jakobson’s term the dominant as McHale applies it to modernist fiction and
postmodernist fiction:
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Figure 1. McHale’s Rendering of Jakobson’s Term the Dominant
dominant
|
modernist fiction
epistemological
(presents problems in knowing)
|
genre par excellence: detective story
|

postmodernist fiction
ontological
(presents problems in modes of being)
|
genre par excellence: science fiction
|

sample queries: ‘How can I interpret
this world of which I am a part?
And what am I in it32?’

sample queries: ‘Which world is this?’
‘What is to be done in it?’ ‘Which of my
selves will do it33?’

‘What is there to be known34?’

‘What is a world35?’

‘How is knowledge transmitted
from one knower to another37?’

‘What kinds of world are there36?’

‘How does the object of knowledge
change as it passes from knower
to knower38?’

‘What is the mode of existence of a text,
and what is the mode of existence of the
world (or worlds) it projects39?’

‘What are the limits of the
knowable41?’

‘How is a projected world structured40?’

The present study applies McHale’s distinction the epistemological dominant versus the
ontological dominant, as a tool for analyzing narrative voice with regard to subjectivity.
32

(Dick Higgins, A Dialectic of the Centuries, quoted in McHale 9)
(McHale 10)
34
(McHale 9)
35
(McHale 10)
36
(McHale 10)
37
(McHale 9)
38
(McHale 9)
39
(McHale 10)
40
(McHale 10)
41
(McHale 9)
33
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The close readings of the novels take shape systematically within the context of
subjectivity progressing through the three spheres of existence, and McHale’s distinction
proves useful occasionally as a point of departure for discussing subjectivity as it
concerns shifts in narrative voices in the novels. The last chapter then simply
appropriates metaphors from the close readings of novels to engage in analysis the three
spheres of existence as they might relate to scholarship and pedagogy.

Overview of the Present Study’s Methodology
Before beginning my readings of the novels, it is important to note that the
movement of the argument in the four chapters treating the novels follows a progressive
pattern from the aesthetic sphere, to the ethical sphere, to the religious sphere. The
argument thus moves progressively through what Kierkegaard considers the “stages on
life’s way. “ The pattern of organization functions as a parallel structure, to guide the
reader’s progression through the close readings of the novels.
***
In focusing on the three spheres of existence and subjectivity, the present study
also incorporates the idea of indirect communication; I treat indirect communication in
relation to both Kierkegaard’s theory and the narrative voices of the four novels under
consideration. Kierkegaard models himself after the Socrates of the dialogues of Plato by
using indirection to encourage individuals toward inquiry into truth, employing
experimental narrative voices that suit the occasion of the message itself42. As with

42

In Kierkegaard’s Either/Or, the voice of the aesthetic sphere, as represented by the
narrative of “The Seducer’s Diary,” is fastidious and restless and fawns over minute
details while remaining ethically remote from life. In contrast, Judge William
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Socrates in the dialogues of Plato, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous voices become the
occasion for the reader to arrive at self-discovery by means of indirect communication.
Because they also employ experimental narrative voices43 and irony as a means of
indirect communication, The Great Gatsby, The Sun Also Rises, Mrs. Dalloway, and
Ulysses offer a suitable occasion to elaborate upon Kierkegaard’s distinctions on
subjective truth and on irony within the context of the three spheres of existence. The
last chapter appropriates metaphors from the close readings of the novels to illustrate how
the three spheres of existence influence contemporary scholarship and pedagogy. In
addition to appropriating metaphors from the close readings of the four novels, the last
chapter also incorporates ideas from Paul Tillich, Parker J. Palmer, and Paulo Friere to
contextualize the three spheres of existence as they occur in contemporary scholarship
and pedagogy. The argument thus closes by applying Kierkegaard’s theory of the three
spheres of existence to the world of scholarship and pedagogy in a way that encourages
open-ended inquiry after the fashion of Kierkegaard’s notion that “truth is subjectivity.”
Even so, it ought to be noted also that the Christian assumptions of Kierkegaard’s theory
do not receive “evangelical” treatment in this study. Rather, these assumptions are
sometimes secularized in the same sense that Paul Tillich and Nicolas Berdyaev
sometimes secularize their existential theology in discussing religion and culture.
***
With regard to the broader issues of methodology, the philosophical/theological
assumptions and assertions underlying the present study are as follows: Life indeed
(Either/Or’s “voice” of the ethical sphere) shows a clear mind for organizing details and
is direct, forthright.
43
The narrative voices of the four novels sometimes resemble Kierkegaard’s
experimental narrative “voices” in Either/Or and the other pseudonymous works.
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means something, and the single individual’s perspective of faith is the ultimate defining
issue in one realizing life’s meaning. And, though there have been recent trends toward
nihilism and atheistic socialism in literary studies, philosophy, and theology that might
contradict the view presented in the present study, an author still has a right to offer a
perspective on literature that formulates itself within the context of a Christian faith,
without having to accomplish the impossible and justify that perspective of faith purely
by way of logic and reason. Although it is not evangelical in the strict sense of the term,
the present study moves from a point-of-view that assumes the Judaeo-Christian
perspective to be an important perspective. Even so, the study is not designed to bring
offense or to dismiss as altogether irrelevant the perspectives of other scholars who might
offer varying points-of-view on the same issue.
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CHAPTER 2
THE GREAT GATSBY
AND
KIERKEGAARD’S THREE SPHERES OF EXISTENCE
“Fitzgerald draws a wonderful portrait of his age, but his work is much more than just
that…F Scott Fitzgerald should be remembered and valued most for the ‘how’ of his
fiction, rather than the ‘what’ of it, namely his style is what makes him exceptional, not
his subject matter” (“The Fiction of F. Scott Fitzgerald: A Conference with Professor
Jackson Bryer”).

A Brief Overview of Relevant Criticism
For the scholar interested in studies that treat issues relevant to Fitzgerald’s The
Great Gatsby—narrative style, irony, critical reception, or research tools—the following
works might prove valuable:
Studies in style, irony, and narrative voice that might prove useful include
Richard Lehan’s F. Scott Fitzgerald and the Craft of Fiction (Southern Illinois University
Press, 1966), James Miller’s F. Scott Fitzgerald: His Art and His Technique (University
of Michigan Press, 1965), John Whitley’s F. Scott Fitzgerald: The Great Gatsby (Arnold
Press, 1976), Jackson Bryer’s F. Scott Fitzgerald: New Perspectives (University of
Georgia Press, 2000), Matthew Bruccoli’s New Essays on The Great Gatsby (Cambridge
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University Press, 1985), and Stephen Matterson’s The Great Gatsby and the Critics
(Macmillan, 1990).
Scholars searching for reference guides for Fitzgerald and The Great Gatsby
might consult Mary Jo Tate’s F. Scott Fitzgerald A to Z: The Essential Reference to His
Life and Work (New York: Facts on File, 1998), Matthew Bruccoli’s F. Scott Fitzgerald’s
The Great Gatsby: A Literary Reference, and Matthew Bruccoli’s video recording
Reading F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby (Detroit: Omnigraphics, 1988), which
also includes a lecture guide by Thomas Jackson Rice.
Scholars studying the personal relationship and influence between Fitzgerald and
Hemingway might consult William Goldhurst’s F. Scott Fitzgerald and his
Contemporaries (New York: World Publishing, 1963), Matthew Bruccoli’s F. Scott
Fitzgerald: A Life in Letters (New York: Scribner’s, 1995), Matthew Bruccoli’s Some
Sort of Epic Grandeur: The Life of F. Scott Fitzgerald (University of South Carolina
Press, 2002), or Carlos Baker’s Ernest Hemingway: A Life Story (New York: Bantam,
1970).
A Close Reading of the Novel
Of the four novels considered in the present study, The Great Gatsby arguably
offers the most straightforward point-of-departure for this study. This is largely because
the novel unfolds within an elegantly designed and simple story, and because the
characters—Nick, Gatsby, Daisy, Tom, Myrtle, and Wilson—present a fairly
straightforward opportunity to explain more clearly of how Kierkegaard conceives of the
three spheres of existence as taking shape in relation to despair. Further, Nick’s role as
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“unreliable narrator” offers an opportunity to elaborate upon Kierkegaard’s concept of
irony as indirect communication.
Nick Carraway, as “unreliable narrator,” presents the opportunity to expound
upon Kierkegaard’s notion of the shortcomings of German romantic irony, which
Kierkegaard feels identify romantic irony with despair that takes shape within the
aesthetic sphere. Nick is unreliable in the sense that, in him, Fitzgerald renders a
narrative persona through whom the story takes shape, and who also tends to present a
romanticized version of Jay Gatsby in comparison to his treatment of other characters
such as Jordan Baker and Daisy Buchanan. Nick tells the story as if it were in
recollection, and in doing so, Nick tends to romanticize44 Jay Gatsby—the principal
character, who ends up victim of his own misguided dream. Nick’s tendency to
romanticize Gatsby manifests itself early in the novel: In introducing Gatsby,
immediately after claiming that Gatsby “represented everything for which [Nick has] an
unaffected scorn, “ Nick observes still that “there was something gorgeous about him,
some heightened sensitivity to the promises of life, as if he were related to one of those
intricate machines that register earthquakes ten thousand miles away” (6). In the course
of two sentences, then, Nick expresses that he is both repelled by and drawn toward
Gatsby. This resembles the German Romantic ironist’s tendency to cast his subject
matter within polar opposites, to cast subject matter as “a consistent alternation of
affirmation and negation, of exuberant emergence from oneself and self-critical retreat
into oneself, of enthusiasm and skepticism” (The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry
44

Nick’s sarcastic pose creates aesthetic distance and resembles German Romantic irony
in the way that Nick ignores historical actuality in favor of an interpretation of events that
idealizes Gatsby as the victim of the wrong dream. “Historical actuality...is negated in
order to make room for a self-created actuality” (Concept of Irony 275).
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and Poetics 634). Nick’s narrative bias arises, arguably, from Fitzgerald recognizing
that a narrator would likely express sympathy toward one who was earlier murdered.
Even so, the first chapter and last chapter of the novel beginning with reference to
memory provide a framing device for the story by bringing to light the importance of
“memory as a trope”—memory as an important rhetorical figure45: At the opening of the
last chapter, memory as a trope establishes the context for the close of the novel: “After
two years I remember the rest of that day, and that night and the next day, only as an
endless drill of police and photographers and newspaper men in and out of Gatsby’s front
door” (171). Nick’s recalling yet another instance of those around Gatsby failing to
perceive the “true” Gatsby46 betrays Nick’s own inability to decipher the “truth” about
Gatsby. Beyond the natural inclination of memory to bend things in the direction of
convenient “truth,” Nick’s persona, in a manner similar to Kierkegaard’s young aesthete
in Either/Or47, chooses to emphasize and deemphasize events and character traits that suit
the purposes of his cynical world view—a world view that, in Kierkegaardian terms, uses
irony as existence stance to escape engaging with life in a meaningful way. For
Kierkegaard, “irony as existence stance” is distinct from “irony as a tool” of discourse:
Socrates of the dialogues of Plato represents for Kierkegaard the positive form of irony as

45

Sipiora, Phillip. ENG 7939 “Hemingway-Fitzgerald” class lecture notes. University of
South Florida, Fall 1995
46
The partygoers in Chapter 4 offer various theories as to who Gatsby really is and how
he got his money, but none of them seems interested in him as anything other than a topic
of idle gossip—possibly a “bootlegger,” perhaps a murderer, or maybe even “second
cousin to the devil” (65). The last of these reputed theories is arguably merely a
reflection of Nick’s sarcasm and thus reveals his disdain for the partygoers and their
theorizing.
47
In a sense, Nick assumes a narrative persona similar to the young aesthete in Either/Or
II whom Judge William claims has “hardened” his “mind to interpret all existence in
esthetic categories” (233).
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existence stance in that Socrates makes himself into an extreme negative (one who claims
to know nothing) in order to bring about a positive: the quest for truth on the part of the
auditors of his ironic stance. In contrast, German Romantic irony (as represented by
Schlegel and his protégés) represents for Kierkegaard the negative form of irony as
existence stance in that Kierkegaard believes that the German Romantic ironist errs by
adopting irony as existence stance in a way that “all of historical actuality...is negated in
order to make room for a self-created actuality” (Concept of Irony 275). German
romantic irony is for Kierkegaard a flight from historical actuality into a self-created
dream world—a self-created dream world where historical actuality is displaced by what
Kierkegaard believes is “exaggerated subjectivity” (275). Kierkegaard believes that by
using the power of imagination negatively to reside in a self-created world, the romantic
ironist takes flight from the circumstances of life into the world of imagination.
Kierkegaard sees a need for a balance between imagination and historical actuality:
“Actuality (historical actuality) stands in a twofold relation to the subject: partly as a gift
that refuses to be rejected, partly as a task that wants to be fulfilled…When actuality
offers itself partly as a gift, the individual’s relation to a past is implied. This past will
now claim validity for the individual and will not be overlooked or ignored” (The
Concept of Irony 276, 277). In a sense, Nick Carraway, by adopting a cynical stance,
resembles Kierkegaard’s romantic ironist who reshapes the past by way of “exaggerated
subjectivity.”
Kierkegaard’s concept of romantic irony as existence stance arguably finds its
clearest parallel in The Great Gatsby when Nick talks of his past and his motivations.
For example, when he describes his past and his reason for choosing his career, a sarcasm
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that parallels Kierkegaard’s notion of romantic irony’s “exaggerated subjectivity” creates
distance between Nick and the ethical sphere—the sphere where one might choose
oneself consciously and one might thus use imagination to set life before oneself as a task
and consequently shape goals and responsibilities in relation to others. Nick, however,
acts as one who is headed in the opposite direction; Nick projects a cynical stance in
interpreting his past:
I graduated from New Haven in 1915, just a quarter of a century after my
father, and a little later I participated in that delayed Teutonic migration
known as the Great War. I enjoyed the counter-raid so thoroughly that I
came back restless. Instead of being the warm center of the world, the
middle-west now seemed like that ragged edge of the universe—so I
decided to go east and learn the bond business. Everybody I knew was in
the bond business, so I presumed it could support one more single man.
(7)
Nick’s cynical perspective toward his past is one that parallels Kierkegaard’s notion of
how romantic irony as existence stance can create distance from historical actuality, and
Nick’s apparent avoidance of the possibility of ethical responsibility in plotting a course
in life brings into light the alienation that many young men experienced in the wake of
the Great War. Nick’s detached attitude in relation to his family history and his
nonchalance in choosing a career that many would consider an opportunity for prosperity
arguably resemble the romantic ironist’s tendency to cast life within the context of a
general malaise. Kierkegaard claims that the romantic ironist resorts to “exaggerated
subjectivity”—to “subjectivity raised to the second power” and thus negates “historical
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actuality…in order to make room for a self-created actuality” (The Concept of Irony 275).
Nick acts as one who has lost the courage of self-affirmation which Kierkegaard’s
disciple Paul Tillich considers to be a critical element of faith: “Courage as an element of
faith is the daring self-affirmation of one’s being in spite of the powers of ‘non-being’
which are the heritage of everything finite. Where there is daring and courage there is the
possibility of failure” (Dynamics of Faith 17). Nick does not act as one who finds selfaffirmation through courage in the face of “non-being.” Instead, Nick behaves as one
who has fallen under the sway of alienation in the face of his experiences in “the Great
War.” He thus resembles one who retreats from faith, into “self-seclusion,”
Kierkegaard’s “concept of the demonic” (Tillich, A History of Christian Thought 466).
Nick acts as if he were using cynicism to brace himself against the world and thus, in
Kierkegaardian terms, conducts himself as one who retreats from the possibility of
making a leap to faith that might take shape within the ethical sphere. Like the Romantic
ironist whom Kierkegaard criticizes for living a dream world, by ultimately arriving at
romanticized interpretation of both Gatsby and life in the “haunted East…distorted
beyond [Nick’s] eyes’ power of correction” (185). Nick conducts himself as if he were
retreating into a world of “poetic arbitrariness,” where “all existence becomes mere
sport” (The Concept of Irony 317). Although he claims to be “one of the few honest
persons [he] has ever known” (64), his cynical pose in arriving at a hasty conclusion
about the general dishonesty of the world might be interpreted as being a means of escape
by which he could avoid engaging fully with actuality. He resembles the individual who
lies to himself about the true nature of society in order to avoid responsibility for his own
actions, one who in exaggerated subjectivity accuses the world of corruption and
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dishonesty can thereby avoid responsibility for engaging meaningfully with the actual
conditions of the world around him. “It's no secret that a liar won't believe anyone
else48.” For Kierkegaard, “the individual always has some freedom [to respond to his
environment and historical context], and this element of having freedom or choice is
linked to the individual’s potentiality for a spiritual existence. The ethical-religious
person is…one who is attempting to fulfill the potentiality that lay in the initially given
self. The aesthete or pleasure seeker, on the other hand, is one who remains living a halflife based solely on the initially given synthesis of body and psyche49 and is governed by
the emotions rather than by will” (Watkin 231). Nick, in adopting a cynical pose with
regard the general dishonesty of the world and the “haunted East,” behaves in a manner
similar to the aesthete who unconsciously avoids the potential of making a leap to ethicalreligious way of being.
Another occasion in which Nick resembles the aesthete who retreats from the
possibility of a leap to faith to the ethical sphere occurs in his relationship to Jordan
Baker. In describing his first impression of her, Nick conducts himself as one who
would create aesthetic distance from his existence in the way that he presents her as a
visual curiosity—in the way that he presents her more as an object than as a person:
I looked at Miss Baker wondering what it was she “got done.” I enjoyed
looking at her. She was a slender, small-breasted girl with an erect
carriage that she accentuated by throwing her body backward at the
shoulders like a young cadet. Her grey sun-strained eyes looked back at
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U2, “The Fly,” from the album Achtung, Baby (Island Records, 1991)
The “initially given synthesis of body and psyche” that J. Preston Cole refers to as the
“psychosomatic self” (The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud 63).
49

85
me with polite reciprocal curiosity out of a wan, charming discontented
face. It occurred to me now that I had seen her, or a picture of her,
somewhere before. (15)
Nick’s relationship to her progresses little beyond this initial curiosity and his finding her
entertaining—someone with whom he might pass the time. Nick initially half-remembers
her being involved in a controversy of some sort associated with her “sporting life at
Asheville and Hot Springs and Palm Beach” but claims that “what it was [he] had
forgotten long ago” (23). Later, he reveals that this controversy was that she allegedly
cheated in her first golf tournament, that there were rumors “that she had moved her ball
from a bad lie in the semi-final round” (62). Although she is reputed to be of
questionable character—perhaps even a compulsive liar—Nick offers no direct
explanation as to why he ultimately rejects her. He merely rationalizes their relationship
as being part of his failure in the “haunted East” and states that “there was one thing to be
done before I left, an awkward, unpleasant thing that perhaps had been better left alone.
But I wanted to leave things in order and not just trust that obliging and indifferent sea to
sweep my refuse away. I saw Jordan Baker and talked over and around what had
happened to us together and what had happened to me afterward, and she lay perfectly
still listening in a big chair” (185). Instead of conducting himself as one might within the
ethical sphere by confronting her on what he suspects is a lie—her claim that she is now
“engaged to another man”—Nick meets her lie with a lie of his own, “[pretending] to be
surprised” (185). Similarly, earlier in the novel, when confronting the issue of her flawed
character, he again rationalizes things by overlooking them:
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She was incurably dishonest. She wasn’t able to endure being at a
disadvantage, and given this unwillingness I suppose had begun dealing in
subterfuges when she was very young in order to keep that cool insolent
smile turned to the world and yet satisfy the demands of her hard jaunty
body.
It made no difference to me. Dishonesty in a woman is a thing you
never blame deeply—I was casually sorry50, and then I forgot. (63)
Nick’s actions in relation to Jordan Baker resemble those of the individual who remains
confined to the aesthetic sphere, the sphere of immediacy and self-interest, the sphere of
abstraction and distant reflection—of rationalized distance from decisive action. “The
characteristic of the aesthetic stage [sphere] is the lack of involvement, detachment from
existence” (Tillich, A History of Christian Thought 465). Nick’s detachment from
Jordan, his seeing her as an object of “curiosity” (15, 62) arguably places him in a
situation similar to that of the individual who exempts himself from making the leap to
faith that might take shape within the ethical sphere, the sphere in which “the attitude of
detachment is impossible” (Tillich, A History of Christian Thought 466). Nick’s
assertions with regard to his feelings for Jordan Baker are suspect in that were he truly
“angry, and half in love with her, and tremendously sorry,” he would arguably not “[turn]
away” (186); a person in such a situation, rather than retreat into a rationalization, would
more likely confront the beloved about the lies and thus allow the possibility of escaping
detachment and isolation. If he were, in fact, truly “half in love with her,” in turning
away from her, would he not also be turning away from himself—turning away from the
50

That she had “left a borrowed car out in the rain with the top down, and then lied about
it” (62).
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possibility of leading a life of commitment and responsibility in relation to one he loves?
According to Kierkegaard, the individual who remains confined to the aesthetic sphere
tends to see ethical commitment—“choosing oneself” with existential passion in relation
to another individual—as a loss of freedom. Judge William, in Either/Or II, addresses
the young aesthete on this issue by encouraging him to “choose himself” within the
context of the ethical sphere by loving another in existential sincerity. Judge William
uses his own marriage as an example by which he might encourage the young aesthete:
“there is one thing for which I thank God with my whole soul, and that is that [my wife]
is the only one I have ever loved, the first, and there is one thing for which I pray to God
with my whole heart, the he will give me strength never to want to love any other. This
is a family devotion, in which she shares, because every feeling, every mood, gains
higher meaning for me by having her share in it” (Either/Or II: 9). Judge William thus
explains how the personality might be deepened by decisive and concrete action within
the ethical sphere. In contrast, Nick Carraway, in explaining his attraction-to-butambivalence-toward Jordan Baker, arguably acts as one who rationalizes his actions
while turning away from the possibility of love. Ironically, in accusing her of dishonesty
Nick is not being honest with himself.
Jay Gatsby most dramatically represents a life of detachment and isolation—a life
confined largely to the aesthetic sphere. In fabricating a life that is merely a reaction to
earlier failures51, he resembles the aesthete, by effectively detaching himself from both
the present and the future—from both actuality and possibility. This aesthetic
detachment finds symbolic representation in Gatsby’s carefully staged parties, parties at
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which he remains detached and the guests speculate wildly at his “true” identity (52-54).
James Gatz, the young man from Minnesota (175), creates a life that takes shape in
reaction to two events—in reaction to betrayal by heirs of his mentor, Dan Cody, (heirs
who cheated “Jimmy” out of his portion of Dan Cody’s fortune) (107) and in reaction to
“the Great War’s” calling him, the “young soldier,” to go “overseas” (88), away from
Daisy, the “first ‘nice’ girl he had ever known” (155).
The life that “Jimmy-Gatz-turned-Jay-Gatsby” creates in reaction to these two
events resembles the world of the romantic ironist who ‘lives in a dream world…His fault
is that he seeks content for his existence in the dreams which are his only actuality; he is
never satisfied and cannot be’ (The Phenomenology of Moods in Kierkegaard 10).
Gatsby’s lack of satisfaction, his restlessness in reaction to the past and in reaction to a
failure to connect meaningfully with the present, takes symbolic shape in three ways:
The first is a restless fidgeting: “He was never quite still; there was always a tapping foot
somewhere or an impatient opening and closing of a hand” (68). The second is his
insecurity over the impact that his carefully crafted dream world might have upon Daisy:
“He wants her to see his house” (84). And, when she does see the house, Nick, as
narrator, claims that Gatsby “hadn’t once ceased looking at Daisy” and that it seemed he
“revalued everything in his house according to the measure of response it drew from her
well-loved eyes. Sometimes, too, he stared around at his possessions in a dazed way as
though in her actual and astounding presence none of it was any longer real” (96-97).
The third and arguably most important symbol in relation to Gatsby’s lack of satisfaction
is his “deification” of the green light at the end of Daisy’s dock. At his first sighting of a
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person he presumes to be Gatsby, Nick, as narrator, waxes poetic in observing Gatsby’s
“worshipping” the green light:
I decided to call to him. Miss Baker had mentioned him at dinner, and
that would do for an introduction. But I didn’t call to him for he gave a
sudden intimation that he was content to be alone—he stretched out his
arms toward the dark water in a curious way, and far as I was from him I
could have sworn that he was trembling. Involuntarily I glanced
seaward—and distinguished nothing except a single green light, minute
and far away, that might have been the end of a dock. When I looked once
more for Gatsby he had vanished, and I was alone again in the unquiet
darkness. (25-26)
By having him disappear mysteriously into darkness, Nick mythologizes Gatsby and his
reverence for the green light. Here, Fitzgerald arguably uses indirect communication (via
Nick’s romantic sensibility) to establish the idolatrously elevated character of Gatsby’s
vision of Daisy and her world. In idealizing Daisy, Gatsby acts as a slave to his romantic
vision of her, as one who unwittingly from within the aesthetic sphere projects his
alienation upon the physical world. As Kierkegaard’s disciple Nicolas Berdyaev
osbserves, “The world of slavery is the world of spirit which is alienated from itself.
Exteriorization is the source of slavery, whereas freedom is interiorization52. Slavery
always indicates alienation, the ejection of human nature into the external” (Slavery and
Freedom 60). The world of the aesthetic sphere extended beyond the innocence of youth
might ultimately become a world of immediacy that reflects alienation over trying to find
52
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meaning in relation to material possessions. Kierkegaard believes that within the ethical
and the religious spheres, life is set before one as a task, and the task is to know oneself:
“the task of life is to become subjective” (Concluding Unscientific Postscript 151).
Seeking meaning for life in material possessions Kierkegaard relegates to despair within
the aesthetic sphere: “the man of immediacy does not know himself, he quite literally
identifies himself only be the clothes he wears, he identifies having a self with
externalities” (The Sickness unto Death 53). In a journal entry, Kierkegaard identifies
responsibility and fullness of life with the individual abandoning the quest to find
meaning in externalities: “After the individual has given up every effort to find himself
outside himself in existence, in relation to his surroundings, and when after that
shipwreck he turns toward the highest things, the absolute, coming after such emptiness,
not only bursts upon him in all its fullness, but also in the responsibility which he feels he
has” (A Kierkegaard Anthology 13). The green light arguably symbolizes Gatsby’s
“shipwreck”—his failure to find satisfaction in the “exteriorized” world that he has built
in reaction to his earlier failures.
More specifically, later in the novel, when Gatsby sees Daisy for the first time
after their five-year hiatus and gives her a tour of all of the material possessions he has
accumulated, once the awkward formalities are completed, Gatsby remarks to her, “You
always have a green light that burns all night at the end of your dock” (98). Gatsby’s
reference to the green light arguably identifies his earlier worshipping of the light with
his romantically elevated vision of the life he might have had with Daisy—with the
idyllic life he hopes yet to have but which seems distant and unattainable. His attempts
to attain that dream, however, have amounted primarily to an accumulation of material
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possessions with which he hopes to impress Daisy. In this sense, Gatsby acts in manner
similar to the “man of immediacy” who within the aesthetic sphere distances himself
from both the actual and the possible by identifying himself with externalities.
At the close of the novel, Fitzgerald, using Nick as narrator—via indirect
communication—arguably appropriates the green light as a symbol also for the ultimate
failure of Romanticism—the failure of the world of “subjectivity raised to the second
power”:
Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgastic future that year by year
recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that’s no matter—tomorrow we
will run faster, stretch out our arms farther…. And one fine morning—
So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly
into the past. (189)
Gatsby’s romanticized dream drawn from an idealized past runs tragically aground when
it meets with the actuality that Daisy and Tom turn out to be scoundrels. In the face of
the threat that Daisy might be implicated in the crimes of hit-and-run and manslaughter,
they conspire to betray Gatsby so that they might remain insulated within their world of
wealth and carelessness:
Daisy and Tom were sitting opposite one another at the kitchen table with
a plate of cold fried chicken between them and two bottles of ale. He was
taking intently across the table at her and in his earnestness his hand fallen
upon and covered her own. Once in a while she looked up at him and
nodded in agreement.
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They weren’t happy, and neither of them had touched the chicken
or the ale—and yet they weren’t unhappy either. There was an
unmistakable air of natural intimacy about the picture and anybody would
have said that they were conspiring together. (152-153)
Though the “madman” Wilson is ultimately responsible for Gatsby’s murder (169), Tom
and Daisy are by no means innocent. Gatsby’s dream world collapses when it meets with
the actuality of cruelty, self-interest, and a misdirected bullet.
***
In The Great Gatsby, Kierkegaard’s concept of the ethical sphere of existence is
most notable for its absence—not its presence—and this is arguably due the concerns of
the author and his use of indirect communication to render characters who find
themselves alienated in the modern world. Nick (as both character and narrator), Jordan
Baker, Tom, Daisy, Myrtle, and Wilson, though they all arguably act in ways that remain
confined to the aesthetic sphere, relate also to the ethical, since in some ways represent
inversions of the decisive choosing of oneself that Kierkegaard identifies with the ethical
sphere of existence.
Like the personality confined to the aesthetic sphere, Nick lacks the decisiveness
to “choose himself” within the ethical sphere: he drifts about in life and resorts to
cynicism to distance him from the ethical sphere of commitment and responsibility. In
contrast to Nick’s detached—almost voyeuristic—relationship to those around him
(including Gatsby), for the person who exists “in the ethical [sphere], love overcomes
isolation and generates responsibility” (Tillich, A History of Christian Thought 466).
Nick also serves as an inversion of the ethical sphere in that Nick’s arranging for
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Gatsby’s funeral (172), the one clear instance of Nick acting within what appears to be an
ethical framework, is tainted by Nick’s adversarial attitude toward “the whole damn
bunch” of Gatsby’s associates (162). Rather than claiming to come to Gatsby’s aid out of
love or deep concern in seeing to a friend’s affairs, Nick, like the detached and alienated
aesthete, romanticizes his actions. Nick claims to come to Gatsby’s aid as one who is the
last resort for the abandoned Gatsby: “At first I was surprised and confused; then as he
lay in his house and didn’t move or breathe or speak hour upon hour it grew upon me that
I was responsible, because no one else was interested—interested, I mean, with that
intense personal interest to which everyone has some vague right at the end” (172). By
evoking the emotion of resentment toward Gatsby’s entourage, Nick conducts himself in
a manner that at least partially inverts choice of duty and responsibility of one who
chooses himself in freedom from within the ethical sphere: Nick resembles one who faces
“responsibility” by default. Rather than deal with him as he would with a friend, Nick
places Gatsby into the vague category “everyone.” Nick behaves as one who is thrown
toward responsibility by circumstances, Nick behaves as one who has a “vague” sense of
duty and responsibility, but he refracts this vague sense of morality through his Romantic
sensibilities, much as he does with the telling of his romanticized tale. Nick identifies
with Gatsby as a figurehead who represents the failure of life in the modern era. For
example, before launching into his tale, Nick claims that Gatsby “represented everything
for which [Nick has] an unaffected scorn” but then goes on to claim that “there was
something gorgeous about him, some heightened sensitivity to the promises of life, as if
he were related to one of those intricate machines that register earthquakes ten thousand
miles away” (6). Nick’s contradictory views of Gatsby arguably reflect Nick’s failure to
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commit and pursue his own goals and aspirations in a responsible manner. By
appropriating Gatsby as a metaphor in a cynical interpretation of life, Nick resembles one
who wishes to justify his own retreat and alienation in the face of the “restless” state of
being which the Great War has invoked in him (7). In Kierkegaardian terms, whatever
the justification, the person who remains confined to the aesthetic sphere fails to realize
the possibility of a life that might take shape within the ethical sphere: such an individual
leads a life characterized by a lack of responsibility and commitment and therefore does
not reach his or her potential as a concrete actualized personality. The lack of
responsibility and commitment of one who does not choose herself by making the leap to
the ethical sphere might thus lead the personality that remains confined to the aesthetic
sphere to travel on “a dead-end route that leads to boredom and disgust and deprives life
of all meaning” (Hubben 31). Nick’s retreat at novel’s end to the “middle-west” (184)
and his accepting failure via the rationalization that Tom, Daisy, Gatsby, Jordan, and he
“possessed some deficiency that made [them] subtly unadaptable to Eastern life” (184)
resembles the sort of “disgust” at a “life [deprived] of all meaning” of which William
Hubben speaks53. Confined to the aesthetic sphere, human subjectivity might eventually
devolve into nihilism. The personality might devolve in this manner in the sense that a
person lacking meaningful connections to other individuals would likely find it much
easier to think herself the passive victim of a meaningless life. The personality might
thus devolve to the point of thinking that it merely exists, the personality’s connections to
53

With regard to the individual confined to the aesthetic sphere experiencing disgust at a
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others being perceived as quasi-arbitrary. In contrast, Judge William asserts that the
personality that chooses itself freely within the ethical sphere will be more likely to
affirm existence within the circumstances of life by using freedom to act upon and shape
those circumstances: “When a person has felt the intensity of duty with all his energy,
then he is ethically matured, and then duty will break forth within him. The fundamental
point, therefore, is not whether a person can count on his fingers how many duties he has,
but that he has once and for all felt the intensity of duty in such a way that the
consciousness of it is for him the assurance of the eternal validity of his being”
(Either/Or II: 266).
Tom Buchanan is the most loathsome of the characters in The Great Gatsby, one
who fails to participate meaningfully in the ethical sphere of existence. He not only
resembles the individual who remains indifferent to the possibility of a leap to the ethical,
but he is also shameless with regard to behavior that exploits the distance that his wealth
grants him. More specifically, Tom’s indifference to those around him arguably brings
him to the point where he acts as one who relates antithetically to responsibility and
commitment. Like the romantic ironist, he fails to see beyond the world of immediacy.
He conducts himself as one who participates in the “demonic”—in “self-seclusion”—by
“using everyone and everything for [his] own aesthetic satisfaction” (Tillich, A History of
Christian Thought 466). Tom’s relationship to the ethical sphere is inverted in the sense
that he violates the marriage bond and manipulates those around him. His cavalier
attitude toward his affair with Myrtle Wilson resembles the defiance of the ethical sphere
exhibited by Johannes the Seducer in “The Seducer’s Diary.”

Johannes scoffs at the

ethical and sees women as a means to an end: “The banefulness of an engagement [to be
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married] is always the ethical in it. The ethical is just as boring in scholarship as in life.
What a difference! Under the esthetic sky, everything is buoyant, beautiful, transient;
when ethics arrives on the scene, everything becomes harsh, angular, infinitely
langweiligt [boring]” (Either/Or I: 367). Tom Buchanan resembles such an individual in
defiance of the ethical; he takes Nick to Myrtle’s place as a demonstration of his cavalier
attitude toward the responsibilities of the institution of marriage and toward his
commitment to his wife, who happens to be Nick’s cousin. “The fact that he had [a
mistress] was insisted upon wherever he was known. His acquaintances resented the fact
that turned up in popular restaurants with her and, leaving her at a table, sauntered about
chatting with whomever he knew” (28). Tom’s indifference to the opinion of others and
his cavalier attitude about parading his mistress around town resemble Johannes the
Seducer’s cavalier attitude toward the ethical. Kierkegaard believes that the personality
confined to the aesthetic sphere tends to see the ethical as a loss of freedom, tends to
confuse “liberum arbitrium [the freedom of indifference] with true, positive freedom,”
which is to choose oneself in making the leap to the ethical (Either/Or II: 174). Judge
William claims that the ethical view of marriage does not mean a loss of freedom, but
that the ethical view of marriage qualifies the aesthetic dimension of love, in that the
ethical view sees the beauty of love taking shape within a specific historical context:
The ethical view of marriage…has several advantages over every aesthetic
concept of love. It elucidates the universal, not the accidental. It does not
show how a pair of very specific people can become happy. It sees the
relationship as the absolute and does not take the differences as guarantees
but sees them as tasks. It sees the relationship as the absolute and
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therefore looks upon love according to its freedom; it understands its
historical beauty. (305)
Tom’s casual attitude toward infidelity resembles Johannes the Seducer’s attitude toward
marriage and the ethical in that both ignore the repetition of “tasks” and sacrificing of
immediate desires in favor of obligations to the marriage partner, and both thus overlook
the historical specificity—the ethical dimension—of marriage. Tom conducts himself as
one who is in defiance of the ethical: he fails to see that his ultimately returning to Daisy
does not justify a regular pattern of infidelity. Daisy addresses Tom’s casual attitude
toward the concrete actuality of marriage by pointing out how their social life in Chicago
became disrupted by one of Tom’s “sprees”: “You’re revolting,” said Daisy. She turned
to me and her voice, dropping an octave lower, filled the room with thrilling scorn: “Do
you know why we left Chicago? I’m surprised that they didn’t treat you to the story of
that little spree” (139).
Even though Daisy does have a point to make on this occasion, her failure to live
within the ethical sphere parallels Tom’s failure. Earlier in the novel, she too flaunts her
infidelity—apparently in reaction to Tom’s having done so with regard to Myrtle:
As [Tom] left the room again, [Daisy] got up and went over to Gatsby, and
pulled his face down kissing him on the mouth.
“You know I love you,” she murmured.
“You forget there’s a lady present,” said Jordan.
Daisy looked around doubtfully.
“You kiss Nick too.”
“What a low, vulgar girl!”
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“I don’t care!” cried Daisy and began to clog on the brick fireplace. (122123)
Although Daisy’s flaunting display gets interrupted by the appearance of her daughter,
Pammy, Daisy returns to her attitude of detachment from the ethical by introducing
Pammy to Gatsby and Nick: “’How do you like mother’s friends?’ Daisy turned around
so that she faced Gatsby. ‘Do you think they’re pretty’” (123)? In flirting with the
danger of being caught with Gatsby, Daisy resembles the individual who within the
context of the aesthetic sphere defies the ethical. In addressing the issue of choosing
oneself within the ethical sphere, Judge William claims, “Either a person has to live
aesthetically or he has to live ethically…It is not a matter of a choice in the stricter sense,
for the person who lives aesthetically does not choose” [in the same sense that the person
living in the ethical chooses] (Either/Or II: 168). Judge William qualifies this by stating
that “the character indelebilis [the indelible character] of the ethical” is that it is “that
which makes the choice a choice” (168). In contrast to one who lives as a reaction to the
ethical and sees it as a loss of freedom, Kierkegaard believes that the individual who
chooses herself after having made the leap to the ethical sphere experiences a qualitative
shift in terms of the way she sets her life before her as a task to be realized with
passionate concern for her own potential.
Wilson, in his reaction to adultery, is another character who represents an
antithetical relation to the ethical. He conducts himself in a manner similar to the
personality that succumbs to the exaggerated pathos and immediacy of the aesthetic
sphere. Wilson resembles the man of immediacy who “is only psychically qualified” and
who sees “his self” as “an accompanying something within the dimensions of
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temporality” (The Sickness unto Death 51). Anti-Climacus claims that the “self as
dative” is “bound up in immediacy with the other in desiring, craving, enjoying, etc., yet
passively; in its craving, this self is a dative, like the ‘me’ of a child; its concepts are:
good luck, bad luck, fate” (51). When Wilson learns of Myrtle’s adultery, he behaves in
two ways consistent with the man of immediacy seeing himself as the victim of “bad
luck” or “fate.” First, he resembles one who “is bound up in immediacy with the other in
desiring,” since locks Myrtle into a room where he claims she will “stay… till the day
after tomorrow and then we’re going to move away” (143). Imprisoning her is an act of
brute force that relates antithetically to the ethical because it does not take into account
the dialogue of commitment that comprises the ethical sphere’s relationship to marriage.
After Wilson locks Myrtle in the closet, influenced unduly by Tom’s deceiving him into
thinking that Gatsby is the adulterous partner to Myrtle, Wilson murders Gatsby (170).
In murdering Gatsby, Wilson behaves in a manner consistent with what Anti-Climacus
calls “the despair of weakness,” a form of despair in which the personality succumbs to
the erroneous belief “that the despair arises from unfulfilled worldly expectations or loss
of worldly ‘possessions,’ which may be material or human” (Watts 178). Lastly, Wilson
conducts himself as one who has given in entirely to despair within the aesthetic sphere
in that he commits suicide: “It was after we started with [Gatsby’s body] toward the
house that the gardener saw Wilson’s body a little way off in the grass, and the holocaust
was complete” (170). In committing suicide, Wilson symbolizes despair that adopts the
extreme opposite of the possibility of the leap to faith that might take shape within the
ethical sphere. As Kierkegaard scholar Michael Watts observes in summarizing AntiClimacus’ position in The Sickness unto Death, “Whether despair is avoidance of an
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ethical self or of the genuinely spiritual self, the underlying structure is the same—‘to
want to be rid of oneself’” (Kierkegaard 178; The Sickness unto Death 49). The
individual who commits suicide while progressing no farther than the aesthetic sphere
negates the possibility of a leap to faith that might take shape within either the ethical or
the religious sphere.
In terms of Kierkegaard’s concept of the ethical sphere, Jay Gatsby might be read
as an inversion of the possibility of a leap to faith that might take shape within the ethical
sphere; he exchanges the actuality of the present for a vision of a past that never really
was. As Quaker scholar William Hubben notes in summarizing Kierkegaard’s views on
romantic detachment, “Man detaching himself from moral struggle and indulging in the
search for beauty and pleasure remains within the realm of unreality and dream…History
assumes the shadowlike contours of myth, while reality loses its true character. The
aesthete constructs for himself a fictitious world of dreams, lives only in the immediate
present, and finds himself ultimately rejected by life’s moral realities” (Dostoevsky,
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Kafka 31). Like the aesthete who fails distinguish the actual
world from a dream world, Gatsby not only wants Daisy to admit that she loves him, he
also wants her to deny that she ever loved Tom—something she ultimately fails to do:
“Daisy that’s all over now54,” he said earnestly. “It doesn’t matter
anymore. Just tell him the truth—that you never loved him—and it’s all
wiped out forever. “
She looked at him blindly. “Why, --how could I love
him—possibly?”

54

The adulterous affair in Chicago

101
“You never loved him.”
She hesitated… (139)
When Tom confronts the situation by stating bluntly to Gatsby “there’s things between
Daisy and me that you’ll never know, things that neither of us can forget,” Gatsby
witnesses the collapse of his five-year struggle to see the dream become reality. He
stands in a situation similar to the aesthete who “finds himself ultimately rejected by
life’s moral realities” (Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Kafka 31). From that
point on, Tom is master of the situation, and Daisy pleads with him, “Please, Tom! I
can’t stand this any more” (142). For Kierkegaard, “the tragedy of romanticism is that
what it seizes upon is not actuality” (The Concept of Irony 304). In contrast, the leap to
faith that takes shape within the ethical sphere is one that leads the individual to both
accept actuality and to act decisively to transform the actual into the possible.
***
The issue of how the religious sphere of existence might relate to The Great
Gatsby is addressed in the present study in terms of ambiguous symbolism employed by
Fitzgerald. By employing ambiguous symbols in relation to characters whose judgment
seems questionable, Fitzgerald arguably leaves open the question of a “Transcendent
Other” and thus invites the reader to engage in further inquiry on the matter. One might
argue from a Kierkegaardian perspective that in doing so, Fitzgerald indirectly
interrogates the limitations of the romantic sensibility, with its tendency to retreat into
irony as existence stance. One might argue from a Kierkegaardian perspective that
Fitzgerald presents a scenario in which one might interrogate the limitations of the
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romantic sensibility, and that Fitzgerald does so by way of both symbolism of a spiritual
“wasteland” and the words and actions of the minor character Michaelis.
Regarding symbolism of the wasteland, the recurring ashes associated with the
city and the “progress” of twentieth century industrialization are ambiguous and from a
Kierkegaardian perspective need not be read as representing the “death of God.” More
specifically, since from a Kierkegaardian perspective it is impossible to arrive at faith on
strictly rational grounds, Wilson’s identifying God with the giant eyes on the sign of
Doctor T.J. Eckleburg (167) can be interpreted as representing symbolically the
limitations of concepts of faith that arise from within the aesthetic sphere—as well as the
limitations of rationalist concepts of God. Kierkegaard scholar Rick Anthony Furtak
summarizes Kierkegaard’s position regarding God as “Entirely Other”: “It does not make
sense to speak of divinity as if it could be encountered as an object” (Wisdom in Love:
Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity 98). For Kierkegaard, God is
both Love and the ground of all that is—including the ground of that which we neither
perceive nor understand—and thus stands beyond objectification by human reason55.
“Kierkegaard’s view that love is fundamental to the self informs his reading of the New
Testament idea that our being is ‘rooted and grounded in love’: in loving others
unselfishly, we also define our own individuality” (Furtak 98). In terms of
Kierkegaard’s ultimate concern of what it means to become a Christian in Christendom,
one ought to be grounded in love: “to practice Christianity means, above all else, to live
in accordance with the conviction that God is love; that is, to follow the promptings of a
religious influence which one does not necessarily understand but to which one is
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comprehensively indebted. To admit one’s radical dependence upon a God of love,
without whom one would be capable of nothing, is not to debase oneself but to make an
ennobling concession” (99). In The Great Gatsby, the distraught Wilson is a character
whose judgments are suspect: After Myrtle’s death, in his distraught state, Wilson
confuses a sign featuring a mysterious set of eyes with the image of God. In what might
be interpreted as Wilson lashing out resentfully at his failure, Wilson confuses the eyes of
T.J Eckleburg’s advertisement with the eyes of God:
Wilson’s glazed eyes turned out to the ashheaps, where small grey clouds
took on fantastic shape and scurried here and there in the faint dawn wind.
“I spoke to her,” he muttered, after a long silence. “I told her she
might fool me but she couldn’t fool God. I took her to the window—“
With an effort he got up and walked to the rear window and leaned with
his face pressed against it, “—and I said ‘God knows what you’ve been
doing, everything you’ve been doing. You may fool me but you can’t fool
God!’”
Standing behind him Michaelis saw with a shock that he was
looking at the eyes of Doctor T.J. Eckleburg which had just emerged pale
and enormous from the dissolving night.
“God sees everything,” repeated Wilson.
“That’s an advertisement,” Michaelis assured him.
Something made him turn away from the window and look back into the
room. But Wilson stood there a long time, his face close to the window
pane, nodding into the twilight. (167-168)

104
From a Kierkegaardian perspective, one need not see the eyes amidst the ash heaps as a
straightforward symbol of a godless, material universe. Rather, one might read Doctor
T.J. Eckleburg’s sign amidst the ash heaps as a symbol for the failure of rationalized
concepts of God formulated from within the aesthetic sphere. One might see the eyes as
a symbol of existence that does not reach its potential as self because it remains confined
to the aesthetic sphere. On that issue, Anti-Climacus states in The Sickness unto Death,
“There is a qualitative difference between God and man that [ought to be] maintained in
the paradox of faith” (99). Thus, Wilson’s perspective on “God/the sign” need not be
read as a symbolic representation the fate of modern humanity.
From a Kierkegaardian perspective, one might see the ash heaps and the mistaken
image of God as representing Wilson’s confused state of being, and, by extension, the
confused state of a spiritual point-of-view confined to the aesthetic sphere. Like the man
of immediacy of the aesthetic sphere who confuses self with “externalities,” Wilson so
identifies his failure as an individual with Myrtle’s adultery that when he discovers her
infidelity and subsequently locks her in a room, he is physically ill:
The young Greek, Michaelis, who ran the coffee joint beside the ashheaps
was the principle witness at the inquest. He had slept through the heat,
until after five, when he strolled over to the garage and found George
Wilson sick in his office—really sick, pale as his own pale hair and
shaking all over. Michaelis advised him to go to bed but Wilson refused,
saying that he’d miss a lot of business if he did. While his neighbor was
trying to persuade him a violent racket broke out overhead.
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“I’ve got my wife locked in up there,” explained Wilson calmly.
(143)
In contrast to Wilson who resembles the man of immediacy, who remains
confined the aesthetic sphere, Michaelis is the only significant character in The Great
Gatsby who resembles Kierkegaard’s individual who participates in an ethical-religious
mode of existence. Michaelis goes out of his way to take action in a time of crisis and he
comes to the aid of others by trying to relieve suffering: “Michaelis and [a driver from
New York who had stopped] reached [Myrtle] first but when they had torn open her
shirtwaist still damp with perspiration they saw that her left breast was swinging loose
like a flap and there was no need to listen for the heart beneath” (145). Later, Michaelis
again acts out of a sense of responsibility and compassion toward others:
Michaelis and several other men were with [Wilson]—first four or five
men, later two or three men. Still later Michaelis had to ask the last
stranger to wait there fifteen minutes longer while he went back to his own
place and made a pot of coffee. After that he waited there alone with
Wilson until dawn. (164)
A little later, still trying to comfort Wilson, Michaelis offers what could be
interpreted as the novel’s clearest representation of Kierkegaard’s concept of the religious
sphere (reflected in Michaelis’ emblematic name) in that Michaelis exhorts Wilson to
seek out God to deliver him from his incoherent ramblings and overwhelming despair:
[Michaelis] didn’t like to go into the garage because the work bench was
stained where the body had been lying so he moved uncomfortably around
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the office—he knew every object in it before morning—and from time to
time sat down beside Wilson trying to keep him more quiet.
“Have you got a church you go to sometimes, George? Maybe
even if you haven’t been there in a long time? Maybe I should call up the
church and get a priest to come over and he could talk to you, see?”
“Don’t belong to any.”
“You ought to have a church, George, for times like this. You
must have gone to church once. Didn’t you get married in a church?
Listen, George, listen to me. Didn’t you get married in a church?”
“That was a long time ago.”
In terms of Kierkegaard’s view that the self might ultimately be delivered from despair
by making the leap to faith that takes shape within the religious sphere, Michaelis’ act of
compassion and his exhortation that Wilson appeal to God, juxtaposed with Wilson’s
collapse into the basest forms of failure within the aesthetic sphere (murder and suicide)
could be seen as emphasizing by contrast the individual who ignores the possibility of a
leap to faith that might take shape within the religious sphere. In terms of Kierkegaard’s
concept of the aesthetic sphere, Wilson’s failure in the face of actuality might be
interpreted as representing the sort of despair that leads to destruction of both self and
“other.” In striking out at life in revenge driven by a sense of total failure, Wilson ends at
suicide, that state of being which Kierkegaard calls “the final agony of complete
isolation” (Either/Or II: 246). In his desperation, Wilson destroys first another, then
himself.
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Anti-Climacus in Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death speaks of a form of
despair that is “demonic” because it strikes out to destroy another: “demonic despair is
the most intensive form of despair: in despair to will to be oneself…in hatred toward
existence it wills to be itself, wills to be itself in accordance with its misery”(73). AntiClimacus continues, explaining that this form of despair acts out in spite, out of
resentment toward its own existence: “Not even in defiance or defiantly does it will to be
itself, but for spite; not even in defiance does it want to tear itself loose from the power
that established it, but for spite wants to force itself upon it, to obtrude defiantly upon
it…” (73). Wilson’s murder of Gatsby followed by his suicide resembles the spite
toward existence of which Anti-Climacus speaks. In a sense, it symbolizes the opposite
of what Paul Tillich defines as faith—the courage to be in spite of the threat of nonbeing56: “Courage as an element of faith is the daring self-affirmation of one’s being in
spite of the powers of ‘non-being’ which are the heritage of everything finite” (Tillich,
Dynamics of Faith 17). In lashing out in spite at existence, Wilson moves in accordance
with Kierkegaard’s demonic conception of despair—despair which ends in “the agony of
complete isolation”—Wilson resorts not to “self-affirmation…in spite of the powers of
non-being” but to self-negation.
Although Wilson resembles one who falls into “the agony of complete
isolation”—he is overwhelmed to the point that he ignores Michaelis’ exhortation to seek
56

Paul Tillich’s concept of faith as “the courage to be in spite of the threat of non-being”
is arguably derived in part from Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety, in which narrative
persona Vigilius Haufniensis claims, “The only thing that is truly able to disarm the
sophistry of sin is faith, courage to believe that the state [of anxiety] itself is a new sin,
courage to renounce anxiety [angst] without anxiety, which only faith can do; faith does
not thereby annihilate anxiety, but, itself eternally young, it extricates itself from
anxiety’s moment of death. Only faith is able to do this, for only in faith is the synthesis
eternal and at every moment possible ” (117).
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out God—, in Kierkegaardian terms, Michaelis could nonetheless be said to represent for
Wilson the possibility of making the leap to faith that might take shape within the
religious sphere. Thus, Michaelis’ name is both emblematic and ironic. It is emblematic
in the sense that “Michael,” the Archangel, is the herald of God, thus implying “Michael
Is.” Michaelis offers a message of religious appeal to Wilson, although this message
does not communicate, as Wilson is too overwhelmed to understand the message. In
terms of Kierkegaard’s distinctions, since Michaelis encourages Wilson to appeal to God,
Michaelis symbolizes the possibility of a leap to faith that might take shape within the
religious sphere. From A Kierkegaardian perspective, then, one might see Wilson as
symbolizing the failure of the aesthetic sphere’s—of the world of immediacy—to
perceive the possibility of the religious sphere. According to Anti-Climacus, despair
turned in upon itself within the aesthetic sphere might be bound to collapse into itself as
the personality confronts overwhelming circumstances: “When immediacy despairs, it
does not even have enough self to wish or dream that it had become that which it has not
become…The man of immediacy does not know himself, he quite literally identifies
himself with the clothes he wears, he identifies having a self by externalities” (The
Sickness unto Death 53). Wilson, the self-consumed man, fails to hear the “herald of
God”—remains trapped within an objectified sense of self—full of self-loathing and
resentment, the “demonic” aspect of “inclosing reserve” within the aesthetic sphere. In
an inversion of the religious sphere, Wilson, whom one might read as the “psychosomatic
self57” who becomes the dupe of evil, commits the “demonic” act of murder, of striking

57

In The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud, J. Preston Cole claims that
Kierkegaard’s expression ‘the man of immediacy is only psychically qualified’ (The
Sickness unto Death 51) implies that the self as Kierkegaard defines it extends beyond the
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out in resentment toward the world. Wilson’s murder of Gatsby (170) might be
interpreted, in terms of Kierkegaard’s concept of the man of immediacy within the
aesthetic sphere, as representing a “demonic” act born of hatred that ends at
suicide—“the final agony of complete isolation” (Either/Or II: 246). In terms of
Kierkegaard’s distinctions, one might thus argue that Wilson’s actions invert the religious
sphere of existence: Wilson is so overwhelmed by external matters (interpreted as “fate”
or “bad luck”) that he fails to comprehend the opportunity to appeal to God, and, instead,
in resentment, lashes out at existence itself, both by killing Gatsby and by ending his own
life.

“body-soul relation”: “Indeed, the immediate body-soul relation is not really a relation
but a unity—a psychosomatic unity, so to speak. It is a ‘negative unity,’ as Kierkegaard
puts it, but selfhood requires a positive relationship, one posited by the self itself” (12).
Sprit and soul are for Kierkegaard distinct realties. Kierkegaard believes that one is born
with a soul, but that one must make the leap to arrive at spirit, “the positive third” (The
Sickness unto Death 13).
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CHAPTER 3
THE SUN ALSO RISES
AND
KIERKEGAARD’S THREE SPHERES OF EXISTENCE

A Brief Overview of Relevant Criticism
For the scholar interested in studies that treat issues relevant to Hemingway’s The
Sun Also Rises—narrative style, irony, critical reception, or research tools—the following
works might prove valuable:
The following studies in style, irony, and narrative voice that might prove useful.
Virendra Kumar Bajpai’s Ernest Hemingway: A Study of His Prose (New Delhi: Rajat
Press, 2005), James Phelan’s Narrative as Rhetoric (Ohio State University Press, 1996),
James Phelan’s Living to Tell about It: A Rhetoric and Ethics of Character Narration
(Cornell University Press, 2005), Carlos Baker’s Ernest Hemingway: Critiques of Four
Major Novels (), Carlos Baker’s Hemingway and His Critics: An International
Anthology(), Carlos Baker’s Hemingway: The Writer as Artist (),Wirt Williams’ The
Tragic Art of Ernest Hemingway (), and Robert Weeks’ Hemingway: A Collection of
Critical Essays (), and Frank Scafella’s Hemingway: Essays of Reassessment (1991).
Scholars interested in reference guides to Hemingway might consult Charles M.
Oliver’s Ernest Hemingway A to Z and Linda Wagner-Martin’s A Historical Guide to
Ernest Hemingway (Oxford University Press, 2000).
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Scholars interested in Hemingway’s existentialism might refer to John Killinger’s
Hemingway and the Dead Gods: A Study in Existentialism (Citadel Press, 1965), Robert
Solomon’s Existentialism (McGraw-Hill, 1974), or James R. Mellow’s Hemingway: A
Life Without Consequences (Addison Wesley Publishing, 1993).

A Close Reading of the Novel
Like The Great Gatsby, The Sun Also Rises also offers an elegant structure within
which to perform a close reading relevant to Kierkegaard’s concepts. The Sun Also Rises
contains characters relevant—at least indirectly—to two of the three spheres of existence,
and it too illustrates irony as indirect communication as a possible mode of inquiry
presented by the author. And, although The Sun Also Rises does not offer characters who
might serve as clear representations of the religious sphere of existence, I will contrast
this novel with Saul Bellow’s Henderson the Rain King, a novel that does offer a
character who is relevant to Kierkegaard’s concept of the religious sphere, a character
who might be seen as an extension of Jake Barnes, since Henderson finds healing from
the wound of the “Fisher King” by both embracing the deeper mystery of existence and
reaching out in self-effacing love toward others.
Like that employed by Nick Carraway, the narrative style employed by Jake
Barnes serves as the means by which indirect communication occurs. Both styles suit the
circumstances presented. Even so, unlike the elevated, relatively polished, “Romantic”
style employed by Nick Carraway, the understated style of Jake Barnes takes the form of
subdued—perhaps suppressed—plainspoken prose. In addition to creating the
impression that Jake is a suppressed personality, the understated style becomes a
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rhetorical device for pointing beyond the stated, to the implied and the suppressed.
“Hemingway's style has often been described as ‘gritty’; it involves removal of commas
and deadpan description of often gruesome events. Hemingway often uses concise,
staccato sentences with few authorial comments” (http://web.cn.edu/kwheeler/style.html).
In Hemingway, we see a reaction against Romantic turgidity and vagueness:
back to basics, to the essentials. Thus his new realism in a new key resembles
the old Puritan simplicity and discipline; both of them refrained from
exhibiting the sentimental, the relative.
Hemingway's sincere and stern ambition was to approach Truth,
clinging to an as yet unwritten code, a higher law which he referred to as “an
absolute conscience as unchanging as the standard meter in Paris"
(http://nobelprize.org/literature/articles/hallengren/)
In addition to being a prototypical example of Hemingway’s style, the tone employed by
narrator Jake Barnes in The Sun Also Rises suits the emotional suppression of someone in
Jake’s situation. Jake’s “wound” is both physical and emotional, and his estrangement
resulting from the impact of the Great War places identifies him as the Stoic.
***
In The Sun Also Rises, the aesthetic sphere of existence finds it clearest expression
in the detached life, alternating between culture and nature58, with the Fiesta ultimately
serving—from Jake’s narrative perspective—as a mediating point in the reckless
escapism of Jake and his entourage. Jake’s friends conduct themselves consistently in
58

The failure of the entourage to retreat successfully to nature (they bring themselves and
their restless personalities along) is arguably Hemingway’s symbolic representation of
the failure of nineteenth century Romantic literature in its attempts to recover some sense
of the supposed original “purity” of human experience.

113
manner that symbolizes Kierkegaard’s view that one “who lives aesthetically is not really
in control, either of himself or his situation. [The man of immediacy] typically exists ins
Blaue hinein, ‘for the moment,’ for whatever the passing instant will bring in the way of
entertainment, excitement, interest. Committed to nothing permanent, or definite,
dispersed in sensuous ‘immediacy,’ he may do or think one thing at a given time, the
exact opposite at another” (Kierkegaard 44). For example, when under the sway of the
Romantic novel The Purple Land Robert Cohn impulsively wants to make a trip to South
America, Jake rejects the idea as foolish romanticism:
He had been reading W. H. Hudson. That sounds like an innocent
occupation, but Cohn had read and reread “The Purple Land.” “The Purple
Land” is a very sinister book if read too late in life. It recounts splendid
imaginary amorous adventures of a perfect English gentlemen in an
intensely romantic land, the scenery of which is very well described. For
a man to take it at thirty-four as a guide-book to what life holds is about as
safe as it would be for a man of the same age to enter Wall Street direct
from a French convent, equipped with a complete set of Alger books.
Cohn, I believe, took every word of “The Purple Land” as literally as
though it had been an R. G. Dun report. You understand me, he made
some reservations, but on the whole the book to him was sound. It was all
that was needed to set him off. (17)
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The previous passage is dense with issues related to Cohn, Jake, and the aesthetic sphere.
The dominant trope—or, rhetorical figure—is prosopopeia59, personification. Rather than
being employed in the classical sense of a person represented as an animal, as in “sly
fox,” prosopopeia here takes on a form of a narrator’s “mask”—one that is donned by
Jake to conceal contempt for Robert Cohn60. Jake’s contempt for the delusional
tendencies of those under the sway of romantic literature is obvious. Cohn does appear to
be under the sway of aesthetic despair, restless and focused on self in shape-shifting
patterns: He “exists ins Blaue hinein, ‘for the moment,’ for whatever the passing instant
will bring in the way of entertainment, excitement, interest” (Kierkegaard 44).

In

contrast, Jake resembles the individual who has made the leap to faith that takes shape
within the ethical sphere of existence, in that he prefers a “real”—concrete,
actual—relationship to his surroundings, as he notes when he mentions that he “[goes] to
Spain in the summertime” [to fish for trout] (The Sun Also Rises 18). Also, the two
reasons that Cohn gives for Jake accompanying him are akin to thinking that is rooted in
the self-serving dimension aesthetic sphere, where people can be seen as objects to serve
one’s desires. Cohn wants Jake to go along because Cohn apparently is not enough of a
Romantic to truly go in solitude, and wants someone along who can speak Spanish.
Regarding prosopopeia again, a closer look reveals that Jake overstates his case
against Cohn by adopting the mask of sarcasm and later unwittingly discloses his
contradictory nature by asking Cohn to provide “dirt” on others so that Jake might use it
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Sipiora, Phillip. ENG 7939: “Hemingway-Fitzgerald,” class lecture notes. University
of South Florida: Fall 1995. (See also Phillip Sipiora’s forthcoming book on prosopopeia
in Hemingway’s fiction.)
60
Sipiora, Phillip. ENG 7939: “Hemingway-Fitzgerald,” class lecture notes. University
of South Florida: Fall 1995.
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for upcoming newspaper stories. In spite of his usual commitment to adopting a sincere
and disciplined course of action—one that belongs predominately to the ethical
sphere—Jake nonetheless here places himself in service of the “unreal” by asking Cohn
for gossip, the demonically-delusional cousin to romanticism. A marker characteristic of
the more diabolical aspects of the aesthetic sphere is “self-seclusion. This belongs
[specifically] to the aesthetic stage, not going out of oneself, but using everyone and
everything for one’s own aesthetic satisfaction (Tillich, A History of Christian Though
466). Further, Jake’s sarcastic attack on Cohn, in which he suggests that Cohn should
“cheer up” because “all countries look just like the moving pictures,” again reveals
Hemingway’s clever use of prosopopeia, the narrator’s mask. Recalling earlier events as
he narrates, Jake reveals that part of the reason he treats Cohn with disdain is his jealousy
over the discovery of Cohn’s tryst with Brett Ashley (89), thus revealing that Jake’s
condescending treatment of Cohn is in many ways more about Jake wrestling with his
own inadequacies than about Cohn’s worthiness as either a human being or a literary
figure61. We often tend to notice the things in others that we most detest in ourselves.
Prosopopeia is an excellent rhetorical device for accentuating this paradox, as it makes
use of indirect communication. Jake’s narrative persona here foreshadows his closing
ambiguous remark with regard to Brett’s assertion that she and Jake “could have had such
a damned good time together” (251).

Jake’s response “isn’t it pretty to think so?” again

brings to light the issue of prosopopeia, causing the reader to question whether or not

61

Jake does not spend as much time being critical of Cohn’s inadequacy as a writer or
artist as he does focusing on Cohn’s weak and vacillating personality. Brett apparently
values Jake for his consistency and directness, and Cohn’s wavering, impressionable
personality stands over against this.
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Jake is being mildly sarcastic62 to alert Brett of the insensitivity and uselessness of her
remark, or if he is using irony to casually embrace his situation, by donning a mask of
Stoic reserve to disguise his pain. And, in spite of the quotation marks that indicate
dialogue, the question can be seen as indirect communication with regard to the reader
caught in the question. Further, Jake’s persona of one who accepts things with resolve
and moves on with determination is undercut by the comic, phallic imagery of the
policeman directing traffic: “Ahead was a mounted policeman in khaki directing traffic.
He raised his baton. The car slowed suddenly pressing Brett against me” (251). Due to
the nature of his wound63, Jake cannot replicate the policeman’s raising of the baton.
Of all the characters in The Sun Also Rises, Brett best represents life in the
aesthetic sphere. She lives in the moment and is both reckless and restless. For example,
following her entrance in which she flits about carelessly and mingles frivolously in the
company of several gay men at a nightclub (28), she makes a brief confession to Jake that
begins to reveal her restless nature: “Oh, darling, I’ve been so miserable…” (32). Brett
resembles the young aesthete who in Either/Or: Part II receives Judge William’s chiding
observations:
You let everything pass you by; nothing makes any impact. But then
something comes along that grips you, an idea, a situation, a young
[man’s] smile, and now you are “involved,” so at other times you are “at
your service” in every way. Wherever there is something going on, you
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Sipiora, Phillip. ENG 7939: “Hemingway-Fitzgerald” class lecture notes. University of
South Florida: Fall 1995.
63
Since Jake’s testicles are intact (34) but his penis was severed during the war wound,
he can experience sexual desire for Brett but cannot act on that desire in the conventional
sense.
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join in. You behave in life as you usually do in a crowd. “You work
yourself into the tightest group, see to it, if possible, to get yourself shoved
up against others so that you come to be above them, and as soon as you
are up there you make yourself as comfortable as possible, and in this way
you also let yourself be carried through life.“ But when the crowd is gone,
when the event is over, you again stand on the street corner and look at the
world. (196)
The person in the grip of despair associated with the aesthetic sphere is “never satisfied
and cannot be” because she “seeks content for [her] existence in the dreams which are
[her] only actuality” (The Phenomenology of Moods in Kierkegaard 10). At the
beginning of Chapter IV, Brett refuses rejects Jake’s kisses, because she claims that
because of his wound she does not “want to go through that hell again” (34), “that hell”
being her getting sexually aroused without Jake being able to satisfy her through coitus.
“Inclosing reserve” is a term that Kierkegaard uses to denote the person limited to the
tendency of the aesthetic sphere to see things only in terms of her or his immediate
desires or emotions. Brett sees herself predominately as a sexually active being who
cannot tolerate a male-female relationship that could not be consummated in sex. Jake’s
proposition that they “live together” (62) resembles the ethical either/or of one who
“chooses himself” within the ethical sphere: Jake obviously commits himself to Brett
outside of the immediate-erotic realm of the aesthetic sphere and in spite of his not being
able to sexually consummate the relationship. He shows himself willing to make a
commitment that would involve perpetual disappointment in the sexual realm, the realm
of the immediate-erotic, the realm of the aesthetic sphere.
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***
Of all the characters in The Sun Also Rises, Jake Barnes best represents the ethical
sphere of existence. Though he occasionally regresses into the aesthetic
sphere—especially in his relations with Brett and Cohn—, he organizes his life within a
strict regimen of self-defining behavior and autonomous ethics. For example, in spite of
the intoxicated life he and his friends lead, he makes it a point to meet his professional
obligations to the newspaper by sending newspaper stories on time (20, 44).
And, Hemingway’s use of Jake’s narrative mask64 as a means of indirect
communication offers the clearest example of Jake’s commitment to behavior that one
might argue falls within the ethical sphere of existence. Specifically, Jake’s exposition
on the “aficionado” offers treatment of the ideals that Jake seeks to “choose himself” by
acting passionately within his own life. His description of how Pedro Romero
exemplifies the aficionado reveals indirectly his own ideals for life well lived:
Aficion means passion. An aficionado is one who is passionate about the
bull-fights. All the good bull-fighters stayed at Montoya’s hotel; that is,
those with aficion stayed there. The commercial bull-fighters stayed once,
perhaps, and then did not come back. The good ones came each year. In
Montoya’s room there were photographs. The photographs were
dedicated to Juanito Montoya or to his sister. The photographs of bullfighters Montoya had really believed in were framed. Photographs of
bull-fighters who had been without aficion, Montoya kept in a drawer of
his desk. They often had the most flattering inscriptions. But they did not
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mean anything. One day Montoya took all of them out and dropped them
in a waste-basket. He did not want them around. (136)
In his explanation of aficion, Jake notes the flattering inscriptions and thus shows his eye
for detecting the psychology of the aesthetic sphere, with its primary concern being
immediacy and ego desire. In contrast, aficion brings a sober sense of self-discipline and
responsibility. Montoya shows respect for the aficionados because they have discovered
their passion in life. “Those who were aficionados could always get rooms even when the
hotel was full” (137). There is mutual respect among those who pursue life with a
passion that comes from a leap to faith that takes shape in the ethical sphere. This respect
Montaya and the other aficionados show also to Jake, who numbers himself among them:
Somehow it was taken for granted that an American could not have
aficion. He might simulate it or confuse it with excitement, but he
could not really have it. When they saw that I had aficion, and
there was no password, no set questions that could bring it out,
rather it was a sort of oral spiritual examination with the questions
always a little on the defensive and never apparent, there was this
embarrassing putting of the hand on the shoulder, or a Buen
hombre.” But nearly always there was the actual touching. It
seemed as though they wanted to touch you to make it certain.
(137)
Jake also explains that the code of conduct amongst aficionados is one of honor and
respect that arises in recognition of the task that the aficion as set before himself.
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“Subjective truth65” (which Kierkegaard considers to be a “personal commitment to an
ethical-religious way of life66”), as it takes shape within the ethical sphere, becomes a
resonating force around the individual who recognizes that his life has a new context
when compared to a life confined to immediacy within the aesthetic sphere. In
explaining his respect for aficion, Jake acts as one who values the “experience of being,
or living, within truth”:
Montoya could forgive anything of a bull-fighter who had aficion. He
could forgive attacks of nerves, panic, bad unexplainable actions, all sorts
of lapses. For one who had aficion he could forgive anything. At once he
forgave me all my friends. Without his ever saying anything they were
simply a little something shameful between us, like the spilling open of
the horses in bull-fighting. (137)
Jake’s exposition on aficion emphasizes passion for one’s occupation and mutual
understanding of the value of a passion for life. The bullfighter that fights for
“commercial” reasons does not possess aficion. The bullfighter that engages in selfserving flattery of others does not possess aficion, as he would likely be a bullfighter
engaged in bullfighting because of the popularity and the fringe benefits that it would
bring. In contrast, the bullfighter and spectator who understand the bullfight as a worthy
65

As Kierkegaard scholar Michael Watts explains, by “subjective truth,” Kierkegaard
does not mean that truth is arbitrary: “Kierkegaard regards subjective truth as the highest
truth available to mankind, and he makes it clear that by ‘subjective truth’ he does not
mean that a belief is true simply because one believes it to be true. Instead he is referring
to the subjective experience of being, or living, within truth—of immersing oneself in the
subjective, inward activity of experientially exploring and discovering truth of one’s own
self in the process of existing, which is the process of becoming, a direct personal
involvement in the living moment-by-moment process of unfolding reality” (Kierkegaard
82).
66
(Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy 259)
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occupation because it is a dance with death possess true aficion. It is the existential
matter of the occupation that makes it worthwhile—that the bullfighter understands that
he faces death and still chooses to live with courage in the face of death. “Courage as an
element of faith is the daring self-affirmation of one’s own being in spite of the threat of
‘non-being’ which are the heritage of everything finite. Where there is daring and
courage there is the possibility of failure. And in every act of faith this possibility is
present. The risk must be taken” (Tillich, Dynamics of Faith 17). This distinction of
aficion as recognition of courage in the face of death becomes clearer in Jake’s
observations of Pedro Romero, the model of aficion:
I had [Brett] watch how Romero took the bull away from a fallen horse
with his cape, and how he held him with the cape and turned him,
smoothly and suavely, never wasting the bull. She saw how Romero
avoided very brusque movement and saved his bull for the last when he
wanted them, not winded and discomposed but smoothly worn down. She
saw how close Romero always worked to the bull, and I pointed out to her
the tricks that the other bull-fighters used to make it look as if they were
working closely. She saw why she liked Romero’s cape-work and why
she did not like the others.
Romero never made any contortions, always it was straight and
pure and natural in line. The others twisted themselves like cork-screws,
their elbows raised, and leaned against the flanks of the bull after his horns
had passed, to give a faked look of danger. Afterward, all that was faked
turned bad and gave an unpleasant feeling. Romero’s bull-fighting gave
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real emotion, because he kept the absolute purity of line in his movements
and always quietly and calmly let the horns pass him close each time. He
did not have to emphasize their closeness. (171)
Jake explains further the importance of integrity and passion on the par of the aficion, as
compared to other bullfighters who lack the passion. Pedro Romero approaches his
bullfighting with a passion that is even wiling to risk death before compromising aficion:
Brett saw how something that was beautiful down close to the bull was
ridiculous if it were done a little way off. I told her how since the death of
Joselito all the bull-fighters had been developing a technic that simulated
the appearance of danger in order to give a fake emotional feeling, while
the bull-fighter was really safe. Romero had the old thing, the holding of
his purity of line through maximum exposure, while he dominated the bull
by making him realize he was unattainable, while he prepared him for the
killing. (171-172)
In contrast to the bullfighters that simulate danger, Romero faces real danger and
confronts the “threat of non-being” with graceful, genuine movements and “purity of
line.” Jake expresses here what from a Kierkegaardian perspective might be interpreted
as the outer reaches of the ethical sphere. In committing himself to his vocation to the
extent that he risks death in performing it well, Pedro Romero stands in contrast to those
who merely appear to be committed wholeheartedly. In manner that resembles the
individual who within Kierkegaard’s “Religiousness A” dedicates himself in earnestness
to the enterprise of living life fully, the aficionado dedicates himself to discovering and
living in accordance with what he believes to be possible in an existential sense. As
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Kierkegaard scholar Julia Watkin explains, in Either/Or “Judge William sees the initial
choice of the ethical life as something that purifies, matures, and unifies the personality.
It even brings the individual into contact with what Bishop Nikolai Balle in his catechism
[in Either/Or II: 266-67] calls the ‘Eternal Power’ [den evige Magt = God] underlying all
existence” (Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy 78). Even so, from the
perspective of Kierkegaard whose ultimate concern is what it means to become a
Christian in Christendom, what is ultimately possible for the existing individual is
something that lies beyond limits of the ethical sphere and the limits of Hemingway’s
existentialism. Kierkegaard’s ultimate concern is to urge the individual to make an
appeal to God’s grace by making the leap to faith that takes shape within the religious
sphere, a possibility that in Kierkegaard’s view originates from beyond limits of human
reason within the ethical sphere (which include “Religiousness A” and “first ethics”) and
which moves from God to the individual who makes the leap to the religious sphere
(which includes “Religiousness B” and “second ethics”).
In The Courage to Be, regarding the limits of existentialism, 67 Paul Tillich
implies that radical existentialism might arrive at nihilism—might arrive at a position that
ultimately rejects the possibility of transcendence. Paul Tillich’s position is consistent
with Dostoevsky’s view that humankind living only for itself ultimately becomes
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Sartre wrote a famous essay entitled “Existentialism is Humanism,” and Tillich
responds to the basic assertion of this essay in a way that is consistent with Kierkegaard’s
views on the religious sphere, Religiousness A (of the ethical sphere) versus
Religiousness B (of the religious sphere), and with the Christian view of the limitations
of reason (Romans 7:23). For both Kierkegaard and Tillich, in the context of what it
means to be a Christian, one ought ultimately to make the leap to faith that takes shape
within the religious sphere—one ought ultimately to trust in God—for life to arrive at its
fullest possible state in relation to God as Love—including inner peace (John
14:27)—and for the believer to be reconciled to God (Colossians 1:20).
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humankind against God and therefore humankind against itself.68 According to Tillich,
the two extremes of “courage to be as a part” and “courage to be as oneself” are,
respectively, overwhelming collectivism such as the ravages of twentieth century
Nazism, Marxism, and Fascism and overwhelming negativism of the radical
existentialism hinted at in Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre—negativism that might
believe itself capable to creating a world merely from an “empty shell,” negativism that
might ultimately deny its foundation in “being-itself” (Tillich, The Courage to Be 148153). From a Kierkegaardian perspective, Jake’s and Hemingway’s existentialist
tendencies arguably lean in the direction of the latter—lean in the direction of one being
able to accept oneself without acknowledging that the self has an ontologically rooted
structure. Tillich states, “Finite freedom has a definite structure, and if the self tries to
trespass upon this structure it ends in the loss of itself” (152). Even so, Kierkegaard (as
Judge William in Either/Or) acknowledges that one can in courage relate indirectly to
God/the Eternal by consciously choosing self while adopting a code of ethics69 such as
that exhibited by the Hemingway “code hero70.” Beyond that, however, as Christian
thinkers above all else, both Kierkegaard and Tillich urge the individual to ultimately
68

Dostoyevsky represents this in his works in several places. For example, in The
Brothers Karamozov’s “Discourses of the Elder Zosima,” Father Zosima exclaims, “They
think to establish themselves in truth and justice, but having rejected Christ they end by
bathing the world in blood, for blood seeketh blood, and they that take the sword shall
perish with it too. And were it not for the covenant of Christ, they should destroy one
another even unto the last two men upon the earth” (411).
69
“Religiousness A” and “first ethics” (see page 51 of the present study)
70
As Dr. Gerald Lucas observes, “Many of Hemingway’s heroes search for a
code—values that give their lives meaning. The artists of modernism turned inward to
find the truth since the external world was one of chaos. As a result, truth becomes
relativistic, subjective, and personal, lacking absolutes. This fluctuating reality becomes
the basis of a modernist interpretation of the universe: the construction of reality based
upon an individualistic and provisional interpretation of internal values”
(http://litmuse.maconstate.edu/~glucas/archives/000355.shtml).

125
make an appeal to God’s grace and thereby participate in “Religiousness B” and “second
ethics.” 71 Consistent with his ultimate concern of what it means to be a Christian in
Christendom, Kierkegaard believes that “to be cured of [the] sickness [of despair] is the
Christian’s blessedness” (The Sickness unto Death 15). As Kierkegaard scholar Rick
Anthony Furtak explains, Kierkegaard believes that the ultimate possibility for the self is
to not only be delivered from despair but to also be ‘grounded in God’s love’: “That
upon which we are inevitably dependent is not of our own making; love is the creative
source from which all things proceed as well as the ground in which they
subsist…Kierkegaard’s answer [to the question of how one relates to the “creative
source” unfathomable “ground”] is that the phenomenon of love gives us a direct insight
into the basic nature of existence: ‘God is Love, and therefore we can be like God only in
loving’…Kierkegaard’s view that love is fundamental to the self informs his reading of
the New Testament idea that our being is ‘rooted and grounded in love’” (Wisdom in
Love 98; Works of Love 36; Ephesians 3:17 KJV). IN terms of Kierkegaard’s ultimate
concern of what it means to become a Christian in Christendom, the ultimate concern of
the Christian ought to be to abide in God’s love (John 15:5), and the ultimate possibility
for the self would thus be to appeal to God’s grace and love. As Kierkegaard notes in his
journal regarding God as Love: “When I have said that there is a doubleness in this, that
he loves and wants to be loved, it should be remembered with regard to the latter that this
is again a qualification of his love for the person, because God knows that the highest
blessedness for a human being is to come to love God properly” (Journals and Papers,
Volume 3: 58).

71

See page 50 of the present study
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***
Although there is nobility in the character of Jake Barnes and he acts in a manner
that might be interpreted as courageous similar to the courage of Religiousness A and
first ethics, Jake Barnes the “Fisher King” does not ultimately make an appeal to
transcendence to receive healing from his wound—he does not ultimately make the leap
of faith to the religious sphere of existence. Jake Barnes exhibits the courage to be, but
he does not ultimately overcome the wound of the Fisher King. However, as if in answer
to Jake Barnes and the Hemingway “code hero”—Eugene Henderson of Saul Bellow’s
Henderson the Rain King is a Fisher King who begins to be reconciled with self and thus
begins to reach back toward the ontological structures of “being-itself”—toward both
nature and other human beings. The self becoming reconciled to self becomes a self who
reaches out toward others. As Anti-Climacus states, after making the leap to faith that
takes shape within the religious sphere, when despair is overcome by to leap of faith, “in
relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power
that established it” (The Sickness unto Death 131). Unlike Jake Barnes and the
Hemingway “code hero,” rather than face life in cool reserve, Eugene Henderson makes
an advance toward life—an often-awkward advance—but one that ultimately makes an
appeal to transcendence to overcome the “wound of the Fisher King.”
Henderson starts his journey in much the same state as that in which Jake Barnes
ends his: He is a man given to sarcasm who finds no rest in himself and no peace with the
world. Like Jake Barnes, Henderson’s situation is one of unsatisfied desire: “I heard the
old familiar voice within. It began to say, I want, I want, I want!” (Henderson the Rain
King 43). Both Eugene Henderson and Jake Barnes are “Fisher Kings” whose unfulfilled
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desire needs a remedy before they can embrace life. As in Parry’s (Robin Williams)
rendering of the myth in Richard LaGravenese’s screenplay The Fisher King, both
Henderson and Jake find that life has lost its meaning:
Parry: It begins with the King as a boy—having to spend a night alone in the
forest to prove his courage so that he could become king. While he was
standing there alone, he's visited by a sacred vision. Out of the fire appears
the Holy Grail, the symbol of God's divine grace. And a voice said to the boy,
"You shall be the keeper of the Grail, so that it may heal the hearts of men."
But the boy was blinded by greater visions, of a life filled with power and
glory and beauty. And in this state of radical amazement, he felt for a brief
moment not like a boy, but invincible...like God. So he reached into the fire to
take the Grail. And the Grail vanished, leaving him with his hand in the fire,
to be terribly wounded.
Now, as this boy grew older, his wound grew deeper, until one day, life
for him lost its reason. He had no faith in any man, not even himself. He
couldn't love or feel loved. He was sick with experience. He began to die.
The wound of the Fisher King is arguably despair over the aesthetic sphere; the Fisher
King’s visions of “a life filled with power” blind him because the visions are driven by
immediate desires, and he must die to those desires72 if he is to find the grail and thus
attain “God’s divine grace.” For this occasion, God sends a fool to show the Fisher King
wisdom. Through the fool, the Fisher King learns that one must find humility and be
willing to accept that “God’s divine grace” might show up in ways one might not have
72

To “repent of self” in its current state is Judge William’s expression (Either/Or II: 21618).
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suspected:
Parry: One day, a fool wandered into the castle and found the king alone.
Being a fool, he was simpleminded, he didn't see a king, he saw a man alone
and in pain. And he asked the king, "What ails you, friend?" The king replied,
"I'm thirsty. I need a some water to cool my throat." So the fool took a cup
from beside his bed, filled it with water, handed it to the king. As the king
began to drink he realized that his wound was healed. He looked at his hands,
and there was the Holy Grail that which he sought all of his life! And he
turned to the fool and said in amazement, "How could you find that which
what my brightest and bravest could not?" And the fool replied, "I don't
know. I only knew that you were thirsty."
Both Jake Barnes and Eugene Henderson share the malady of the Fisher King: they are
“sick with experience,” and, for both, the wound is the principle thing to be addressed
before they can move more fully toward life. Like Jake, Henderson fought in a world
war (4), but that is not “what ails him”: He is a multi-millionaire (3) who finds no
pleasure in life and has become a nuisance because of his restless and disruptive
behavior:
In my own way I worked hard. Violent suffering is labor. And, often I
was drunk before lunch…I raved at Lily [my wife] in public and swore at
her in private. I got into brawls in the country saloons near my farm and
the troopers locked me up. I offered to take them all on, and they would
have worked me over if I hadn’t been so prominent in the county. Lily
came and bailed me out. Then I had a fight with the vet over one of my
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pigs, and another with the driver of a snowplow on US 7 when he tried to
force me off the road. Then about two years ago I fell off a tractor while
drunk and ran over myself and broke my leg. For months I was on
crutches, hitting everyone who crossed my path, man or beast, and giving
Lily hell. With the bulk of a football player and the color of a gipsy,
swearing and crying out and showing my teeth and shaking my head—no
wonder people got out of my way. But this wasn’t all… (4, 5)
In contrast to Jake Barnes, Eugene Henderson expresses the wound of the Fisher King in
an outward manner: he progresses in the same manner as one who moves through the
aesthetic, to the ethical, and then at last to the religious sphere, and he does so in the same
outgoing, imposing manner. Jake maintains a suppressed, unobtrusive “code,” whereas,
Henderson blusters through his quest, imposing his large frame and large personality
upon whatever and whomever he encounters. In fact, Henderson addresses directly this
tendency to be outgoing to the point of bring imposing, when he states, ”I am not good at
suppressing my feelings. Whole crowds of them, especially the bad ones, wave to the
world from the galleries of my face. I can’t prevent them” (53).
During his quest through Africa in search of self and deliverance from the restless
inner voice “I want, I want, I want,” Henderson confronts what one might see as the limit
of the aesthetic sphere, and he does so by imposing himself upon a tribe he attempts to
help:
And I wanted to do something for them—my desire for this was
something fierce “At least,” I thought, “If I were a doctor I would operate
on Willatale’s [the queen’s] eye.” Oh, yes, I know what cataract
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operations are, and I had no intentions of trying. But I felt singularly
ashamed of not being a doctor—or maybe it was shame at having come all
this way and having nothing to contribute. All the ingenuity and
development and coordination that it takes to bring a fellow in the African
interior! And then—he is the wrong fellow! Thus I had once again the
conviction that I filled a place in existence which should be filled properly
by someone else. And I suppose it was ridiculous that it should trouble
me not to be a doctor, as after all some doctors are pretty puny characters,
and not a few I have met are in a racket, but I was thinking mostly about
my childhood idol, Sir Wilfred Grenfell of Labrador. Forty years ago,
when I read his books on the back porch, I swore I’d be a medical
missionary. It’s too bad, but suffering is about the only reliable burster of
the spirit’s sleep. There is a rumor of long standing that love also does it.
(77-78)
This passage reflects in two ways Henderson’s acting as one who has made the leap to
faith that might take shape within the ethical sphere. Firstly, he acts as one who
recognizes that in the ethical sphere “the individual and duty stand outside one another”
(Either/Or: Part II 254), moreover, Henderson acknowledges the gap between his desire
to perform an ethical act and his ability to do so. He wishes that he could remove
Willatale’s cataract, but he recognizes his inability to do so—wishes that he were a
doctor so that he could adequately perform the task. Secondly, in recalling his childhood
idol Sir Grenfell, Henderson recognizes that “the ethical is the universal and thus the
abstract” (255). Reading books on the back porch and dreaming of far-off adventures is a
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different matter from actually making a difference by meeting someone else’s needs
within the real-life context at-hand.
Further, like Hemingway, Bellow makes use of indirect communication in the
form of prosopopeia73, combined with irony, to show the protagonist at the limits of
“self.” However, in contrast to Jake’s suppressed, understated prosopopeia, Henderson’s
prosopopeia applies self-effacing sarcasm, a form of irony that in this context implies
humility. In contrast to Jake Barnes’ cool reserve, Henderson moves closer to life and in
the direction of “Truth.” Henderson’s use of prosopopeia and irony symbolize his
failure in the face of life’s ambiguities within the ethical sphere. Henderson appropriates
self-effacing prosopopeia to expose how he earlier, in prideful enthusiasm, squandered
his chance to rescue the tribe and its cattle from frogs that contaminate their cistern:
I blew on the wick of my device,74 to free it from dust (or for good luck),
and spun the wheel of the lighter, and when it responded with a flame, I lit
the fuse, formerly my shoelace…After this, I had to call on intuition plus
luck, and as there was now nothing I especially wanted to see in the
external world I closed my eyes and waited for the spirit to move me. It
was not yet time, and still not time, and I pressed the case and thought I
heard the spark as it ate the lace and fussed toward the powder. At the last
moment I took a Band-Aid which I had prepared for this moment and
fastened it over the hole. Then I lobbed the bomb, giving it an underhand
toss….Then a new motion began; the water swelled at the middle and I
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Sipiora, Phillip. ENG 7939: “Hemingway-Fitzgerald” class lecture notes. University of
South Florida: Fall 1995.
74
An improvised “pipe bomb” made from a flashlight, gun powder, and a shoelace
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realized that the thing was working. Damned if my soul didn’t rise with
the water even before it began to spout, following the same motion, and I
cried to myself, “Hallelujah! Henderson, you dumb brute, this time you’ve
done it!” Then the water came shooting upward. It might not have been
Hiroshima, but it was enough of a gush for me, and it started raining frogs’
bodies upward…
I had gotten more of a result than I could have known in the first
instants, and instead of an answering cry I heard shrieks from the natives,
and looking to see what was the matter I found that the dead frogs were
pouring out of the cistern together with the water. The explosion had
blasted out the retaining wall at the front end. The big stone blocks had
fallen and the reservoir was emptying fast. “Oh! Hell!” (77, 78)
The comic timing and hurried, cascading meter, coupled with inverted religious
symbolism, deliver Henderson’s self-effacing, sarcastic description of this attempt to
behave well within the “duties” of the ethical sphere. In attempting to be a hero to the
natives, Henderson ends up being run out of the village. An inversion of God in the
attempt to become a “deliverer,” Henderson creates an upside-down plague of frogs and a
flood, all at once.
Both Jake Barnes and Eugene Henderson suffer from the wound of the Fisher
King. Jake’s physical war wound leaves him with a permanent inability to be satisfied in
the immediate-erotic and the aesthetic sphere75. Even so, Jake moves beyond the
immediate-erotic stage of the aesthetic sphere to the ethical sphere in his recognition of
75

Jake’s penis was severed by a landmine, and his testicles remain intact. Thus, he can
experience sexual desire, but he cannot act on that desire in the conventional sense.
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the importance of aficion (171) and in his request that Brett live with him (62). Although
Brett rejects the offer (62), Jake is aware of the ethical either/or: of the individual either
being conscious of the code by which he orders his life, or of the individual not being
conscious of the code by which he orders his life. As Judge William explains with regard
to the ethical either/or, “The choice itself is crucial for the content of the personality:
through the choice the personality submerges itself in that which is being chosen, and
when it does not choose, it withers away in atrophy” (Either/Or II: 163). At the end of
The Sun Also Rises, Jake Barnes arguably stands at position analogous to Judge
William’s ethical either/or, in that it is ambiguous where Jake stands in relation to the
ethical either/or of choosing himself in relation to Brett. Although he is conscious of the
importance of the ethical either/or, the novel ends at a point at which it is not clear
whether he will again “submerge [himself] in that which is being chosen” or whether he
will “wither away in atrophy.”
In contrast, Henderson’s wound of the Fisher King eventually leads him to the
roots of humanity and to a more fulfilling existence in the ethical-religious sense, as
symbolized by one of his favorite expressions: “truth comes in blows” (23-ff).
Henderson claims to have arrived at this insight while chopping wood: “A chunk of wood
flew up from the block and hit me in the nose…I carried a bruise there for some
time…As I felt the blow my only thought was truth…That’s a military idea if ever there
was one. I tired to say something about it to Lily; she, too, had felt the force of truth
when her second husband, Hazard, punched her in the eye” (23). Unlike Jake Barnes,
Eugene Henderson usually expresses his ideas without resorting to avoidant behavior.
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As is indicative of the paradoxical nature of the religious sphere, Henderson must
find humility in the face of existence before he can grow as a personality and thereby
embrace existence more fully. He “must lose himself to find himself” (Matthew 10:39).
In both losing himself and finding himself, Henderson must conquer his fear of death and
then turn toward nature in a way that embraces both nature and his place as a natural
being. In contrast to Jake Barnes whose relationship to nature is one of domination and
control—trout fishing, bullfighting—Henderson’s relationship to nature moves from
control, to identification, to compassion—compassion toward all creation, including
other human beings. As Kierkegaard scholar Michael Watts states regarding to the
paradoxical nature of the religious sphere,
When Kierkegaard speaks of the fact that faith requires a ‘leap’ on the part
of the individual, he is not talking about any type of ‘blind leap’ or ‘a leap
into the dark’ which some forms of existentialism talk about. Rather, the
‘leap’ expresses Kierkegaard’s acknowledgment of the fact that faith is
discontinuous with what came before—it is not a development of any sort
of potential skill or characteristic that is already present in the individual
but a transition to a completely different dimension of consciousness. It is
the coming into being of something brand new. (Kierkegaard 89)
Henderson’s transformation in relation to nature symbolizes his coming into a new way
of being; he arguably acts as one who has made the leap to faith that brings a qualitative
shift in consciousness and a new relationship to the world.
Early in the novel, while he suffers from emotional distress—as a Fisher King for
whom “life has lost its meaning”—Henderson treats nature either with hostility or as a
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“means to an end.” His treating nature as a ”means to an end” takes on the form of his
raising pigs to spite his neighbors: “When I came back from the war it was with the
thought of becoming a pig farmer, which maybe illustrates what I thought of life in
general…The place stank of swill and pigs and the mashes cooking, and dung. Furious,
my neighbors got the health officer after me. I dared him to take me to law” (20, 21).
Here, Henderson does not embrace nature but exploits it to defiantly upset those around
him and draw attention to himself.
In addition to the “plague of frogs,” Henderson’s hostility toward nature takes on
the form of his shooting awkwardly in the direction of a cat left behind by former tenants
of Henderson’s who had left in a rush in response to one of Henderson’s tantrums:
They abandoned their cat, and I didn’t want a cat going wild on my place.
Cats gone wild are a bad business, and this was a very powerful animal…I
didn’t want to fire more than a single shot. From reading about Pancho
Villa I had picked up the Mexican method of marksmanship, which is to
aim with the forefinger on the barrel and press the trigger with the middle
finger, because the forefinger is the most accurate pointer at our disposal.
Thus I got the center of his head under my (somewhat twisted) forefinger,
but my will was not truly bent on his death, and I missed. (90, 92)
Later in his journey toward healing and self-discovery, when he and his guide
Romilayu discover a dead body, Henderson identifies himself symbolically with
“Lazarus” and thus with resurrection of the dead (Fisher King76):
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It is revealed later that the dead body actually is the body of the former king and the
precursor of Henderson’s reign as “Sungo”—or, Rain King (Chapter XIX).
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I had decided to carry this [dead body] on my back in case we had to run
for it…Tears of anger and repugnance began to hang from my eyes. I
fought to stifle these feelings back into my chest. And I thought, what if
this man should turn out to be a Lazarus? I believe in Lazarus. I believe
in the wakening of the dead. I am sure that for some, at least, there is a
resurrection. I was never better aware of my belief than when I stooped
there with my heavy belly, my face far forward and tears of fear and
sorrowful perplexity coming from my eyes. (139-140)
After his symbolic journey into the underworld and his encounter with “Lazarus,”
Henderson the Fisher/Rain King is symbolically prepared to later identify with nature in
the form of Atti the lioness. Under the tutelage of the ironic “philosopher king77, “
Dahfu, Henderson does not dominate nature; he identifies with nature as he descends to
identify with the lioness and imitates her—“transforms” himself into her:
“You must try to make more of a lion of yourself,” Dahfu insisted, and
that I certainly did. Considering my handicaps, the king declared I was
making progress. “Your roaring is still choked. Of course, it is natural, as
you have a lot to purge,” he would say. That was no lie, as everyone
knows. I would have hated to witness my own antics and hear my own
voice. Romilayu admitted that he had heard me roar, and you couldn’t
blame the rest of the natives for thinking that I was Dahfu’s understudy in
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In several ways, Dahfu is Henderson’s polar opposite. Henderson actually replaces
Dahfu in the ritual of the Fisher King by taking his place in the den with Atti the lioness.
Dahfu was educated in the West where he studied medicine (283), Henderson’s ideal.
Henderson comes from the West to Africa to become Dahfu’s “pupil” and find healing
that will “burst the spirit’s sleep” (76).
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the black arts, or whatever they accused him of practicing. But what the
king called pathos was actually (I couldn’t help myself) a cry which
summarized my entire course on this earth, from birth to Africa; and
certain words crept into my roars, like “God,” “Help,” “Lord have mercy,”
only they came out “Hooolp! “Moooorcy!” It’s funny what words sprang
forth. “Au secours, “ which was “Secooooooor” and also “De
profooooondis,” plus snatches of “The Messiah” (He was despised and
rejected, a man of sorrows, etcetera)… (274)
After his ritual transformation, in which he makes a “leap” from imitation to
identification, Henderson writes a letter to his wife and asks that she enroll him in
medical school: “When I get back, I am going to study medicine. My age is against it,
but that’s just too damn bad, I’m going to do it anyway” (284). Henderson thus acts as
one who sets his life before him as a task that might benefit others.
Although he loses part of the letter—symbolizing that transformation of self will
still involve striving toward being and “Truth”—Henderson still recognizes that his “life
and deeds were a prison” (284). He sees himself as one who has found deliverance from
his former self.
Henderson finds both “courage to be as oneself” and “courage to be as a part,78”
as he moves toward a vocation—a “calling”—that will make a difference in the lives of
others. The symbol of Lazarus is especially appropriate to the “resurrected” Eugene
Henderson: Kierkegaard appropriates the symbol of Lazarus in The Sickness unto Death
in his treatment of despair. In reference to Jesus’ words with regard to Lazarus, “this
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(Tillich, The Courage to Be 113-54; 86-112)
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sickness is not unto death” (John 11:4), Kierkegaard claims “despair is the sickness unto
death” (14). Like Lazarus, Henderson experiences a resurrection in terms of his
relationship to the world. In contrast to the individual who remains confined to the
aesthetic sphere, whose “inclosing reserve” leaves him under the sway of despair, Eugene
Henderson is released from his former notion of self and chooses to turn more fully
toward life and dedicate himself to making a difference for others.
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CHAPTER 4
MRS. DALLOWAY
AND
KIERKEGAARD’S THREE SPHERES OF EXISTENCE

A Brief Overview of Relevant Criticism
For the scholar interested in studies that treat issues relevant to Woolf’s Mrs.
Dalloway—narrative style, irony, critical reception, or research tools—the following
works might prove valuable:
The studies in style, irony, and narrative voice that might prove useful include
Daniel Ferrer’s Virginia Woolf and the Madness of Language (Routledge, 1990), Diane
Gillespie’s The Sisters' Arts: The Writing and Painting of Virginia Woolf and Vanessa
Bell (Syracuse University Press, 1988), Mark Hussey’s The Singing of the Real World:
The Philosophy of Virginia Woolf (Ohio State University Press, 1986), Alice van Buren
Kelly’s The Novels of Virginia Woolf: Fact and Vision (Chicago University Press, 1973),
Beverly Ann Schlack’s Continuing Presences: Virginia Woolf's Use of Literary Allusion
(Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979), Makiko Minow-Pinkney’s Virginia Woolf
and the Problem of the Subject: Feminine Writing in the Major Novels (Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1987), Jane Marcus’ Virginia Woolf and the Languages of Patriarchy
(Indiana University Press, 1987), Jane Goldman’s The Feminist Aesthetics of Virginia
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Woolf: Modernism, Post-Impressionism, and the Politics of the Visual (Cambridge
University Press, 2001), and Alex Zwerdling’s Virginia Woolf and the Real World
(University of California Press, 1986).
Scholars interested in reference material on Virginia Woolf might consult Mark
Hussey’s Virginia Woolf A to Z (Oxford University Press, 1995), Julia King’s The
Library of Leonard and Virginia Woof: A Short Title Catalog (Washington State
University Press, 2004), and Julia Briggs’ Virginia Woolf: Introductions to the Major
Works (Virago Press, 1994).
Scholars interested in connections between Virginia Woolf and James Joyce
might refer to Tony Jackson’s The Subject of Modernism: Alterations in the Fiction of
Eliot, Conrad, Woolf, and Joyce (University of Michigan Press, 1995), John WhittierFerguson’s Designs of the Gloss in Joyce, Woolf, and Pound (Oxford University Press,
1996), and Richard Pearce’s The Politics of Narration: James Joyce, William Faulkner,
and Virginia Woolf (Rutgers University Press, 1991).

A Close Reading of the Novel
With reference to Brain McHale’s concept of the dominant mentioned in Chapter
1 and the manner in which it relates to Mrs. Dalloway, it is worth noting here that the first
two79 novels in this study resemble more what one would typically consider “literary
modernism” since they both offer an epistemological dominant. However, the second
two novels, Mrs. Dalloway and Ulysses are forerunners in what we now consider
“postmodern” because they both “foreground” an ontological dominant. Whereas
79

Technically, three, if you count also Saul Bellow’s Henderson the Rain King, which
also presents an epistemological “dominant,” as in the missing part of the letter to Lily.

141
modernist fiction is marked by a dominant that features “textual indefiniteness or
incompleteness, [and] epistemological doubt,” postmodernist fiction is marked by
“epistemological issues [which are] backgrounded as the price for foregrounding
ontology” (Postmodernist Fiction 10, 11). Modernist texts tend to prefer the
epistemological dominant and thus tend to take shape in the form of underlying questions
such as,
“How can I interpret this world of which I am part? And what am I in it?”
Other typical modernist questions might be added: “What is there to be
known? Who knows it? ; How do they know it and with what degree of
certainty? ; How is knowledge transmitted from one knower to another,
and with what degree of reliability?; How does the object of knowledge
change as it passes from knower to knower? ; What are the limits of the
knowable?” And so on. (9)
Whereas the epistemological dominant of the modernist text tends to present the reader
with “problems in knowing,80” the ontological dominant of the postmodernist text tends
to present the reader with “problems in modes of being.81” These problems in modes of
being, McHale claims, might take the form of the following questions:
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McHale illustrates this point by citing the detective story as the epistemological genre
par excellence (9). In a detective story, the reader must “sift through the evidence of
witnesses of different degrees of reliability in order to reconstruct and solve a ‘crime’”
(9). McHale believes that the modernist texts such as Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! “are
organized around issues of epistemological doubt and meta-lingual self-reflection” (8).
Like the detective story, modernist fiction tends to take shape within the context of a
dominant concern that asks the question “what is there to be known?”
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McHale illustrates this point by citing the science fiction story as the ontological genre
par excellence (16). McHale claims that “postmodernist fiction differs from modernist
fiction just as a poetics dominated by ontological issues differs from one dominated by
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“Which world is this? What is to be done in it? Which of my selves is to
do it?” Other typical postmodernist questions bear either on the ontology
of the literary text itself or on the ontology of the world it projects, for
instance: What is a world? ; What kinds of world are there, how are they
constituted, and how do they differ? ; What happens when different kinds
of world are placed in confrontation, or when boundaries between worlds
are violated? ; What is the mode of existence of a text, and what is the
mode of existence of the world (or worlds) it projects? How is a projected
world structured?” (McHale 10)
Unlike The Great Gatsby and The Sun Also Rises, Mrs. Dalloway offers a narrative
structure that employs multiple voices through which it tends also to “foreground”
ontological issues such as “what is the mode of existence of a text?” and “what happens
when different types of world are placed in confrontation?”
Like The Great Gatsby and The Sun Also Rises, Mrs. Dalloway contains
paradoxical characters. However, these paradoxical characters take shape within
complex movement of time, place, and character—one that includes “stream-ofconsciousness” narrative and fragmented time. This increased complexity of narrative
voice/ontology offers a highly dynamic possibility for a close reading that deals with
irony and the three spheres of existence.
***

epistemological issues” (xii). ). Like science fiction, postmodernist fiction tends to take
shape within the context of a dominant concern that asks the question “what type of
world is this?”
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Regarding the aesthetic sphere of existence, Mrs. Dalloway offers more complex
opportunities for close reading than the novels considered thus far, since it makes use of
dynamic characters/voices in relation to one another—as opposed to the characters of The
Great Gatsby and The Sun Also Rises, that tend to inhabit spaces in isolation/alienation
from one another. The paradoxical round-robin of voices/characters in Mrs. Dalloway
creates a “ghostly” quality in the way that it applies indirect communication, as opposed
to the prosopopeia82 more characteristic of the previous two novels. Thus, it makes sense
to treat the characters analyzed in terms of the three spheres in a complimentary manner,
as opposed to treating them in isolation from one another.
The first relationship to be investigated is that of Richard Dalloway in relation to
the public sphere (his political life) and Richard Dalloway in relation to the private sphere
(his relationship to Clarissa). Specifically, though one might think that Richard’s
position as political figure would place him in an emblematic role within the ethical
sphere—the sphere associated with “duty83” and social obligations, Richard Dalloway’s
thoughtless traditionalism and unthinking political conservativism reveal that he is
actually a ghost-of-a-man in relation to both the political world and his wife. Like
shallow twenty-first century coffee shop culture, with its generic “classical” music that is
innocuous almost to the point of being unnoticeable, Richard Dalloway seems to have
been relieved of soul. His lack of traction in life places him into the company of those
who fail to exhibit “the courage to be as a part.” 84 He is a man driven primarily by
convention and appearances, not a man of action, thus, his profession of political
82

Sipiora, Phillip. ENG 7939: “Hemingway-Fitzgerald,” class lecture notes. University
of South Florida: Fall 1995.
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Judge William in Either/Or: Part II serves just such an emblematic role
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Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, pages 86-ff
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discourse is highly ironic. Woolf scholar Mark Hussey claims that Richard
Dalloway—both in his role in The Voyage Out and in Mrs. Dalloway—represents a type
that Woolf’s fiction often critiques” (Virginia Woolf A-Z 68). Richard Dalloway is
“described by Peter Walsh as possessed of the ‘public-spirited, British Empire, tariffreform, governing-class spirit’” (68). His commitment to the status quo and British
Imperialism mark him as one whose political aims take shape within the aesthetic sphere,
the sphere of self-interest and thoughtless conformism. Although there is a place for a
conservative politics that takes shape within the realm of the ethical sphere, Richard
Dalloway’s brand of conservative conformism resembles the “governing-class spirit” that
is more often than not driven more by fear of change85—by aesthetic despair—than by
commitment to making a difference in the lives of others.
The courage to be as a part is the courage to affirm one’s own being by
participation. One participates in the world to which one belongs and
from which one at the same time is separated. But participating in the
world becomes real through participation in those sections of it which
constitute one’s own life. The world as a whole is potential, not actual.
Those sections are actual with which one is partially identical. The more
self-relatedness a being has the more it is able, according to the polar
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In Destiny of Man Nicolas Berdyaev claims that there is a tendency toward two
extremes in political discourse and that these two extremes tend to occur dialectically and
falsely see themselves in exclusion of one another. He refers to these two fallacious
tendencies as “the illusion of conservatism” (the illusion that political and social issues
remain the same through time, without regard for changes in human needs and
consciousness) and “false liberalism” (the erroneous notion that every individual ought to
be able to pursue his or her immediate desires without regard for the social conditions athand). Drawing from both Marx and Nietzsche in formulating the terms, Berdyaev
moves beyond both Marx and Nietzsche by making the claim that both of these political
extremes spring from existential fear—from a lack of faith in either self or humanity.
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structure of reality, to participate. Man as the completely centered being
or as a person can participate in everything, but he participates through
that section of the world which makes him a person. Only in the
continuous encounter with persons does the person become and remain a
person. The place of this encounter is the community. (Tillich, The
Courage to Be 90-91)
The community is also the realm of the ethical sphere in that the universal concepts of
language are realized in “community,” in actual connections between persons who strive
to actualize themselves in relation to one another—who strive to realize such universal
concepts as “justice,” “honor,” family,” friends,” etc. Thus, Kierkegaard, through the
voice of Judge William, representative persona of the ethical sphere, can say that
the ethical…is that whereby a person comes what he becomes. It does not
want to make the individual into something else but into the individual
himself; it does not want to destroy the aesthetic but to transfigure it. For
a person to live ethically it is necessary that he become conscious of
himself, so thoroughly that no accidental element escapes him. The
ethical does not want to wipe out this concretion but sees in it its task, sees
the material with which it is to build and that which it is to build.
Ordinarily we view the ethical altogether abstractly and therefore have a
secret horror of it. In that case the ethical is viewed as something alien to
the personality, and we shrink from devoting ourselves to it, since we
cannot really be sure what it will lead to in the course of time. (Either/Or
II: 253)
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Insofar as he “shrinks from devoting [himself] to [the ethical sphere],” Richard Dalloway
is a character that resembles an individual who remains confined to the aesthetic sphere.
This resemblance finds representation in his public life by way of his politics tinged with
self-interest. An example of this sort of “collectivist” thinking occurs when Richard
Dalloway hears from Dr. Bradshaw of the suicide of Septimus Smith. Richard’s response
is not one of compassion toward the man or his family86; Richard instead resembles one
acting within the aesthetic sphere, addressing the issue by refracting it through politics:
he refracts the issue through an abstract conversation about a “provision in [a]
Bill…concerning the effects of shell shock,”(200) one of which is the suicide of Septimus
Smith, who was a person, not an abstract “effect.” Richard Dalloway’s refracting
Septimus Smith’s suicide through trivial matters resembles Anti-Climacus description of
despair and the “philistine-bourgeois mentality“: “The philistine-bourgeois mentality,
that is, triviality, essentially lacks possibility. The philistine-bourgeois mentality is
spiritlessness…Bereft of imagination, as the philistine-bourgeois always is, whether
alehouse keeper or prime minister, he lives within a certain trivial compendium of
experiences as to how things go, what is possible, what usually happens” (The Sickness
unto Death 41). Richard Dalloway acts in a manner consistent with the “despair that
lacks possibility” that Anti-Climacus associates with the philistine-bourgeois mentality
(41), in that he refracts the serious matter of suicide through the trivial issue of a
provision in a bill.
With regard to the tensions within the narrative voices of the novel, Richard’s
distance from Septimus Smith in his tragedy stands in counter-point to his distance from
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Clarissa in her tragedy. Thus, Richard Dalloway’s “ghostly” nature is represented further
by his failure in the personal sphere.

His “specular moment87” in the novel is his failure

to say “I love you” to Clarissa:
Peter Walsh! All three, Lady Bruton, Hugh Whitbread, and Richard
Dalloway, remembered the same thing—how passionately Peter had been
in love; been rejected; gone to India; come a cropper; made a mess of
things; and Richard Dalloway had a great liking for the dear old fellow
too. Milly Brush saw that; saw a depth in the brown of his eyes; saw him
hesitate; consider; which interested her, as Mr. Dalloway always interested
her, for what was he thinking, she wondered, about Peter Walsh?
That Peter Walsh had been in love with Clarissa; that he would go
back directly after lunch and find Clarissa; that he would tell her, in so
many words, that he loved her. Yes, he would say that. (115-116)
Richard Dalloway’s presence in the life of Clarissa and in the lives of those around him is
most notable as an absence—he is a ghost-of-a-man. Richard thinks of telling Clarissa
that he loves her, “in so many words,” in reaction to his remembering Peter Walsh once
having done so. His reactionary, romanticized version of Peter Walsh connects him to
the person in despair who lacks of a true sense of self. Julia Watkin notes, Kierkegaard
believes that the person in “unconscious despair” is “for a time, superficially happy in a
life directed toward temporal goals such as making money or achieving political power.
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Paul DeMan’s term applies here because Richard Dalloway is a presence in the
aesthetic sphere by virtue of his absence in the ethical sphere—is a specter. DeMan’s
term is connected in the essay “Autobiography as De-facement” to the individual’s
recognition of “the impossibility of coming into being” of an exhaustive interpretation of
self within a system of language and is thus also connected with the rhetorical figure
“prosopopeia.”
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When the goals begin to fail to satisfy, that person tries to deal with the problem as
something external needing to be fixed” (Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s
philosophy 65). In the sense that he fails to see the significance of his place the life of
Clarissa, Richard Dalloway resembles the individual who in unconscious despair
occupies himself with trivial details and fails to consider deeper issues relevant to the
ethical-religious possibilities. Peter Walsh has not played the role in Clarissa’s everyday
life that Richard has, but Richard fails to see that. Peter Walsh and Richard Dalloway are
diametrically opposed characters in that Peter has been a “presence while being absent”
and Richard has been an “absence while being present.” As Judge William notes with
regard to personality and the ethical sphere, “The more deeply a man has structured his
life ethically, the less he will feel compelled to talk about duty every moment, to worry
every moment whether he is performing it, every moment to seek the advice of others
about what his duty is. When the ethical is viewed properly, it makes the individual
infinitely secure within himself; when it is viewed improperly, it makes the individual
utterly insecure” (Either/Or: Part II 255). In contrast to the security of self one
experiences within the ethical sphere, Richard Dalloway’s wanting to tell Clarissa that he
loves her in reaction to Peter Walsh, in Kierkegaardian terms, identifies him more with
the individual who remains confined to the aesthetic sphere than is does with the
emblematic role of faithful husband. In a sense, Richard Dalloway acts in manner akin to
persons in “unconscious despair,” who find themselves “completely absorbed in one of
the multitude of ready-made identities provided by society” (Watts 183).
The counterpart to Richard Dalloway in the aesthetic sphere is Dr. William
Bradshaw, who also fails to in his public life and who also lives in terms of “social
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decorum” and what he believes others think of him. For example, his insecurity over his
public image is symbolized by his resentment toward those whom he considers to be of a
higher position socially. “…There was in Sir William, whose father had been a
tradesman, a natural respect for breeding and clothing, which shabbiness nettled; again,
more profoundly, there was in Sir William, who never had time for reading, a grudge,
deeply buried, against cultivated people who came into his room and intimated that
doctors, whose profession is a constant strain upon all the highest faculties, are not
educated men” (105).
Further, Dr. Bradshaw serves as a counterpart to Richard Dalloway in that he too
conducts his profession in a superficial way, out of self-interest, as is often the case for an
individual confined to the aesthetic sphere. For example, his failure as doctor to
Septimus Smith is linked to his self-interested approach to his profession. This is
indicated not only by his being paired with Richard Dalloway in the discussion of the
“Bill concerning the effects of shell shock” (200), but also by way of his rationalizations
associated with the treatment of Septimus Smith and his other patients, for whom he
recommends, “proportion”:
Proportion, divine proportion, Sir William’s goddess, was acquired
by Sir William walking hospitals, catching salmon, begetting one
son in Harley Street by Lady Bradshaw, who caught salmon
herself and took photographs scarcely to be distinguished from the
work of professionals. Worshipping proportion, Sir William not
only prospered himself but made England prosper, secluded her
lunatics, forbade childbirth, penalized despair, made it possible for
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the unfit to propagate their views until they, too, shared his sense
of proportion—his, if they were men, Lady Bradshaw’s of they
were women (she embroidered, knitted, spent four nights out of
seven at home with her son), so that not only did his colleagues
respect him, his subordinated fear him, but the friends and relations
of his patients felt for him the keenest gratitude for insisting that
these Christs and Christesses, who prophesied the end of the world,
or the advent of God, should drink milk in bed, as Sir William
ordered; Sir William with his thirty years’ experience at these
kinds of cases, and his infallible instinct, this is madness, this is
sense; in fact, his sense of proportion. (107-108)
For all his “sense of proportion,” Sir William proves to be of little help in preventing
Septimus Smith from jumping to his death in a most gruesome fashion: “He had thrown
himself from a window. Up had flashed the ground; through him, blundering, bruising,
went the rusty spikes. There he lay with a thud, thud, thud in his brain, and then a
suffocation of blackness” (200). Instead of facing ideally-ethical medical matters as
matters unique to the context that actualizes the universal in the concrete, Sir William
acts in a manner similar to the individual who in aesthetic despair “remains too deeply
rooted in his own mode of life and thought to attempt to liberate himself and seeks
instead, by a variety of stratagems, to keep the truth from impinging upon him” (Gardiner
45-46). In Kierkegaardian terms, Dr. Bradshaw’s continually falling back on the idea
that cures are a matter of maintaining one’s “sense of proportion” might be read as a
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“stratagem” similar to the stratagems the aesthete uses to keep truth from “impinging
upon him.”
Dr. William Bradshaw’s relation to Richard Dalloway is paralleled by Doris
Kilman’s relation to Clarissa. As with Sir William and his well-read clients, Miss
Kilman, in her resentment toward others, acts as one confined to the aesthetic sphere.
Although her position as tutor might initially appear to be emblematic of the ethical
sphere, her resentment toward Clarissa and her desire to “ruin” Clarissa reveal that she is
the most loathsome individual in the novel who is confined to the aesthetic sphere:
But Miss Kilman did not hate Mrs. Dalloway. Turning her large
gooseberry-coloured eyes upon Clarissa, observing her small pink face,
her delicate body, her air of freshness and fashion, Miss Kilman felt, Fool!
Simpleton! You have known neither sorrow nor pleasure; who have
trifled your life away! And there rose in her an overmastering desire to
overcome her; to unmask her. If she could have felled her it would have
eased her. But it was not the body; it was the soul and its mockery that
she wished to subdue; make her feel mastery. If only she could make her
weep; could ruin her; humiliate her; bring her to her knees crying. You
are right! But this was God’s will, not Miss Kilman’s. It was to be a
religious victory. So she glared; so she glowered. (135-136)
Miss Kilman’s resentment in relation to Clarissa and Clarissa’s station in life resembles
Dr. Bradshaw’s resentment toward those whom he considers to be of higher social
standing. Both loathe others in reaction to their own failures, and this active form of
resentment resembles in Kierkegaard’s philosophy the demonic aspect of the aesthetic
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sphere. As Julia Watkin remarks, Kierkegaard believes that “the good is viewed by the
demonic individual as bad and a threat to freedom” (Historical Dictionary of
Kierkegaard’s Philosophy 63). Whereas Clarissa’s dissipation is outward, Miss Kilman’s
dissipation is inward—Miss Kilman’s dissipation is a dissipation of the soul in the sense
that she resembles symbolically the “inclosing reserve” of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic
sphere. Kierkegaard’s narrative persona Judge William asserts, “The individual [who]
rests with confident security in the assurance that his life is ethically structured…does not
torment himself and others with quibbling anxiety about this or that” (Either/Or: Part II
257). To resent others in indirect proportion to one’s failure to actualize oneself is
arguably a marker trait of the individual confined within the demonic element of aesthetic
sphere. Whereas the individual acting within the ethical sphere finds self-actualization in
love for others that she expresses through concrete actions, the individual under the sway
of the demonic aspect of the aesthetic sphere might ultimately amount to failure of the
personality to realize selfhood. The self of such an individual might devolve into
resentment; the self might fall into “inclosing reserve.”

Kierkegaard believes that

within the aesthetic sphere “what is demonic wants to shut itself up in itself and isolate
itself from the threat of the good” (Watkin 63). Within the context of the personality that
is limited by being confined to the aesthetic sphere, his acting in resentment toward
others might ultimately become a covert way of sabotaging his potential to become a
concrete personality.
***
Lucrezia (Rezia) Warren Smith, wife of Septimus Smith, is the character in Mrs.
Dalloway who serves as the clearest representative the ethical sphere of existence. Her
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constant care for Septimus is represented by Woolf as arising from Rezia’s love for
Septimus and from the associated sense of “duty” and “responsibility”:
Mr. Smith was talking aloud to himself, Agnes the servant girl cried to
Mrs. Filmer in the kitchen. “Evans, Evans,” he had said as she brought in
the tray. She jumped, she did. She scuttled downstairs.
And Rezia came in, with her flowers, an walked across the room,
and put the roses in the vase, upon which the sun struck directly, and it
went laughing, leaping round the room.
She had had to buy the roses, Rezia said, from a poor man in the
street. But they were almost dead already, she said, arranging the roses.
So there was a man outside; Evans presumably; and the roses,
which Rezia said were half dead, had been picked by him in the fields of
Greece. “Communication is health; communication is happiness,
communication—“ he muttered.
“What are you saying Septimus?” Rezia asked, wild with terror,
for he was talking to himself.
She sent Agnes running for Dr. Holmes. Her husband, she said,
was mad. He scarcely knew her. (100-101)
Rezia Warren Smith’s place within the ethical sphere is symbolized here by her buying
flowers from the “poor man in the street,” though the flowers are clearly dying and will
serve her little purpose, and by her sending “Agnes running for Dr. Holmes.” The dying
flowers also foreshadow that her concern and care for Septimus will ultimately fail.
Although noble and worthy, “duty” and “responsibility” cannot ultimately overcome the
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power of death and one’s recognition of finitude. According to Kierkegaard, only the
leap of faith to the religious sphere can accomplish this88. Rezia faces the limitations of
the ethical sphere when she asks “why me?”:
But Lucrezia Warren Smith was saying to herself, it’s wicked; why should
I suffer? She was asking as she walked down the broad path.89 No; I can’t
stand it any longer, she was saying, having left Septimus, who wasn’t
Septimus any longer, to say hard, cruel, wicked things, to talk to himself,
to talk to a dead man [Evans] on the seat over there; when the child ran
full tilt into her, fell flat, and burst out crying.
That was comforting rather. She stood her upright, dusted her
frock, kissed her.
But for herself she had done nothing wrong; she had loved
Septimus; she had been happy; she had had a beautiful home, and there
her sisters lived still, making hats. Why should she suffer? (69-70)
In spite of the chaos that surrounds her, Rezia Warren Smith honors the ethical either/or,
in that, in spite of the chaos, she chooses herself within the ethical: she dusts off and
kisses the little girl who runs into her.
Clarissa also faces paradox with regard to the limit of the ethical sphere of
existence, by serving as the mediating point in the contrasting roles of the other primary
characters. Most significant of these contrasts is her double-bladed relationship to Peter
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“O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?” (I Corinthians 15:55)
Apparently, this expression is Woolf’s ironic pun on Jesus’ expression “wide is the gate
and broad is the road that leads to destruction and many enter through it” (Matthew 7:13)
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Walsh, her adventurous suitor, and Richard, her less-than-adventurous suitor-thenhusband. Regarding Richard, Clarissa recognizes that
no vulgar jealousy could separate her from Richard. But she feared that
time itself, and read on lady Bruton’s face, as if it had been a dial cut in
impassive stone, the dwindling of life; how year by year her share was
sliced; how little the margin that remained was capable any longer of
stretching, of absorbing, as in the youthful years, the colours, salts, tones,
of existence, so that she filed the room she entered, and felt often as she
stood hesitating one moment on the threshold of her drawing-room, an
exquisite suspense, such as might stay a diver before plunging while the
sea darkens and brightens beneath him, and the waves which threaten to
break but only gently split their surface, roll and conceal and encrust as
they turn over the weeds with pearl. (30-31)
In counteracting her recognition of finitude, Clarissa foreshadows her later similarity to
the individual who recognizes of the limit of the ethical sphere:
Not for a moment did she believe in God; but all the more, she thought,
taking up the [drawing] pad, one must repay in daily life to servants, yes,
to dogs and canaries, above all to Richard her husband, who was the
foundation of it—of the gay sounds, of the green lights, of the cook even
whistling, for Mrs. Walker was Irish and whistled all day long—one must
pay back from this secret deposit of exquisite moments, while Lucy stood
by her, trying to explain how. (30)
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Here, Clarissa connects the sense of duty and obligation characteristic of the ethical
sphere to the beauty and precious moments of life, but this connection arises from her
recognition that, soon enough, life will have passed. This in a sense resembles
Kierkegaard’s idea that one might relate indirectly to God/the Eternal through moments
within the ethical sphere in expression of Religiousness A, even though ultimately in
Kierkegaard’s “Christomorphic poetics90” it is the Incarnation that brings reconciliation
with God and offers the personality complete deliverance from despair and assurance of
eternal life (John 3:15; Titus 3:5-7). From a Kierkegaardian perspective, the tragic
beauty of Clarissa recognizing the she too soon will pass is the tragic beauty of the finite
within the ethical sphere. For Kierkegaard, it is the leap to faith that takes shape within
the religious sphere that ultimately overcomes the finite aspect of human existence and
the power of despair (1 Corinthians 15:55).
In facing her failure to be like Peter Walsh, Clarissa arguably acts as one who
within the context of Kierkegaard’s Religiousness A in noble courage embraces finitude
while also recognizing the tragic sense of the world’s beauty—she arrives at a point at
which she might acknowledge that her diminishing health leaves her with the challenge
of facing with existential gravity her place in the world as that very place fades away.
This is why Lucio Ruotolo refers to Clarissa Dalloway as an “existential hero” (Hussey
66). Ironically, when Peter Walsh returns and sees her family life, it is Peter, not
Clarissa, who considers himself to be a “failure” in the sense of one’s rising to the truer
things of life:
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His life was not over; not by any means. He was only past fifty. Shall I
tell her, he thought, or not? He would like to make clean breast of it all.
But she is too cold, he thought; sewing with her scissors; Daisy would
look ordinary beside Clarissa. And she would think me a failure, which I
am in their sense, he thought, in the Dalloway’s sense. Oh yes, he had no
doubt about that; he was a failure compared with all of this—the inlaid
table, the mounted paper-knife, the dolphin and the candlesticks, the chaircovers and the old valuable English tinted prints—he was a failure! (45)
In moving beyond defining herself narrowly in relation to limitations set forth by
her earlier rejection of Peter Walsh or her marriage to Richard Dalloway, Clarissa acts as
one who “chooses herself” within the context of Kierkegaard’s ethical sphere; she
recognize that she is not “Mrs. Dalloway,” nor is she the interpretation of herself into
which she is tempted to fall in reaction to her declining health. She stands in the position
of the individual who faces the existential limit of her interpretation of self. She faces a
situation similar to the individual who confronts the limit of the ethical sphere and the
finite nature of human existence, and she thus reaches a place where an individual might
embrace the possibility of making a leap to faith that takes shape within the religious
sphere. Even though the narrative voice claims, “not for a moment did [Clarissa] believe
in God” (30), Kierkegaard would argue that this very sort of radical skepticism might
paradoxically make one a good candidate for the leap to faith that takes shape within the
religious sphere. For example, in a journal entry from 1845 that is entitled “A Proof for
the Truth of Christianity,” Kierkegaard claims,
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The proof is that many times its most zealous enemies have become its
most zealous defenders. With philosophers and others like them the
opposite often happens, that the closest adherent becomes an enemy and
falls away. The double relationship in Christianity is the very thing that
demonstrates its absolute truth, the fact that it goads just as intensely as it
attracts. Generally, an adherent’s first relationship is immediately defined
as that of a friend, not an enemy; he becomes charmed (he is repulsed by
Christianity), and then he becomes bored. It is just the opposite with
Christianity. It is so full of meaning that it first repels and then attracts,
and the repulsion of the contrast is the dynamometer of the inwardness.
(Journal and Papers, Volume 1: 179)
In a similar context, Kierkegaard notes in a journal entry from 1835, “It is the same with
Christianity or with becoming a Christian as it is with all radical cures. One postpones it
as long as possible” (168). For Kierkegaard, the Absolute Paradox “repels and then
attracts.”
In resembling one who has reached the limit of Kierkegaard’s ethical sphere,
Clarissa also confronts the double-bladed nature of her relationship to both Sally Seton
and Elizabeth Dalloway. The first part of this paradoxical triad takes on the form of the
Sally Seton of the past (a retreat by Clarissa into the world of Romantic imagination) and
the Sally Seton of the present (a “real” human being whose abiding within the ethical
sphere disrupts Clarissa’s retreat into the Romantic). The Sally Seton of the past is
something to which Clarissa apparently clings to brace herself against her
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dissipation—memories of a fond youth that never really was—an idealized picture of the
past that becomes a tempting means to escape from the present:
[Sally Seton and Clarissa] sat, hour after hour, talking in her bedroom at
the top of the house, talking about life, how they were to reform the world.
They meant to found a society to abolish private property, and actually
had a letter written, though not sent out. The ideas were Sally’s, of
course—but very soon she was just as excited—read Plato in bed before
breakfast; read Morris; read Shelly by the hour.
Sally’s power was amazing, her gift, her personality. There was
her way with flowers, for instance. At Bourton they always had stiff little
vases all the way down the table. Sally went out, picked hollyhocks,
dahlias—all sorts of flowers that had never been seen together—cut their
heads off, and made them swim on the top of water bowls. The effect was
extraordinary—coming into dinner in the sunset. (Of course, Aunt Helena
thought it wicked to treat flowers like that.) Then she forgot her sponge,
and ran along the passage naked. The grim old housemaid, Ellen Atkins,
went about rumbling—“suppose any of the gentlemen had seen?” Indeed
she did shock people. She was untidy, Papa said. (33-36)
In a sense, Sally Seton of the past represents for Clarissa what the green light represents
for Gatsby—an escape from the present “reality.” Sally Seton of the past is exotic,
represents adventure, the new, the strange, primeval sexuality, challenging of authority,
challenging of family conventions and prim and proper behavior, fun for the sake of fun,
and new ideas as a means of escaping thoughtless conventionality. However, like the
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green light for Gatsby, Sally Seton of the past represents the Romantic escapism
characteristic of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic sphere—Shelly, Morris, and Sally Seton
symbolize for Clarissa what she never had the courage to become. Unlike Gatsby,
however, Clarissa’s escapist dream collides with a present that offers hope: Sally Seton of
the present is, for Clarissa, a metaphor for personality associated with the responsibilities
of motherhood—with facing one’s place within the ethical sphere of existence. Such an
example of a connection with the ethical might lead Clarissa naturally to thoughts of
Elizabeth Dalloway, Clarissa’s link to the future.
In a way that resembles Judge William’s exhorting the aesthete of Either/Or II to
embrace the existentially rewarding responsibilities that life within the ethical sphere
might offer, 91 the idealized Sally Seton of the past is disrupted as the “real” Sally Seton
re-enters Clarissa’s life. Sally Seton of the present has “five sons” (204) and is a married
woman in her fifties, Lady Rosseter, wife of an industrialist (204). Sally Seton of the
past, this “ghostly” memory to which Clarissa retreats on occasion, represents Clarissa’s
failure to find lasting meaning within her occasional retreats to the aesthetic sphere.
Sally Seton of the present arguably represents for Clarissa Religiousness A’s truthful and
often jarring self-assessment—recognition that the ethical sphere takes precedence over
Romantic visions from the past, however tempting they might be. Clarissa arguably
faces a situation similar to the individual who through concrete and specific action might
choose herself by “repenting” of her earlier self (Either/Or II: 216).
The second part of this triad of symbols of the ethical sphere for takes on the form
of the Elizabeth Dalloway of the present (whom Clarissa strives to understand) and the
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For example, the “aesthetic validity of marriage” (Either/Or II: 5-145).
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Elizabeth Dalloway of the future (who symbolizes Clarissa’s tragic relation to the ethical
sphere, and who becomes a means of revealing indirectly Clarissa’s recognition of the
limit of the ethical sphere). Clarissa strives to relate to Elizabeth, whose time is occupied
by the loathsome Miss Kilman: “Clarissa was really shocked [at Miss Kilman]. This is a
Christian—this woman! This woman had taken her daughter from her! She in touch
with invisible presences! Heavy, ugly, commonplace, without kindness or grace, she
know the meaning of life!” (136). Here, Woolf arguably uses indirect communication to
reveal that Clarissa’s concern that Miss Kilman will “take her daughter from her” is
actually Clarissa’s existential frustration at recognizing that her own dissipation and
ensuing death will ultimately leave Elizabeth without a mother—a mother who, after all,
says Sally Seton, “was pure-hearted…generous to her friends” (209). For Kierkegaard,
the ethical sphere ultimately runs into the limit imposed by time—by one’s recognition of
finitude. As Kierkegaard observes in a journal entry from 1850, “The majority of men
live from the cradle to the grave constantly on the go and never stopping, in the medium
of ceaselessness (temporality, the merely quantified, etc.). Then finally death comes
along and stops them—and now they become aware of Christianity, repent of not having
availed themselves of it earlier, by means of this repentance achieve a relationship to
Christianity, and then die” (Journals and Papers, Volume 4: 468-69). Kierkegaard goes
on to note that it is not death (as an abstract concept) that is troubling to the “natural
man,” but it is “stopping” that is troubling: “The natural man does not fear death more
than he fears stopping. Well, death and stopping have much in common. Stopping is
comparable to a fish’s being taken out of water and having to breathe in the air. The
natural man shudders at this other element, at the enormous power residing in ‘the stop’”
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(469). When she contemplates Elizabeth being without a mother, Clarissa arguably
reaches a point analogous to the individual who distinguishes between death as an
abstract concept and “the stop” as an existential limit.
Lastly, Clarissa must face the double-bladed nature of her interpretation of self in
relation to Septimus Smith. This too brings her symbolically to the limit of the ethical
sphere in that she identifies herself with Septimus when she learns that he has just died:
Somehow it was her disaster—her disgrace. It was her punishment to see
sink and disappear here a man, there a woman, in this profound darkness,
and she forced herself to stand here in her evening dress. She had
schemed; she had pilfered. She was never wholly admirable. She wanted
success. Lady Bexborough and the rest of it… (202)
Clarissa, in thinking that she was “never wholly admirable” and in identifying herself
with Septimus Smith’s finitude, paradoxically, faces a situation similar to the individual
who, in Kierkegaard’s schema, confronts her own limit within the ethical sphere of
existence. For Kierkegaard, recognition of guilt before the Eternal—the limit of the
ethical sphere—is ultimately a gift of God’s grace. Kierkegaard believes that “man is
guilty, but he is also redeemed from this guilt” (Hubben 48). Kierkegaard believes that
“in relation to God, [one] is always in the wrong” (Either/Or II: 351), and narrative
persona Johannes Climacus in Concluding Unscientific Postscript identifies redemption
from this sense of guilt with Christ as the Absolute Paradox: “The paradox of the
forgiveness of sins…is a paradox in the Socratic sense, in so far as it involves a
relationship between the eternal truth and an existing individual; it is a paradox sensu
strictiori, because the existing individual is stamped as a sinner, by which existence is

163
accentuated a second time, and because it purports to be an eternal decision in time with
retroactive power to annul the past, and because it is linked with the existence of God in
time” (201). For Kierkegaard, the leap to faith that takes shape within the religious
sphere of existence is a leap to faith in the face of the absurdity of the incarnation of Jesus
as savior. Kierkegaard believes that in Religiousness A the individual moves and acts
nobly in choosing herself in concrete actualization of the personality in relationships with
other individuals; even so, Kierkegaard believes also that Religiousness B moves from
God to the individual in the sense that Eternity breaks into time with the Incarnation.
This belief that with Religiousness B the Eternal breaks paradoxically into time is
consistent with Kierkegaard’s ultimate concern of what it means to be a Christian in
Christendom, in that the Gospel maintains that “while the Law was given through Moses,
grace and truth came through Jesus Christ” (John 1:18).
***
The character Septimus Smith becomes a trope—a rhetorical figure—for Woolf
to represent symbolically the limitations of the ethical sphere and the limitations of what
Kierkegaard refers to as Religiousness A. Kierkegaard believes that a “good” person,
such as Clarissa is in terms of Religiousness A, cannot in the context of what it means to
be a Christian ultimately arrive at “salvation” 92 under her own power; what it means to be
a Christian in Christendom is to ultimately make an appeal to God’s grace. For
Kierkegaard, the limitations of the ethical sphere imply the need for a leap to faith that
extends beyond these limitations, a leap to faith that takes shape within the religious
sphere. Septimus Smith’s wife Rezia arguably represents also the limit of Kierkegaard’s
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Assurance in faith of eternal life (John 3:15-16)
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ethical sphere’s “duty and responsibility,” in that she acts nobly in terms of Religiousness
A but ultimately fails to prevent Septimus from committing suicide. In Kierkegaard’s
view, it is only the leap to faith that takes shape within the religious sphere that ultimately
overcomes the overwhelming power of death and the dread associated with recognizing
one’s finitude. For Kierkegaard, whose ultimate concern is what it means to be a
Christian in Christendom, God’s grace is the way by which the individual in faith
ultimately finds victory over the power of death (1 Corinthians 15:55).
Clarissa sees herself as somehow connected with Septimus Smith, and he
represents for her a powerful symbol of the power of death, while he also serves as a
compliment to her concept of the self in dissipation. For Kierkegaard, such a recognition
by the individual of the personality’s need to ultimately identify passionately with
something that transcends self might ultimately offer an opportunity—though it is not
realized in Clarissa’s case—for the leap to faith that takes shape in the religious sphere.
Like the phenomenon of freedom from which human self-consciousness and human
recognition of the inevitably of death arises, the phenomenon of death transcends self in
an archetypal sense: It is impossible to avoid the archetypal nature of death in that death
confronts all individuals. With paradoxical optimism, Kierkegaard sees death for the
Christian as the point at which God’s light shines brightest: In a journal entry from 1844,
Kierkegaard remarks, “There is a beautiful expression which the common man uses about
dying: that God or our Lord ‘brightens’ for him. Accordingly, at the very time
everything becomes darkest—for what is as dark as the grave—God ‘brightens’”
(Journals and Papers, Volume 1: 335). As with the Apostle Paul, for Kierkegaard death
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loses its sting (1 Corinthians 15:5593) when the individual makes the leap to faith that
takes shape in the religious sphere: “When a man in relating himself to himself absolutely
relates himself to God, then all despair is annihilated” (The Sickness unto Death 146).
Although death is a potentially ugly physical reality—as becomes gruesomely apparent in
the suicide of Septimus Smith (Mrs. Dalloway 200)—Kierkegaard sees death for the
Christian as being the point at which God shines brightest.
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“O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?” (KJV).
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CHAPTER 5
ULYSSES
AND
KIERKEGAARD’S THREE SPHERES OF EXISTENCE

A Brief Overview of Relevant Criticism
For the scholar interested in studies that treat issues relevant to James Joyce,
Ulysses—narrative style, irony, critical reception, or research tools—the following works
might prove valuable:
Studies in style, irony, and narrative voice that might prove useful include Hugh
Kenner’s Joyce’s Voices (University of California Press, 1979), Hugh Kenner’s Ulysses
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), Karen Lawrence’s The Odyssey of Style in
"Ulysses (Princeton University Press, 1981), Thomas Jackson Rice’s Joyce, Chaos, and
Complexity (University of Illinois Press, 1997), Phillip F. Herring’s Joyce’s Uncertainty
Principle (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1987), Derek Attridge’s James Joyce's "Ulysses": A
Casebook (Oxford UP, 2004), William Schutte’s Joyce and Shakespeare: A Study in the
Meaning of “Ulysses”(Archin Books, 1971), Marilyn French’s The Book as
World: James Joyce's "Ulysses, Brad Bucknell’s Literary Modernism and Musical
Aesthetics (Cambridge UP, 2002), and Frank Budgen’s James Joyce and the Making of
"Ulysses" (Oxford UP, 1989).
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Scholars interested in reference guides for James Joyce and Ulysses might
consult William Schutte’s Index of Recurrent Elements in "Ulysses" (Southern Illinois
UP, 1982), Nicholas Fargnoi’s James Joyce A to Z (Oxford UP, 1995), Don Gifford’s
“Ulysses” Annotated (University of California Press, 1988), Thomas Rice Jackson’s
James Joyce: A Guide to Research (Garland Publications, 1982), Phillip F. Herring’s
Joyce's "Ulysses" Notesheets in the British Museum (University of Virginia Press, 1972),
Phillip F. Herring’s Joyce's Notes and Early Drafts for "Ulysses": Selections from the
Buffalo Collection (University of Virginia Press, 1977), and John Henry Raleigh’s The
Chronicle of Leopold and Molly Bloom: "Ulysses" as Narrative (University of California
Press, 1978).
Scholars interested in exploring indirect connections between Kierkegaard and
Joyce might consult the following works addressing Ibsen’s influence upon Joyce: B.J.
Tysdahl’s Joyce and Ibsen: A Study in Literary Influence (Norwegian Universities Press,
1968), Hugh Kenner’s Joyce and Ibsen’s Naturalism (Sewanee Press, 1951), and, lastly,
James Joyce’s essay “Ibsen’s New Drama” (in James Joyce: The Critical Writings,
Cornell University Press, 1989).

A Close Reading of the Novel
Like Mrs. Dalloway, Ulysses offers a complex structure within which to perform
a close reading that applies Kierkegaard’s concepts. Like The Great Gatsby, The Sun
Also Rises, and Mrs. Dalloway, Ulysses contains paradoxical characters—one of which is
the text itself, in its contradiction and interrogation of itself. Thus, Ulysses takes shape
within an even more complex interaction of narrative voice and movement of story than
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does Mrs. Dalloway—one that includes both “interior monologue narrative” 94 and a
paradoxical relationship of reader and text. This even more complex narrative
voice/story thus offers a more dynamic possibility for setting forth a close reading that
deals with irony and the three spheres of existence than any of the other three novels
examined thus far. And, of all the novels analyzed in this study, Ulysses illustrates most
vividly irony as indirect communication.
***
In terms of the aesthetic sphere of existence, This study will consider the three
primary characters Stephen Dedalus, Leopold Bloom, and Molly Bloom as individuals, in
relation to one another, and in relation to other characters. Further, the text will be
considered as a “character” unconsciousness of itself.
Aside from the text itself, Steven Dedalus is possibly the most enigmatic
character in Joyce’s Ulysses. The novel starts with Steven confronting the enigma and
physical realities of his life, and he does so while confronting aesthetic despair on the part
of his roommate/”usurper”, “stately Buck Mulligan” (3). Mulligan conducts a mock
mass:
* Stately, plump Buck Mulligan came from the stairhead, bearing a bowl
of lather on which a mirror and a razor lay crossed. A yellow
dressinggown, ungirdled, was sustained gently behind him on the mild
morning air. He held the bowl aloft and intoned:
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Stuart Gilbert notes that, “following Nature’s method, Joyce [in his use of interior
monologue and fragmentary narrative] depicts only the present time and place of the
times that are passing, a rapid flux of images. ‘Hold to the now, the here, through which
all future plunges to the past’ (Ulysses 153). It is for the reader to assemble the fragments
and join the images into a band” (James Joyce’s Ulysses 25).
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--Introibo ad altare Dei. 95
Halted, he peered down the dark winding stairs and called out coarsely:
--Come up, Kinch! Come up, you fearful jesuit!
Solemnly he came forward and mounted the gunrest. He faced
about and blessed thrice the tower, the surrounding land and the awaking
mountains. Then, catching sight of Stephen Dedalus, he bent towards him
and made rapid crosses in the air, gurgling in is throat and shaking his
head. Stephen Dedalus, displeased and sleepy, leaned his arms on the top
of the staircase and looked coldly at the gurgling face that blessed him,
equine in its length, and at the light untonsured hair, gained and heud like
pale oak. (3)
Although Stephen is “Kinch,” 96 the skeptic skeptical of his own skepticism (Gilbert 52),
he is offended by Buck Mulligan’s mock Catholic Mass, as the text indicates in Stephen’s
perceptions of Mulligan’s “equine” features, “gurgling face,” and “untonsured” 97 hair.
The imagery suggests that Stephen is not only offended but also that Mulligan leads
Stephen to see him as being temporarily insane, 98 unkempt, and a “horse’s ass.”
Although Stephen demonstrates skeptical tendencies himself and therefore wrestles with
the question of religious conviction within the more philosophical dimension of the
aesthetic sphere of existence, he does not take the matter of religious conviction lightly,
as Mulligan does; therefore, in his offense at Buck Mulligan’s actions, Stephen resembles
95

“I will go up to God’s altar.” Latin from Vulgate translation of Psalm 43:4 (Gifford
13).
96
Kinch, as in the sound of a knife blade, and as in one who cuts things into pieces in
analyzing them (Gifford 13).
97
Lacking shaving of the crown of he head as some monks and priests do
98
As in “foaming at the mouth”
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the individual who shows the potential of making the leap to faith that might take shape
within the ethical sphere. Mockery such as Mulligan’s is the lowest form of irony—is the
“devil’s ministry,” as in Christ being mocked before the crucifixion99--and Stephen, in
rejecting it, shows the potential of moving beyond his radical skepticism, a skepticism
that is arguably resembles despair over the limitations of the aesthetic sphere. In
rejecting Buck Mulligan’s mock Catholic Mass, Stephen acknowledges that “religious
language, the language of symbol and myth, is created in the community of the believers
and cannot be fully understood outside of this community…Only as a member of such a
community (even if in isolation or expulsion) can man have a content for his ultimate
concern. Only in a community of language can man actualize his faith” (Tillich,
Dynamics of Faith 24). Buck Mulligan’s disrespect for the symbolism of the Mass
disturbs something deeper than Stephen’s skepticism—it invokes his troubled memory of
the death of his mother, as Mulligan implies when he turns on Stephen and mocks him:
--The aunt thinks you killed your mother, he said. That’s why she won’t
let me have anything to do with you.
--Someone100 killed her, Stephen said gloomily.
--You could have knelt down, damn it, Kinch, when your dying mother
asked you, Buck Mulligan said. I’m hyperborean101 as much as you. But
to think of your mother begging you with her last breath to kneel down
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Matthew 27:29
“Someone” rhymes with “Simon,” Stephen’s father, whose alcoholism and emotional
abuse Stephen blames for his mother’s death.
101
Reference to Nietzsche’s “hyperborean” from The Will to Power, who is “above the
crowd” of Christian morality (Ulysses Annotated 15).
100
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and pray for her. And you refused. There is something sinister in you….
(5)
Mulligan’s goading of Stephen concerning Stephen’s failure to grant his mother’s
deathbed wish also invokes in Stephen the memory of a dream, as his conscience presses
toward what resembles the limit of the aesthetic sphere:
Stephen, an elbow rested on the jagged granite, leaned his palm against his
brow and gazed at the fraying edge of his shiny black coatsleeve. Pain,
that was not yet the pain of love, fretted his heart. Silently, in a dream she
had come to him after her death, her wasted body within its loose brown
graveclothes giving off an odour of wax and rosewood, her breath, that
had bent upon him, mute, reproachful, a faint odour of wetted ashes.
Across the threadbare cuffedge he saw the sea hailed as a great sweet
mother by the wellfed voice beside him. The ring of bay and skyline held
a dull green mass of liquid. A bowl of white china had stood by her
deathbed holding the green sluggish bile which she had torn up from her
rotting liver by fits of loud groaning vomiting. (80)
In this opening scene between Buck Mulligan and Stephen Dedalus, the text of Ulysses
reveals subtly that—whether he chooses to do so or not—brooding Stephen acts in a
manner similar to the individual who is poised to make the leap to faith to the ethical
sphere. Mulligan’s mockery reminds him of his having played Hamlet by staying too
long in black102 and how his skepticism had brought him to despair when he did not honor
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Stephen refuses to wear the grey trousers Mulligan offers him, because Stephen takes
the part of Hamlet literally, has been mourning his mother’s—not his father’s—death for
too long—past the newly relaxed Victorian standards. Stephens adheres to the letter of
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his mother’s deathbed request that he pray for her (9). Stephen’s brooding temperament
resembles the temperament of the individual confined to the aesthetic sphere of
existence— resembles the temperament of the individual confined by “inclosing reserve”
(The Sickness unto Death 63-67). As Kierkegaard’s disciple Paul Tillich notes, inclosing
reserve is despair turned in upon itself:
The demonic is anxiety about the good. In innocence, freedom
was not posited as freedom: its possibility was anxiety in the individual.
In the demonic, the relation is reversed. Freedom is posited as unfreedom,
because freedom is lost. Here again freedom’s possibility is anxiety. The
difference is absolute, because freedom’s possibility appears in relation to
unfreedom, which is the very opposite of innocence, which is a
qualification disposed toward freedom.
The demonic is unfreedom that wants to close itself off. This,
however, is and remains an impossibility. It always retains a relation, and
even when this has apparently disappeared altogether, it is nevertheless
there, and anxiety at once manifests itself in the moment of contact [with
the good]. (The Concept of Anxiety 123)
Stephen’s anxiety over the dream and memory of his mother—over her religious
convictions—is similar to the dizziness of despair, as anxiety contacts the “good” and
therefore paradoxically offers possibility, via despair. Despair as “aporia”—as
dizziness—offers hope of deliverance through the leap to faith, away from “inclosing
reserve” of the aesthetic sphere of existence, and toward the actualized love of the ethical
the law for “a son’s deep mourning for his mother (black suit, shoes, socks and tie and a
sharply limited social life)” (Ulysses Annotated 15).
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sphere of existence103—away from the self-limiting dialectic of “inclosing reserve,” the
“neurotic paradox.” 104 In Either/Or II, Judge William, speaking in behalf of a balance
between the aesthetic and ethical spheres, claims that
the atheist perceives very well that the way the ethical is most easily
evaporated is to open the door to the historical infinity. And yet there is
something legitimate in his behavior, for if, when all is said and done, the
individual is not the absolute, then the empirical is the only route allotted
to him, and the end of this road is just like the source of the Niger
River—no one knows where it is. If I am assigned to the finite, it is
arbitrary to stand at any particular point. Therefore, along this road one
never makes a beginning, for in order to start one must have come to an
end, but this is an impossibility. When the personality is the absolute, then
it is itself the Archimedean point from which one can lift the world. (265)
Stephen’s uneasiness over the way in which his skepticism clashed with his
mother’s deathbed request mirrors the atheist’s uneasiness over being empirically bound
to a road whose beginning and end are arbitrary. Within the confines of the aesthetic
sphere, choosing one action over against another creates recognition that one has
eliminated all other possibilities and therefore invokes anxiety over what is perceived as a
loss of freedom. Like Dante’s “shades,” the aesthete and the romantic ironist are tossed
103

Ulysses is “Bloom’s day” more than it is (not-Saint) Stephen’s day. Bloom’s love for
Molly and his genuine sense of compassion toward others offset Stephen’s brooding
temperament and thus ultimately bring Bloom to fulfilling the role of Stephen’s “missing
father.”
104
Jung sees the “neurotic paradox” as that tendency for others to be able to see the very
maladaptive behavior that was either entirely or largely invisible to the neurotic—the
neurotic’s tendency to be self-defeating and thus bring isolation upon him or herself
(”Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious,” The Portable Jung 70-ff).
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this way or that, depending upon immediate desire and existentially limited perspective
of one who remains confined to the aesthetic sphere. If no choice he makes brings
ultimate release from recognition of his finitude, all choices might for him become
equally vague and arbitrary. In contrast, the individual who makes the leap to faith that
takes shape within the ethical sphere “chooses himself” (Either/Or II: 232). The person
in the grips of aesthetic despair is likely to seek existential validation that he cannot find
through arbitrary judgments. Anti-Climacus describes a state of aesthetic despair that he
calls “despair that lacks finitude.” This form of despair lacks connection with the actual
conditions surrounding the individual: “When feeling or knowing or willing has become
fantastic, the entire self can eventually become that, whether in the more active form of
plunging headlong into fantasy or in the more passive form of being carries away, but in
both cases the person is responsible. The self, then, leads a fantasized existence in
abstract infinitizing or in abstract isolation, continually lacking itself, from which it
moves further and further away” (The Sickness unto Death 32). As with the protagonist
of Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground, the issue is not that there is, generally
speaking, suffering in the world, but that he is conscious of the fact that he suffers right
now, on this occasion. All other suffering is for him remote from the suffering at hand,
which becomes the accuser of all “reality.” Like Hamlet, Stephen resembles the aesthete
who when confronting death mourns more for himself and his “condition” than for his
dead parent: “An individual in despair despairs over something. So it seems for a
moment, but only for a moment; in the same moment the true despair or despair in its true
form shows itself. In despairing over something, he really despaired over himself, and
now he wants to be rid of himself” (The Sickness unto Death 18).
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In “Proteus” (Chapter 3), Stephen again acts in a manner similar to the
individual who arrives at the limit of the aesthetic sphere, as he “[tries] to grasp, whether
metaphysically or mystically, the eternal ideas that cast their shadow on the wall of the
cave”: 105
Ineluctable modality of the visible: at least that if no more, thought
through my eyes. Signature of all things I am here to read, seaspawn and
seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty boot. Snotgreen, bluesilver, rust:
coloured signs. Limits of the diaphane. But he adds: in bodies. There he
was aware of them bodies before of them coloured. How? By knocking
his sconce against them, sure. Go easy. Bald he was and a millionaire,
maestro di color che sanno. Limit of the diaphane in. Why in?
Diaphane, adiaphane. If you can put your five fingers through it it is a
gate, if not a door. Shut your eyes and see. (31)
Stephen here takes on the form of Proteus, shape-shifter, but not in body—in mind: Like
the Romantic Idealist, Stephen attempts to but fails to abstract himself out of existence by
flitting from one idea to the next, as if the ideas were being-itself. He starts with abstract
concepts regarding the physical world—the senses as analyzed by Aristotle (“ineluctable
modality of the visible” 106), Boehme (“everything is figured with its own
signature”—with its corresponding opposite on the spiritual plane), Berkeley (whose
105

Plato’s cave in the “Allegory of the Cave” (Gilbert 119). This is the world of Ideas
and thus represents soul absent from body, the individual abstracted out of existence, the
antithesis of the ethical which realizes concrete actuality in the form of duty an
responsibility.
106
Aristotle is thought to have asserted that vision is the
“ineluctable”—unalterable—“modality” of the senses in that the ear can alter the
perception of sound, whereas the eye must see colors as they are, without altering them
(Ulysses Annotated 44).
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idealism was supposedly refuted by Samuel Johnson’s kicking of a large stone107), and
then again to the physical appearance/surroundings of Aristotle (“bald he was, and a
millionaire” 108). In Philosophical Fragments, Johannes Climacus addresses just such a
dilemma—the dilemma of being unable to think one’s way to “being itself”:
Which is first, immediacy or mediacy? Cannot the
consciousness…remain in immediacy? This is a foolish question,
because if it could, there would be no consciousness at all. But how, then,
is immediacy cancelled? By mediacy, which cancels immediacy by presupposing it. What, then, is immediacy? It is reality itself [Realitet].
What is mediacy? It is the word. How does the one cancel the other? By
giving expression to it, for that which is given expression is always
presupposed.
Immediacy is reality; language is ideality; consciousness is
contradiction [Modsigelse]. The moment I make a statement about reality,
contradiction is present, for what I say is ideality. (Philosophical
Fragments 168)
Just as Kierkegaard rejection of Hegel and the Neo-Hegelians presupposes both
existentialist currents of thought in the twentieth century and poststructuralist movement
of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, in a sense, Stephen’s failure to think
the ideal in relation to the actual in the above passage presupposes the postmodernist turn
in twentieth century fiction. Both transitions offer a paradigm shift whose concern is an
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Kicking the large stone, Johnson reputedly claimed, “I refute it [Berkeley’s Idealism]
thus!”
108
(Ulysses Annotated 44)
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increasingly differentiated view of human consciousness. Both transitions set forth a
more dynamic concept of human consciousness: one that takes into the account more
fully the complexities of subject-object-interpretation. 109 It is impossible to interpret
“Reality-Truth” exhaustively; in order to do so, one would have to utilize language, and
language presupposes the “the Fall” 110 of consciousness in that it reveals the split
between the ideal and the actual. “A pure existentialism is impossible because to
describe existence one must use language. Now language deals with universals. In using
universals, language is by its very nature essentialist, and cannot escape it” (Tillich, A
History of Christian Thought 541). Language has limitations in expressing the
experience of the existing individual, who is more dynamic than language is.
In the passage above in which Stephen tries to think being itself, since the text is
foregrounded, 111 indirect communication poses the question “what happens when
different types of world are placed in confrontation, or when boundaries between worlds
are violated?” (Postmodernist Fiction 10). Stephen’s flitting from idea to idea within the
context of analyzing his own senses poetically captures the restless quality of a
personality confined to the aesthetic sphere. In contrast to Stephen’s flight from the
109

In letters to Wordsworth, Coleridge, after initial enthusiasm over Romantic Idealism
and Hegel, explains why he rejects his earlier Unitarian convictions, by pointing out that
human consciousness and the freedom thereof presuppose a Trinitarian structure to one’s
perception of the universe. For both Kierkegaard and the later Coleridge, one cannot
perceive God directly in the forms of “Nature, “ because the interpretation of the
experience is always mediated by the gap created by human consciousness, which creates
a third “reality”: subject-object-interpretation. In short, Kierkegaard rejected Hegel and
Romantic Idealism for the same basic reason that Coleridge did: both believed that
human consciousness is a mediating force in approaching the world of Ideas and that
Romantic Idealism is thus logically flawed. For Kierkegaard, “pure thought is a
phantom” ()
110
cf. Jacques Derrida’s “The Signifier and Truth.” Of Grammatology. London: Johns
Hopkins UP, 1976.
111
(McHale, Postmodernist Fiction 9)
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particular to the universal as abstract idea, Judge William asserts, “The very moment it is
perceived that the personality is the absolute, is its own objective, is the unity of the
universal and the particular, that very moment every skepticism that makes the historical
its point of departure will be vanquished” (Either/Or II: 265). Although concepts such as
duty and responsibility are abstract—are ideals—they take on form within the concrete,
the actual in that individuals make use ideals to connect with others in social interaction.
112

Thus, Judge William can claim that the individual acting within the ethical sphere

qualifies her relationship also to the aesthetic sphere, transcends it but does not destroy it
or reject it.
Unlike Stephen’s brooding intellectualism that arguably resembles the individual
who struggles to escape the confines of the aesthetic sphere, Bloom acts in manner
similar to the individual whose place within the aesthetic sphere is qualified by his having
made the leap to the ethical sphere. The overwhelming issue for Bloom is the question of
whether or not his love for Molly will overcome her committing adultery with Blazes
Boylan: Bloom faces a situation similar to the individual who within the context of the
ethical sphere must choose himself in the face of difficulties touching directly upon the
ethical either/or. Marriage is the primary relationship in which individuals who have
made the leap to the ethical sphere act concretely within the context of an ethical
either/or. Judge William sees marriage as fertile territory for the ethical either/or, in that
marriage involves action that simultaneously affirms life within the aesthetic: “I have not
112

The vocations of firefighter and law enforcement officer offer clear illustrations of
Judge William’s point: most who pursue careers in these vocations are inspired to do so
by the initial “ideals” associated with wanting to make a difference in the lives of others;
however, these ideals play themselves out in concrete actions that include multiple
instances of courage and compassion. For the firefighter or law enforcement officer, the
universal becomes the concrete when a life is saved.
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become so spiritual that the worldly aspect of life has no meaning for me. All the beauty
implicit in the erotic of paganism has its validity in Christianity insofar as it can be
combined with marriage. This rejuvenation of our first love is not just a sad looking back
or a poetic recollecting of past experience, whereby one is finally enmeshed—all that
kind of thing is exhausting—it is an action…the fresh wellspring of life ought to be kept
open as long as possible” (Either/Or II: 6). In terms of the individual’s relationship to the
aesthetic sphere, Bloom acts as one who lives within the context of the ethical either/or
but who occasionally resorts to distraction within the aesthetic sphere to divert attention
away from the ethical either/or. Thus, Kierkegaard’s belief that, after the leap to faith,
one sphere qualifies another finds a parallel in the way that Bloom makes use of the
aesthetic sphere for escapism but ultimately fails in doing so: He returns to Molly.
Bloom behaves in a manner parallel to one who, after having made the leap to the ethical
sphere, finds that escapism within diversions of aesthetic sphere ultimately fails.
Bloom‘s return reveals the overwhelming importance of his love for Molly, and this
resembles the qualitatively higher position that the ethical sphere holds in relation to the
aesthetic sphere.
For example, as Bloom makes his journey through Dublin, he appropriates
aesthetic diversion to distract him from the awareness that Molly is about to commit
adultery with Blazes Boylan.
Upholding the lid he (who?) gazed in the coffin (coffin?) at the
oblique triple (piano!) wires. He pressed (the same who pressed
indulgently her hand), soft pedalling, a triple of keys to see the thicknesses
of felt advancing, to hear the muffled hammerfall in action.
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Two sheets cream vellum paper one reserve two envelopes when I
was in Wisdom Hely’s wise Bloom in Daly’s Henry Flower bought. Are
you not happy in your home? Flower to console me and a pin cuts lo.
Means something, language of flow. Was it daisy? Innocence that is.
Respectable girl meet after mass. Thanks awfully muchly. Wise Bloom
eyed on the door a poster, a swaying mermaid smoking mid nice waves.
Smoke mermaids, coolest whiff of all. Hair streaming: lovelorn. For
some man. For Raoul. He eyed and saw afar on Essex bridge a gay hat
riding on a jaunty car. It is. Again. Third time. Coincidence.
Jingling on supple rubbers it jaunted from the bridge Ormond
quay. Follow. Risk it. Go quick. At four. Near now. Out. (216-217)
In the passage above, the text’s being foregrounded resembles the aesthetic sphere’s
tendency on occasion to overwhelm the ethical. The musicality of the passage—the
aesthetic beauty of the passage—nearly makes it unintelligible: only the details provided
in “traces” within the text make it clear that the stream of consciousness narrative belongs
to Bloom. The occasion is Bloom’s visit to a pub (in the lobby of the Ormond Hotel) in
which Simon Dedalus, Stephen’s “missing father,” sings and engages in empty chatter
shortly after his daughter Dilly Dedalus begged him for money so the family might eat
(217). (Though James Joyce possessed a first-class tenor’s voice, he showed a suspicious
attitude toward the “purity” of music as an art form; he distrusted the way that people
tend to appropriate music as an escapist venture. 113 Simon Dedalus singing and chatting

113

In Either/Or I, music in the form of Mozart’s Don Giovanni becomes the art form
representative of moods that predominate within the aesthetic sphere, with seductive
allure as practiced by Don Juan being the dominant mood of this particular section of
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frivolously in a bar while his daughter stands in rags in the street arguably illustrates
Joyce’s disdain toward the escapist dimension of music and the escapist culture
surrounding music that in Kierkegaardian terms reflects aesthetic despair.) This chapter
was dubbed “Sirens” by Joyce because of the seductive allure of music, but the pleasures
of the aesthetic sphere (in the form of music) ultimately fail Bloom as a means of evading
the issue of the day: Molly’s immanent adultery. The issue of fidelity opposes the ethical
either/or, since it contradicts the individual’s existential commitment to live life in
reverence of another individual. As Judge William goes as far as to claim that within the
context of the ethical sphere it is “as a married man [Aegtemand]” that one “proves
himself to be an authentic [aegte] man” (Either/Or II: 125).
Although Bloom’s stream of consciousness flows freely—almost
incoherently—in rhythm with the seductive allure of the music of the “Sirens,” his
consciousness nonetheless drifts away from aesthetic matters and back to the ethical
matters—to Molly and other issues related to her tryst: Bloom drifts to thoughts of his
reactionary but limited flirting with Martha Clifford, as the anonymous “Henry Flower,”
Martha’s epistolary secret admirer. He thinks of Martha’s epistolary question “are you
happy in your home?” and then thinks of Martha Clifford as merely a “flower to console
me.” Finally, the illusory and escapist climate of the lair of the “Sirens” gets disrupted by
Bloom’s comically portrayed sighting of Blazes Boylan and the partially obscured view
of Boylan’s “gay hat riding on a jaunty car.” Although the aesthetic sphere has a place in
defining humanity and although music’s place in culture may not be confined to the

Either/Or (51-ff). As Julia Watkin notes, “Kierkegaard’s interest in music especially
concerns its power to express moods or feelings” (Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s
Philosophy 170).
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aesthetic sphere, issues concerning the duty and responsibility of the ethical sphere
qualify and transcend those of the aesthetic sphere. The juxtaposition of Simon Dedalus,
Stephen Dedalus’ “missing father” and Bloom, Stephen Dedalus’ “adoptive father,”
illustrates the qualitative shift initiated by the leap to faith that might take shape within
the ethical sphere. Simon Dedalus, Stephen’s “missing father,” ignores his
responsibilities and squanders his time by crooning, drinking, and engaging in empty
chatter about music; Leopold Bloom, Stephen’s “adoptive father,” cannot seem to escape
his responsibilities in that even his dalliance with Martha Clifford is a reaction to his
“violated” love for Molly. Bloom concludes his stay in the lair of the Sirens by passing
gas: “Pprrpffrrppffff”(238). Joyce’s pun implies that Bloom punctuates his stay by
providing a metaphor for the spiritual state-of-being in the Sirens’ lair—a place where
“thinking [is] strictly prohibited [where people are] always talking shop. Fiddlefaddle
about notes”(236). Moreover, the immediacy of musical “entertainment” cannot liberate
Bloom from thoughts that Molly is about to commit adultery, from thoughts that Blazes
Boylan, with “gay hat” and “jaunty car,” is now on his way to visit Molly.
The indirect communication of the above passage reveals how Joyce uses irony in
relation to rhetorical structure to undercut the place of the aesthetic sphere in relation to
the ethical sphere. The comical rhythm and disruptive nature of the text convey Bloom’s
disorderly uneasiness over Molly’s infidelity and reveal also his inability to keep
thoughts of Molly submerged in his stream of consciousness. Bloom’s physical journey
around Dublin leads him away from Molly, to Stephen, then back to Molly, with
Stephen—his symbolically adopted son—in tow. In the journey of his mind, however, he
cannot escape Molly and the thought of her committing adultery, as he on several
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occasions tries to suppress from his stream of consciousness the idea of her pending
infidelity. Also, in this particular chapter in the journey, Blazes Boylan, the entertainer
and singer, cannot escape Bloom’s notice either, as he coincidentally passes by with “gay
hat” and “jaunty car.” For Bloom, in this anxiety-provoking scene, “thinking is” not
“strictly prohibited,” though the thoughts are not likely to be especially comforting, given
what Molly is planning.
Molly offers an opportunity to expound upon the aesthetic sphere, since she is a
character who lives almost exclusively in the sensual world; however, she does, at last,
arrive at a position that favors Bloom over Boylan. Just as Bloom’s journey leads him
away from Molly and then back to her, Molly’s “journey” leads her away from Bloom
then back to him, though her journey, in Kierkegaardian terms, resembles the journey of
an individual who remains confined to the aesthetic sphere. Her journey does, however,
end at a position that resembles the perspective an individual confronts in making the
leap to faith that might take shape within in the ethical sphere.
…the sun shines for you he said the day we were lying among the
rhododendrons on Howth head in the grey tweed suit and his straw hat the
day I got him to propose to me yes first I gave him the bit of seedcake out
of my mouth and it was the leapyear like now yes 16 years ago my God
after that long kiss I near lost my breath yes he said I was the flower of the
mountain yes so we are flowers all a womans body yes that was one true
thing he said in his life and the sun shines for you today yes that was why
I liked him because I saw he understood or felt what a woman is and I
knew I could always get round him and I gave him all the pleasure I could
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leading him on till he asked me to say yes and I wouldnt answer first only
looked out over the sea and the sky I was thinking of so many things he
didnt know of… (643)
Molly’s stream of consciousness stands in juxtaposition to Bloom’s earlier
uneasiness in that her exuberance answers his anxiety. She represents the aesthetic
sphere in the sense that she abides in immediacy: Her thoughts are “egocentric—she
thinks of herself, her grievances, her youth” (Gilbert 402). Even so, she is also drawn
toward an “outside force, the attraction of ‘Poldy,’ her Apollo, round whom her thought,
half reluctantly, turns” (402). Nonetheless, her attraction to Bloom—to “Poldy”—is also
slightly egocentric—she “could always get round him” (Ulysses 643). Yet, the innocence
of her immediacy stands in juxtaposition to Bloom’s straightforward manner that
resembles life in the ethical sphere. Johannes Climacus claims that the ethical is
straightforward and concrete: “The ethical as the absolute is infinitely valid in itself, and
does not need to be tricked out with accessories to help it make a better showing”
(Concluding Unscientific Postscript 127). Although Molly resembles the individual who
remains confined to the aesthetic sphere, she does not resemble the “demonic” aspect of
the aesthetic sphere: she is more childlike than malicious, and she does not resemble the
individual under the sway of “inclosing reserve” (The Sickness unto Death 63-67). Molly
is more like an innocent “great Mother of gods” (Gilbert 402). Even so, in choosing
Bloom over Boylan (whom she recognizes as being inferior to “Poldy” 114), she resembles
the individual who from within the aesthetic sphere offers a hint of a promise of make a
leap to faith in the ethical sphere, as a response a sense of duty and responsibility within
114

She recognizes Hugh “Blazes” Boylan as an insensitive phony: “Hugh the ignoramus
that doesnt know poetry from a cabbage” (638).
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the context love/marriage. As Sylvia Walsh explains with regard to marriage and the
leap to the ethical, “Judge William argues not only that the aesthetic is preserved and
ennobled in the ethical but also that it receives its highest aesthetic, or poetic, expression
in that form of life” (Living Poetically: Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics 99-100).
More specifically, Judge William claims that time is the factor that makes marriage in the
context of the ethical sphere aesthetically more beautiful than if it were to remain
marriage in the context of the aesthetic sphere:
If one traces dialectically and just as much historically the development of
the aesthetically beautiful, one will find that the direction of this
movement is from spatial to temporal categories, and that the perfecting of
art is contingent upon the possibility of gradually detaching itself more
and more from space and aiming toward time. This constitutes the
transition from sculpture to painting, as Schelling early pointed out. 115
Music has time as its element but has no continuance in time116; its
significance is the continual vanishing in time; it sounds in time, but it
also fades and has no continuance. Ultimately poetry is the highest form
of all the arts and therefore also the art that best knows how to affirm the
meaning of time. It does not need to limit itself to the moment in the
sense that painting does; neither does it disappear without a trace in the
sense that music does. But despite all this, it, too, is compelled to
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In Philosophische Schriften (1809)
Kierkegaard scholar Ronald L. Hall, in Word and Spirit: A Kierkegaardian Critique of
the Modern Age, notes that Kierkegaard thinks of music (without lyrics) as being the
representative art of the aesthetic sphere because music lacks “existential immediacy”:
“Music has no active voice, no past or future tense, no indicative mood” (50).
116
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concentrate in the moment. It has, therefore, its limitation and cannot
portray that of which the truth is precisely the temporal sequence. And yet
this, that time is not a disparagement of the aesthetic; on the contrary, the
more this occurs, the richer and fuller the aesthetic becomes.
How, then can the aesthetic, which is incommensurable even for
the portrayal of poetry, be represented? Answer: By being lived.
(Either/Or II: 125)
The aesthetic for judge William attains deeper beauty with repetition of acts of love
through time.
What might be interpreted as Molly’s closest movement in the direction of the
ethical sphere takes a slightly egocentric turn: When she considers her son Rudy’s death,
she becomes avoidant—like Bloom is earlier in relation to her adultery—, not wanting to
fall again into the melancholy of “inclosing reserve”: ”…that disheartened me altogether
I suppose I oughtnt to have buried him [Rudy] in that little wooly jacket I knitted crying
as I was but give it to some poor child but I knew Id never have another our lst death too
it was we were never the same since O Im not going to think myself into the glooms
about that any more…” (640). Her thinking herself “into the glooms” reinforces the
theme of despair at the occasion of the death of a loved one, in that Stephen thought
himself “into the glooms” earlier—in playing Hamlet by remaining too-long-in-black
after his mother’s death.
***
In terms of the ethical sphere of existence, the two primary characters Stephen
Dedalus and Leopold Bloom can be read as representing a meeting of two spheres: the
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aesthetic sphere meets the ethical sphere. Further, the text can arguably be considered to
be a “character” that contradicts itself and thereby calls attention to the limits of
epistemology and the limits of reason with respect to Religiousness A within the ethical
sphere of existence. By disrupting expectations, the text uses indirect communication to
foreground “the problem of ‘unknowability’ or the limits of knowledge.” 117
Bloom and Stephen becomes the means .by which Stephen Dedalus might make
the leap of faith from the aesthetic sphere to the ethical sphere Thus, Stephen’s relation
to the ethical sphere is mediated by Bloom as “mid-wife.” In “Eumaeus” (Chapter 16),
Bloom literally rescues Stephen from the aesthetic sphere in that Bloom intervenes in the
brothel to save Stephen from the consequences of excess within the aesthetic sphere:
Preparatory to anything else Mr Bloom brushed off the greater bulk of the
[wood] shavings [on Stephen’s clothes] and handed Stephen the hat and
ashplant and bucked him up generally in Orthodox Samaritan fashion,
which he very badly needed. His (Stephen’s) mind was not exactly what
you would call wandering but a bit unsteady and on his expressed desire
for some beverage to drink Mr Bloom, in view of the hour it was and there
being pumps of Vartry water available for their ablutions, let alone for
drinking purposes, hit upon an expedient by suggesting, off the reel, the
propriety of the cabman’s shelter, as it was called, hardly a stonesthrow
away near Butt Bridge, where they might hit upon some drinkables in the
form of a milk and soda or a mineral. (501)
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(McHale, Postmodernist Fiction 9)
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Although Molly resembles the individual who remains confined to the aesthetic
sphere, her relationship to the ethical sphere is a presence by means of being an absence.
It is her absence and the thought that she is about to commit adultery that in part reveals
the ethical side of Bloom. Although Bloom tries to divert himself during his daylong
journey through Dublin, his thoughts at various points in the journey inevitably return to
Molly. For example, in reference to “Lestrygonians” (Chapter 8), Harry Blamires asserts,
“It is characteristic of Joyce’s pathos and irony that Bloom’s touching, nostalgic
memories…of Molly the young wife, in the home and in the street, in the kitchen and in
the bedroom, should be…entangled with his recollections of the men who admired her
too intimately” (The New Bloomsday Book 59). Bloom’s “entangled recollections”
reflect his anxiety over Molly’s impending rendezvous with Blazes Boylan. And, in spite
of this anxiety, to Molly Bloom returns (546)—both physically and spiritually—even
though he knows she has committed adultery. Bloom’s complex relationship to Molly
reflects the complex relationship of the single individual to of the modern world:
In his cultural background, his psychological attitudes, his material
condition, Bloom can be read as an Everyman figure—l’homme moyen
sensuel—whose life reflects the traumas of the modern world from which
Ulysses emerged. He is also a complete man, as Joyce explained in a
conversation with his Zurich friend, Frank Budgen. “I see [Bloom],”
Joyce said, “from all sides, and therefore he is all-round, in the sense of
your sculptor’s figure. But he is a complete man as well—a good man.”
(James Joyce A to Z 19)
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And, part of the “traumas of the modern world” is marital infidelity, and Bloom, the
“good man”/Everyman responds with an attitude of forgiveness mixed with complex
ambiguity, since he never actually says to Molly “I forgive you”: He merely returns to
their home at 7 Eccles Street and to their everyday life, as if nothing happened (456-ff).
However temporary the answer might be, the ethical sphere provides as an answer
to the brooding, the “inclosing reserve,” of the aesthetic sphere in that one’s personality
becomes actualized in relation to others rather than falling into itself, in despair. Rather
than see himself as a passive victim of Molly’s infidelity, Bloom takes it upon himself to
forgive her and move on with their life together. In this sense, he resembles the
individual who “chooses himself” in relation to another, in spite of the faults or
shortcomings of the other.
***
In much the same manner that the issue of transcendence remains ambiguous in
The Great Gatsby, Ulysses also stands in an ambiguous relationship to transcendence and
Kierkegaard’s concept of the religious sphere of existence. More specifically, Stephen,
Dedalus finds no lasting answer to the religious doubt and radical skepticism that set
upon him when he earlier refused to pray for his mother at her deathbed, and Stephen’s
mother haunts him much as Hamlet’s father’s ghost haunted him. Considered from a
Kierkegaardian perspective, Stephen’s mother becomes a rhetorical device for leaving
open to inquiry the question of faith within the religious sphere. More specifically, the
ghost of Stephen’s mother can be read as an inversion of the Christian concept of the
Holy Ghost, and instead of being delivered from sin, Stephen becomes troubled by
doubts over his failure to kneel and pray for her on her deathbed (7).
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The vivid image of Stephen’s mother’s death first appears in Chapter 1
(“Telemachus”) in the context of Stephen brooding like Hamlet; the description appears
twice within the first nine pages and is nearly identical both times:
In a dream, silently, she had come to him, her wasted body within its loose
graveclothes giving off an odour of wax and rosewood, her breath, bent
over him with mute secret words, a faint odor of wetted ashes. (5)
Ghostly imagery prevails on page 9, as the text repeats the sentence above, then provides
adds a section that moves into Stephen’s brooding mind:
In a dream, silently, she had come to him, her wasted body within its loose
graveclothes giving off an odour of wax and rosewood, her breath, bent
over him with mute secret words, a faint odor of wetted ashes.
Her glazing eyes, staring out of death, to shake and bend my soul.
On me alone. The ghostcandle to light her agony. Ghostly light on the
tortured face. Her hoarse breath rattling in horror, while all prayed on
their knees. Her eyes on me strike me down. Liliata rutilantium te
confessorum turma circumdet: iubulantium te virginum chorus excipiat
[May the glittering throng of confessors, bright as lilies, gather about you.
May the glorious choir of virgins receive you118]
Ghoul! Chewer of Corpses119!
No, mother! Let me be and let me live! (9)
Stephen’s being deeply troubled over his failure to pray at his mother’s deathbed
places him in alignment with the individual who remains in the aesthetic sphere, but who
118
119

Latin: A layman’s prayer as part of the Catholic “Prayers for the Dying”(Gifford 19).
“Chewer of corpses, “as in eating the body of Christ at Holy Communion.
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shows an ambiguous relationship to Religiousness A. Stephen is not indifferent to
Religiousness A, and he conducts himself as an individual who stands on the verge of
facing the ethical either/or “guilty/not guilty,” which Judge William identifies with the
concept that “in relation to God [one] is always in the wrong” (Either/Or II: 351) and
with the leap to faith that takes shape within the ethical sphere: Judge William claims,
“To be sure, the ethical individual dares to employ the expression that he is his own
editor, but he is also fully aware that he is responsible, responsible for himself personally,
inasmuch as what he chooses will have decisive influence upon himself, responsible to
the order of things in which he lives, responsible to God”(260). In facing the ghost of
his mother, Stephen stands in a situation that resembles the psychological state of the
individual who holds simultaneously an ambiguous relation to both the ethical and the
religious spheres, and this occurs by way of Stephen’s mother’s ghost serving as the
mediating force. One could even interpret Stephen’s mother’s absence in death as a
symbolic inversion of the presence of the Holy Spirit.120 Further, in the hallucinogenic
atmosphere of the chapter “Circe”(Chapter 15), the text inverts also the historical-actual
of Stephen refusing to pray for his mother, and Stephen’s mother insists on praying for
Stephen:
STEPHEN
(eagerly) Tell me the word, mother, if you know now. The word
known to all men.121
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Rather than deliver Stephen from despair (The Sickness unto Death 15), she “haunts”
him in a manner similar to the ghost of Hamlet’s father (9).
121
Joyce scholar Don Gifford asserts that the word is “love,” and that “Stephen seems to
regard the question ‘What is the word known to all men?’ as a mystery (41; 474). The
key to the mystery seems to be not the word itself but the word made-manifest. Only in
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THE MOTHER
Who saved you the night you jumped into the train at Dalkey with
Paddy Lee? Who had pity for you when you were sad among the
strangers? Prayer is allpowerful. Prayer for the suffering souls in
the Ursaline122 manual and forty days’ indulgence. Repent,
Stephen.
STEPHEN
The ghoul! Hyena! 123
THE MOTHER
I pray for you in my other world. Get Dilly to make you that
boiled rice every night after your brainwork. Years and years I
loved you, O, my son, my firstborn, when you lay in my womb…
THE MOTHER
(with smouldering eyes) Repent! O, the fire of hell!
STEPHEN
(panting) His noncorrosive sublimate! 124 The corpsechewer! Raw
head and bloody bones.

the experience of love can the word know to all men truly be known” (Ulysses Annotated
221).
122
“Roman Catholic religious order for women devoted to the teaching of young girls and
the nursing of the sick” (Gifford 517).
123
Arguably another allusion to cannibalism and the body of Christ/the body of Stephen’s
mother, in that Don Gifford notes, “The hyena is accustomed to live in the sepulchers of
the dead and to devour their bodies” (Ulysses Annotated 518).
124
A “sublimate” is a chemical substance formed as a result of sublimation, a chemical
process by which solid is converted directly to gas without passing through the stage of
being a liquid. Don Gifford claims that Stephen here refers to God’s “fires of hell, which
punish sinners without consuming or destroying them” (Ulysses Annotated 518).
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THE MOTHER
(her face drawing near and nearer, sending out an ashen breath)
Beware! (she raises her blackened withered right arm slowly
towards Stephen’s breast with outstretched finger) Beware God’s
hand!
(A green crab with malignant red eyes sticks deep its
grinning claws in Stephen’s heart.)
STEPHEN
(strangled with rage, his features drawn grey and old) Shite!
BLOOM
(at the window) What?
STEPHEN
Ah non, par exemple!125 The intellectual imagination! With me all
or not at all. Non servium!126…
THE MOTHER
(wrings her hands slowly, moaning desperately) O Sacred Heart of
Jesus, have mercy on him! Save him from hell, O Divine Sacred
Heart!

Stephen’s notion of hell in this case arguably owes more to Dante’s Inferno than it does
to the Bible.
125
Don Gifford notes that this is the French equivalent of the exclamation ‘Good heavens,
no!’ (Ulysses Annotated 518).
126
Don Gifford explains that this phrase is Latin and means ‘I will not serve.’ Gifford
also explains, “The phrase is traditionally assigned to Satan at the moment of his fall,
after Jeremiah 2:20: ‘and thou saidst, I will not serve”(Ulysses Annotated 518).

194
STEPHEN
No! No! No! Break my spirit, all of you, if you can! I’ll bring
you all to heel!
THE MOTHER
(in the agony of her deathrattle) Have mercy on Stephen, Lord, for
my sake! Inexpressible was my anguish when expiring with love,
grief and agony on Mount Calvary!
STEPHEN
Nothung!127
(He lifts his ashplant high in both hands and smashes the
chandelier. Time’s livid final frame leaps, and in the following
darkness, ruin of all space, shattered glass and toppling masonry.)
In the dramatic exchange above, Stephen resembles the individual who in
Kierkegaardian terms stands in an ambiguous relationship to “the despair of defiance.”
Paradoxically, however, Stephen also resembles the individual who faces the possibility
of repentance and the leap to faith that acknowledges the ethical before leaping to the
religious sphere. (For Kierkegaard, Religiousness A is a necessary condition for
Religiousness B, so he believes that one must encounter the ethical before one can leap to
the religious; however, neither Kierkegaard in his journal nor his narrative personas rule
out the possibility that the individual might acknowledge that he is “in the wrong” in
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Don Gifford explains that this German word is an allusion to “Needful,” the magic
sword in Wagner’s Der Ring des Nibelungen. “In Die Walkure (1854-56), the second of
the four operas in the Ring, Wotan, the king of the gods, has planted it in the heart of a
giant ash tree (‘ashplant’)”(Ulysses Annotated 518). Stephen evokes the phrase here to
call his ashplant into action before he strikes the chandelier.
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relation to God while also making the leap that makes an appeal to God’s grace and thus
arrive at the religious sphere; in fact, the “Sinner’s Prayer” of Protestantism accomplishes
just that, as does the Catholic “Prayer of Extreme Compunction, ”which Stephen’s
mother attempts to perform on his behalf: both prayers acknowledge guilt before God and
make an appeal to God’s “saving grace.”) Stephen is of a double-bladed nature in
relation to defying his mother’s wish.
In Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death, Anti-Climacus associates “the despair
of defiance” with the devil:
First comes despair over the earthly or over something earthly, then
despair of the eternal, over oneself. Then comes defiance, which is really
despair through the aid of the eternal, the despairing misuse of the eternal
within the self to will in despair to be oneself. But just because it is
despair through the aid of the eternal, in a certain sense it is very close to
the truth; and just because it lies very close to the truth, it is infinitely far
away. The despair is that the thoroughfare of faith comes also through the
aid of the eternal; through the aid of the eternal the self has the courage to
lose itself in order to win itself. Here, however, it is unwilling to begin
with losing itself but wills to be itself…
The devil’s despair is the most intensive despair, for the devil is
sheer spirit and hence unqualified consciousness and transparency; there is
no obscurity in the devil that could serve as a mitigating excuse.
Therefore, his despair is the most absolute defiance. (67, 42)
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In the preceding passage from “Circe,” Stephen resembles the individual who in defiance
wills to be himself in that Stephen identifies himself with the devil by invoking the Latin
phrase non servium [“I will not serve,” attributed to the devil in Jeremiah 2:20]; however,
this defiance exhibit by Stephen is ironically undercut by Stephen’s consciousness
actually being the force behind him wrestling with the issue of submitting to God’s grace.
Thus, Stephen behaves not as one who defies God, but as one who in frustration leaves
the issue unresolved and who thus remains haunted by it.
Johannes Climacus claims, “Christianity…requires that the individual should
venture all [in passion]. This is something that a pagan can do; he may, for example,
venture everything on an immortality’s perhaps. But Christianity also requires that the
individual risk his thought, venturing to believe against the understanding (the
dialectical)” (Concluding Unscientific Postscript 384). One could argue that when
Stephen in Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man vows to “fly by the net [of] religion“
(252), this includes only his concept of Religiousness A, 128 which from a Kierkegaardian
perspective would amount to believing that there is no ultimate answer in the “religion of
immanence,” 129 but this would not mean that an individual in Stephen’s position would
not be able to make the leap to “believe against the understanding”(Concluding
Unscientific Postscript 384). Stephen’s claiming in a conversation with Haines to be

128

Kierkegaard believes that because Religiousness B originates with God and moves
toward the individual who makes the leap to faith that takes shape within the religious
sphere, it is paradoxical and one cannot arrive there by way of “the dialectic” of reason
(Concluding Unscientific Postscript 493-ff).
129
Johannes Climacus claims that as immanent religion, “Religiousness A is not the
specifically Christian religiousness” (Concluding Unscientific Postscript 493).
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skeptical about his own skepticism130 would leave open the matter of there possibly being
something available for Stephen in terms “paradoxical religion” or Religiousness B,
which Johannes Climacus calls “Christianity proper” (493). As Julia Watkin explains in
summarizing Johannes Climacus’ discourse in Philosophical Fragments, “Where
Christianity is concerned, the individual is like a blind person, needing the restoration of
sight. The individual had the condition of seeing initially but is to blame for the loss of
sight. The individual in Christianity thus needs the God and Savior to provide the
condition for leaning truth, including the truth that the individual is in untruth (i.e., sin)”
(Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy 194). Rather than admit to guilt
before God and appeal to the savior as his mother’s hallucinatory image urges him to do,
Stephen smashes the chandalier with his ashplant (walking stick); thus, Stephen’s
mother’s prayer has no effect beyond reminding Stephen that the truest thing he has ever
known is “a mother’s love.” 131 Stephen stands in an ambiguous relation to the “Absolute
Paradox,” since his mother’s words in the hallucination end by her merging personalities
with Christ on the cross, as she claims “Inexpressible was my anguish when expiring
with love, grief and agony on Mount Calvary” (475). Stephen has known earthly love in

130

When Haines asks Stephen if he believes in god, he expresses his skeptical dimension
and, with self-effacing irony, refers to himself as “a horrible example of free thought”
who is the “servant of two masters, English and Italian” (a “crazy queen” and the Pope)
(17). Addressing Stephen’s tendency to be skeptical of his own skepticism, Buck
Mulligan jokes that Stephen is of a “jesuit strain”(rigorous in faith), but that the strain
was “injected the wrong way” (7).
131
In Chapter 1 (“Telemachus”), Stephen associates the image of his dying mother with
thoughts of how her love was the only “true” thing he had known: Ugly and futile: lean
and thick and a stain of ink, a snail’s bed. Yet someone had loved him, borne him in her
arms and heart. But for her the race of the world would have trampled him underfoot, a
squashed boneless snail. She had loved his weak watery blood drained from her own.
Was that then real? The only true thing in life?” (23)
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his mother’s compassion but makes no appeal to God’s saving grace, though that is what
she wishes for Stephen.

In Ulysses, the brilliant use of irony and indirect communication takes on the form
of “Joyce’s voices.” 132 Like Kierkegaard in his pseudonymous works, in Ulysses, James
Joyce makes use of multiple voices and does so within a complex psychological labyrinth
of characters that reflect the complexities of human experience. The juxtaposition of
multiple voices, the contradictory nature of the voices, the text interrogating itself in
different voices—all within a day’s journey through Dublin—form a metaphor for the
human quest for “Truth” and for freedom in a world of increasing chaos, superficiality,
and potential confusion. Although written over eighty-five years ago, James Joyce’s
Ulysses speaks in voices that have sounded beyond its particular time and place—in
voices that still speak to us now and will likely speak for generations to come.

132

A term coined by Hugh Kenner and the title of his the groundbreaking book on
Joyce’s paradigm-shifting contribution to narrative voice and fiction.
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CHAPTER 6
APPLYING THE THREE SPHERES TO SCHOLARSHIP AND PEDAGOGY:
IMPLICATIONS AND
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE STUDY
In the four illustrative close readings, I have attempted to demonstrate
Kierkegaard’s concept of the three spheres of existence. I will proceed now to
implications/ramifications of my study by offering a point of view on how one might
apply Kierkegaard’s theory of the three spheres of existence to scholarship and pedagogy.
More specifically, in the conclusion of my study, I will suggest how applying
Kierkegaard’s theory might prove valuable to scholarship and pedagogy.

Scholarship-Pedagogy and Kierkegaard’s Aesthetic Sphere
In the aesthetic sphere of scholarship, criticism, and pedagogy, four distinct
possibilities arise:
* The Scholarship of Self-Interest
* The Scholarship of “Proteus”—the scholarship of fear and self-doubt
* The Scholarship of Arbitrariness and Ethical Indifference
* The Scholarship of Abstract Detachment
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Buck Mulligan’s irreverent display of his knowledge of Latin and the Catholic
Mass could serve as a metaphor for the scholarship of self-interest (Ulysses 3).
Mulligan’s mockery of the Catholic Mass merely serves self-interest and ego desire in
that he knows that it will annoy Stephen Dedalus and will thus put Mulligan in a position
of advantage as the “usurper” (19) of Stephen’s thoughts with regard to Stephen’s dead
mother (5) and Stephen’s uneasy relationship with the Catholic faith133 (5). In the same
way Buck Mulligan’s relationship to Stephen Dedalus is shaped by a self-centered will to
control and manipulate, the scholarship of self-interest is scholarship driven by ego desire
and by a self-centered wish to be in control and to receive praise from one’s peers.
Although ego-related issues can arguably never be eliminated from one’s approach to
scholarship, criticism, and pedagogy, the “controlling spirit” of ego-driven scholarship
must be overcome sufficiently in order for one to operate in either the ethical sphere or
the religious sphere. One ought ideally to strive to operate within a sphere that qualifies
one’s ego desires rather than one that remains dominated ego desires. For example,
striving to challenge stereotypical views of the student-teacher relationship would offer
more possibilities than would assuming a role that sees the teacher as being a dispenser of
information. “For many of us, ‘education’ has come to mean a scramble for information,
which leads to grades, which lead to a diploma, which leads to a job” (Palmer 1). This
“objectified,” stereotypical view of education is limited and is the product of the
scholarship of self-interest. Education within the ethical and religious spheres would
challenge such stereotypical notions; education limited by ego desire associated with the

133

Because he is skeptical even to the point of questioning his own skepticism, Stephen
Dedalus does not grant his mother’s dying wish that he kneel and pray with her (Ulysses
5).
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aesthetic sphere would not. A leap to faith that takes shape within the ethical sphere of
scholarship would arguably imply one striving to overcome limitations imposed by the
scholarship of self-interest that might occur within the aesthetic sphere. In the same
sense that Eugene Henderson of Henderson the Rain King strives to overcome his egodriven notion of Self in order to move more creatively toward life, to realize Self within
the scholarly world and to move beyond the cage of the aesthetic sphere, one ought
ideally to strive to overcome limitations imposed—either consciously or
unconsciously—by ego desire.
***
The scholarship of “Proteus”—the shape-shifting scholarship of fear and selfdoubt and the ugly sibling of the scholarship of self-interest—is my term for scholarship
that arises also from ego desire but is further limited by pathological nature of its
motivation. Like Proteus—and the voices within Chapter 3 of Ulysses—who cannot
assume a constant form and must thus continually change to adapt to the occasion athand, the scholarship of fear and self-doubt is driven by external factors that seem to be
beyond the individual’s control. For example, a lack of self-confidence might lead
graduate students and other fledgling scholars to mimic ideas of thinkers who are
considered significant in contemporary scholarship. Rather than risk looking foolish by
interrogating challenging or dubious assertions by professors or other authority figures,
students might shape themselves in thoughtless conformity to ideas with which they have
not fully engaged. Driven by fear and self-doubt, students might exaggerate the power
that a professor or other noteworthy figure wields over them. The professor herself
would likely remain unaware of this—at least until the compromised quality of the
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student’s work made it apparent that something was amiss. Exposure of the limitations
of one sphere of existence might result in a comical or tragic collision of values and
motives associated with one or more of the other spheres of existence. In this case, the
student’s fear and self-doubt might give rise to a comical relationship to the ethical
sphere with its commitment to “duty” and “responsibility.” (A true sense of duty and
responsibility never arises from fear and self-doubt but from a healthy sense of one’s
place in relation to others and society, and from the courage to embrace that place.) If the
student or fledgling scholar in question were to recognize that this fear and self-doubt
might create a comical relationship between the actual and the possible, she or he might
thus make to leap of faith toward realizing a scholarship that occurs primarily within the
ethical sphere. Otherwise, he or she might be destined to follow a scholarly path
characterized primarily by conformity. Thus, the concept of the scholarship of fear and
self-doubt implies a culpable ignorance: this culpable ignorance involves the individual
being ignorant of the impact that fear and self-doubt might exert upon her scholarship,
criticism, and pedagogy. Overcoming the ignorance would improve the quality of
workmanship of her scholarship in that it would be less likely to be limited by issues
related to personal psychology and ego development. Changing oneself continually in
thoughtless conformity to “the dog of the day” is a different matter from addressing
currently relevant trends within one’s discipline. In the terminology of Paul Tillich,
scholarship that might be driven by fear and self-doubt would arguably be more likely to
manifests itself as a lack of “the courage to be as a part” (The Courage to Be 90-ff).
Issues of fear and poor self-esteem might ultimately overwhelm one’s ability to
contribute meaningfully to the discourse community. Scholarship confined to the
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aesthetic sphere might thus tend to limit possibility for both the individual and discourse
community.
***
The scholarship of arbitrariness and ethical indifference is my term for another
form of learning that—like the scholarship of Proteus—might also arise from both fear
and self-interest taking shape from within the aesthetic sphere. Scholars, critics, and
teachers who might fall prey to this particular mode of scholarship, criticism, and
pedagogy would be those who might engage in arbitrariness and indifference not because
of “situational ethics,” but because of a misplaced notion of Self in the world. They
might be tempted to mistake ego desire for the world-itself. If in scholarship one were to
move from a perspective that either consciously or unconsciously privileges ego desires
over the broader context of the relationships student-teacher/scholar-discourse
community, it might amount to engaging in scholarship that eventually nullifies itself.
This would occur in the same sense that a child’s view of the ethical ideally retreats
eventually from “wishful thinking” and does so in direct proportion to her or his growing
concept of the world and its social constraints. Children develop a sense of Self that
starts from immediacy and that in healthy development ideally grows into a more
differentiated, less ego-driven view of both Self and other. The “immediate, erotic stage”
of the aesthetic sphere comes naturally to the child, but, to realize their potential, scholars
might strive to grow beyond the ego-driven desire to be “children of immediacy.” As
myopic ideologies driving the commercial aspects of education continue to be broadcast
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over the popular media, 134 the temptation to fall into this ego-driven mode of scholarship
arguably increases: It is arguably easier to rationalize seeing education primarily in terms
of one’s immediate desires when one’s students are encouraged so often by popular
“objectivized” 135 notions of education to do the same. However, two wrongs do not
make a right, and to submit oneself in resignation to the prevailing “banking concept of
education” 136 might ultimately mean that the individual risks engaging in ego-driven
scholarship that might betray his or her vocation. In much the same sense that Gatsby
mistakes his romanticized, child-like view of Daisy for the world-itself and thus ends up
being betrayed by his own vision, if scholars, critics, and teachers were to mistake ego
desire for the world-itself, they might risk leading a professional life that would betray
itself when it collided awkwardly with the ethical sphere of existence.
***
The present study uses the term the scholarship of abstract detachment for
disconnected scholarship that fails to consider the concrete and actual conditions of the
matter at-hand. Scholarship of this type might resemble what Paulo Freire refers to as the
“banking concept of education,” which results in an abstract, disconnected concept of
134

(It is increasingly common for colleges and universities to ”market” themselves on
television, radio, and the Internet by implying or stating directly “come to our school so
that you can increase your income and thus have your heart’s desires.” Though an
increase in income might be one of the fruits of education, it is by no means the most
valuable one, and to see it as such is a betrayal of both wisdom and one’s possibilities in
life.)
135
See also Nicolas Berdyaev’s Slavery and Freedom, in which he discusses from a
Kierkegaardian/Kantian perspective objectification of knowledge as a possible aspect of
self-enslavement (New York: Scribner’s, 1944: 73-ff).
136
Chapter 2 of Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed exposes this increasingly
popular view that the teacher’s “task is to ‘fill’ the students with the contents of his
narration—contents which are detached from reality, disconnected from the totality that
engendered them and could give them significance. Words are emptied of their
concreteness and become a hollow, alienated, and alienating verbosity.”
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education in which the teacher’s “words are emptied of their concreteness and become a
hollow, alienated, and alienating verbosity”
(http://www.webster.edu/~corbetre/philosophy/education/freire/freire-2.html). Setting on
a pedestal the abstract ideal of education and subsequently viewing students as objects to
be filled with a fixed portion of knowledge presented by an absolute authority (the
teacher) might subordinate the individual student to an abstract ideal, and might either
overlook or deny the importance of the individual’s experience and interpretation.
Within the context of Kierkegaard’s idea that “thought does not posses reality by way of
a presupposition137” (The Concept of Anxiety 11), if scholarship and pedagogy were to
privilege the ideal and abstract at the expense of the actual, it might also unwittingly
confine itself to the aesthetic sphere. In a similar way, criticism and scholarship that
might hold up an abstract ideal and then unwittingly create a “false dilemma” by judging
the world for not realizing this ideal would run the risk of remaining confined to the
aesthetic sphere. To the extent that these “ideals” might be merely a projection of a
desire for power and control, this form of criticism and scholarship might tend to remain
confined to the aesthetic sphere. For example, a scholar who might judge Hemingway or
Jake Barnes for not being a twenty-first century feminist (as he imagines one to be) or a
socially progressive thinker (as he imagines one to be) might, because of ideological bias,
make little contribution toward serious criticism and scholarship. In its most limited
form, such criticism might become merely a projection of desire for a particular form of
social change as an abstract ideal and would thus remain confined to the aesthetic
sphere—the sphere where abstract reflection and one’s immediate desires might

137

The “ideal” never contains the “actual” in all its ambiguity.
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ultimately conflict with a potential for concrete actualization of personality. Although in
some contexts it might be important to the scholarly community to foreground
Hemingway’s tendencies toward misogyny or to challenge his portrayal of certain aspects
of society, for a scholar to merely judge Hemingway for not reaffirming her position on
feminism or social theory would risk falling into a solipsism similar to that of the
personality who remains confined to the aesthetic sphere and thus thinks of ideas
primarily in terms of her immediate desires—in terms of what might benefit her.

Scholarship-Pedagogy and Kierkegaard’s Ethical Sphere
In the ethical sphere of scholarship, criticism, and pedagogy, I propose that three
distinct possibilities might arise:
•

Scholarship as Vocation—or “Calling”

•

Scholarship as Self-Examination

•

Scholarship as Service to Others

In contrast to Nick Carraway, who chooses his occupation because “everyone [he]
knew was in the bond business,” 138 scholarship as vocation would ideally move from the
belief that one might find a place in this world that suits one’s character and one’s talents
and that this place might include noble activity that benefits both other individuals and
society. In the same sense that Eugene Henderson moves closer to Self by deciding to
become a doctor and thus reaching out towards others,139 if the scholar were to see her
scholarship, criticism, and pedagogy as a “calling,” this might open a realm of possibility
not available to the scholar who was confined to the aesthetic sphere. Scholarship as
138
139

The Great Gatsby, page 7
Henderson the Rain King, pages 284-85
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vocation might choose to teach not in reaction to circumstances but in spite of
circumstances. “Courage as an element of faith is daring self-affirmation of one’s own
being in spite of the powers of ‘nonbeing’ that are the heritage of everything finite”
(Tillich, Dynamics of Faith 17). Scholarship as vocation would ideally strive to see itself
as altering circumstances into something they might not otherwise be without the creative
input of the parties involved; scholarship as vocation might thus choose consciously to
express itself within the context of striving to benefit fully from the student-teacher
dialectic. Scholarship as vocation might thus be more likely to act upon rather than in
reaction to circumstances. Within the context of scholarship as vocation, altering for the
better the conditions within which one learns-teaches might thus becomes a predominate
concern. Being-toward-an-aim might thus imply making a difference for other
individuals. Taking it upon oneself to better the place in which one learns-teaches might
thus become the form in which “concrete actualization of Self” could occur within this
potential manifestation of the ethical sphere of scholarship.
***
In a manner similar to the way in which Pedro Romero holds himself accountable
to the idea that constant improvement is important (The Sun Also Rises 171), scholarship
as self-examination might hold itself accountable to the idea that constant selfimprovement is valuable to enhancing the experience of teaching and scholarship.
Further, like Pedro Romero, scholarship as self-examination might strive to avoid looking
for approval from others as a measure of success (172). Rather, scholarship as selfexamination might see the journey toward excellence as the goal and might recognize the
importance of being in the moment in relation to others and one’s vocation. In this sense,
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scholarship as self-examination might also strive to realize “concrete actualization of
Self in relation to others” as is characteristic of Kierkegaard’s concept of the ethical
sphere. Self-discipline and self-examination might thus become internalized in the form
of existential experience; the scholar who would strive to progress within this realm
might eventually move from apprentice to journeyman by virtue of existential experience.
Rather than see the rules and conventions of the scholarly domain as being an “evil
outside other” (Kristeva) or an inconvenience, scholarship as self-examination might see
them as an occasion for either self-improvement or for avoiding the possibility of living
in bondage to bureaucratic procedure. In contrast to scholarship that might take shape
within the aesthetic sphere where authority might be seen as a loss of freedom140 and a
possible source of “punishment and limitations, ” scholarship as self-examination might
see authority as if it were a necessary yet alterable “reality,” one in need of constant
interrogation and revision to suit the exigencies of the moment. Excellence, then, might
become the goal, rather than obligation to avoid punishment for falling short of an ideal
or obligation to gain approval from others by standing out from the crowd.
***
In the sense that for Kierkegaard the ethical sphere of existence takes the form of
a “concrete actualization of self in relation to others,” scholarship as service to others
might seem to be the most obvious form of scholarship within the ethical sphere. Even
so, service to others might often get overlooked, in that ideologies that shape academic
life and scholarship might sometimes run counter to this intuitively obvious “mission.”
Specifically, ideologies that inform the administrative and socio-political quest for

140
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absolute standards and measures of academic and professional performance might
unwittingly run counter to scholarship as service to others. As Kierkegaard’s disciple
Nicolas Berdyaev observes, “The objectivization of Sobornost [spiritual communality],
the transference of it to social institutions, has always meant slavery. The spell and
slavery of collectivism is nothing else than the transference of spiritual communality,
fellowship, universality, from subject to object, and the objectification either of separate
functions of human life or of human life as a whole” (Slavery and Freedom 201-02).
Objectifying sometimes-subjective matters such as the quality of an individual’s
scholarship and translating them to yearly-compiled numbers on a bell curve might, in the
long run, prove contrary to scholarship as service to others in that it might perpetuate an
illusion that one could actually count high enough to arrive at truth. Scholarship
performed as service to others might ideally mean that individuals were accepted as
individual personalities with inherent dignity and with individual idiosyncrasies: Ideally,
individuals—including their desire to strive toward excellence—might be held in higher
regard than numbers on a bell curve. Ideally, education as service to others might strive
to recognize more fully that human behavior is ultimately too complex and ambiguous to
be objectified and assigned to clearly defined points on a bell curve. The community of
scholars might thus recognize that it is impossible to quantify quality. Scholarship as
service to others might thus involve a community of individuals who work in unison to
arrive at a broader understanding of both their individual potential as scholars and their
contribution to the broader conversation and to the task at-hand. The environment of
scholarship as service to others might thus offer a more dynamic experience and create
broader possibilities that might not be available not available to “objectivized”
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scholarship. In the same sense that Leopold Bloom, the “good man,” 141 strives to accept
others on equal terms, so scholarship as service to others might enable scholars to strive
to better understand both individual personalities and the situations in which these
personalities operate.

Teaching/Learning and Kierkegaard’s Religious Sphere
In scholarship, criticism, and pedagogy in terms of the religious sphere, I propose
three distinct possibilities that might arise for the Christian142 teacher-student:
•

Teaching/Learning as Open-Ended inquiry

•

Teaching/Learning as “Courage to Be as Oneself”

•

Teaching/Learning as “Courage to Be as a Part”

As a mode of scholarship in the same context as scholarship as service to others,
teaching/learning as open-ended inquiry might strive toward equality and understanding.
Christian scholars who might ideally realize this mode of teaching within the Quaker
concept of community, with the importance that the Quaker approach places on meeting
as single individuals striving to arrive at “truth” before God. As Parker J. Palmer asserts
in the essay “Meeting for Learning: Education in a Quaker Context,” There are too many
educational institutions where truth is not the point! Perhaps the image of a ‘meeting for
141

“I see [Bloom],” Joyce said, “from all sides, and therefore he is all-round, in the sense
of your sculptor’s figure. But he is a complete man as well—a good man” (Fargnoli 19).
142
Although these modes of teaching-learning might be imitated in a secular sense (as
Parker J. Palmer proposes), in terms of Kierkegaard’s ultimate concern of what it means
to be a Christian in Christendom, the religious sphere includes “Religiousness B” and
“second ethics,” and both of these distinctions are for Kierkegaard unique to the Christian
experience in that they are realized through God’s grace in the act of the Incarnation
(Watkin 76-79).
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learning’ will remind us of forgotten depths in the educational process, just as the silent
meeting for worship once stood as a rebuke to ways of worship which put the human
before the divine” (Palmer). In what Kierkegaard would arguably consider to be
scholarship confined to the aesthetic sphere, “when we anticipate and predict one
another’s responses, we kill off the novelty which infuses authentic education” (Palmer).
However, in scholarship as open-ended inquiry, “the image of meeting urges us to
encounter each other as strangers whenever we meet. For we are strangers to each other
and to ourselves—unable to reveal at any moment all that we hold within. When we
meet to learn with the openness which we bring to a stranger, teaching and learning are
enriched” (Palmer). In the sense that Leopold Bloom strives to meet others with an open
mind as he makes the journey through Dublin, 143 in scholarship as open-ended inquiry
the teacher-learner might ideally be open to revelation (the inner light) but would also
accept that “learning happens between persons and not simply within the learner”
(Palmer). The inquiry for such a group of teachers-learners would occur in dialogue, and
the dialogue would ideally develop from within a context of equality and thus presumes
that “among members of the meeting there is equal opportunity for light or insight”
(Palmer).

143

Though as a Jew he is an outsider at Paddy Dignam’s Catholic funeral, Bloom meets
the occasion with an open mind and even ponders the significance of the symbolism of
the funeral (Ulysses 96).
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Unlike the ”banking concept of education,” 144 teaching-learning as open-ended
inquiry might strive to move beyond objectifying knowledge and to meet others in a way
that honors Christian community and up-building (1 Corinthians 13):
The encounter between persons in a meeting for learning is deepened and
disciplined by a “third party” to the dialogue—whether that be an idea, a
text, some data, or a concrete experience. This “third thing” mediates the
relation between selves. It saves the dialogue from becoming a simple
sharing of subjectivities. The common text—a poem, for example—has
an irreducible reality of its own. And this reality is capable of breaking
through the closure and deadlock [that] can sometimes occur in a simple
dialogue. It enables the participants to speak and to listen to something
outside of themselves. (Palmer)
The “third party” 145 is a term secularized by Palmer to describe truth that emerges
via a paradigm shift through open-minded dialogue, but ideally for the Christian teacherlearner this “third party” would be edification and wisdom brought about by the Holy
Spirit. Teaching/learning as open-ended inquiry might also ideally require a willingness
to face vulnerability and to place trust in the community of learners. “One of the basic
disciplines of an experience-based meeting for learning is to claim only what one knows,
and no more [not to assign validity to an idea merely because it came from a reputable
144

Paulo Freire’s term for knowledge and education perceived as a collection of facts
with little or no existential connection to the community of learners (Pedagogy of the
Oppressed, Chapter 2).
145
The Quaker concept of the third party in dialogue during a meeting refers to the
“inward light” (or revelation) from God’s Holy Spirit and the subsequent sharing of this
revelation in the meeting. The other members, believe the Quakers, would ideally
receive confirmation in their spirits (a feeling of peace/insight that also had its source in
the Holy Spirit).
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source, and not to in fear cover one’s ignorance on a subject by creating a red herring to
deflect attention away from one’s ignorance]. Think of what could be gained if we could
adopt the discipline in education! The greatest gain would be the legitimate exposure of
doubt and ignorance, of what whole range of questions and quandaries which motivate
inquiry but which we often suppress for fear of appearing unlearned” (Palmer). Unlike
the political views of Richard Dalloway, which merely reaffirm the status quo within the
context of a ‘governing class spirit’ (Hussey 68), teaching/learning as open-ended inquiry
might be willing to accept that a journey toward “Truth” and wisdom might involve deep
personal crisis and a subsequent change in one’s perspective on life. Ideally, the
community of teachers-learners ought to be willing to “speak the truth in love” 146
(Ephesians 4:15). In the context of Kierkegaard’s “Christomorphic poetics” (Rasmussen
83-ff), God’s Incarnation as Jesus the Christ becomes the qualifying event in what it
means to be a Christian in Christendom; the person who participates in Religiousness B
and second ethics can, by God’s grace, act within God’s love: “Just as Christ’s entrance
into the world of spirit is what creation is in the physical world—so also the Holy Spirit
is the sustenance in the world of the spirit, i.e., the concept of sustenance” (Journals and
Papers, Volume 1: 127). Kierkegaard alludes here to the Gospel of John in which Jesus
tells his disciples first that He is the “true vine” (John 15:1) then later in the same
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In Ephesians Chapter 4, the Apostle Paul encourages the beloved community to grow
together in the common bond that is their relationship to Christ: “And these were
[Christ’s] gifts: some to be apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and
teachers, to equip God’s people for work in his service, to the building up of the body of
Christ. So shall we all at last attain to the unity inherent in our faith and our knowledge
of the Son of God—to mature manhood measured by nothing less than the full stature of
Christ. And we are no longer to be children, tossed by the waves and whirled about by
every gust of teaching…No, let us speak the truth in love; so shall we fully grow up into
Christ. He is the head, and on him the whole body depends” (Ephesians 4:7-16).
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discourse tells them that he “will send an Advocate—the Spirit of truth” (John15:26).
For the Christian teacher-learner, the sustenance to which Kierkegaard refers implies that
God’s love might be both the prototype and the source of strength by which this
prototype might be imitated.
Arguably, the most important aspect of teaching/learning as open-ended inquiry
for the learner-teacher might occur in the phenomenon of the group in a bond of God’s
Love experiencing a qualitative shift: Since meeting ideally occurs within a context of
equality, the roles of teacher and student ought thus to become interchangeable. In
teaching-learning as open-ended inquiry,147 “the roles of teacher and student [would]
continually move from one person to another, and it [would] be impossible at any
moment to anticipate who will be teacher next” (Palmer). As Kierkegaard notes with
regard to Christ as the prototype [protokos] for the believer, “All true effort to help
begins with self-humiliation; the helper must first humble himself under him he would
help, and therewith must understand that to help does not mean to be a sovereign but to
be a servant, that to help does not mean to be ambitious but to be patient, that to help
means to endure for the time being the imputation that one is in the wrong and does not
understand what the other understands” (The Point of View for My Work as an Author 2728).
If emphasis were placed on meeting in love, this might also include a paradigm
shift that would move beyond the teacher or student being reduced to being a member of
a quasi-organized herd. In fact,

147

The term is used here in a way that is interchangeable with the Quaker concept of
“meeting for learning.”
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the teacher will…have expert resources on the subject. The question is
how to nurture and encourage the expertise of others. The most difficult
task in teaching is to give away what you have, without making students
feel like the resentful recipients of welfare. And the teacher must also be
expert in helping to build a group which can be trusted by its members. In
this kind of education, the role of the teacher gains in subtlety and
significance what it loses in visibility. (Palmer)
The aspect that might most clearly qualify scholarship as open-ended inquiry as
scholarship that occurs within the religious sphere of existence and the context of
Religiousness Band second ethics might be that the individual who might engage
meaningfully in scholarship as open-ended inquiry would strive to finds her “true” self by
denying herself (Matthew 10:39). In doing so, she might thus move existentially in the
direction of “Truth” and wisdom. The community of scholars might thus replicate the
“beloved community” of the Gospels and the teachings of the Apostle Paul, who
encouraged individuals within the beloved community to avoid being judgmental and to
grow spiritually by “speaking the truth in love” (Ephesians 4:15).
***
The last two modes of scholarship to be proposed within the context of learningteaching within the religious sphere in this study, teaching/learning as “courage to be as
oneself148” and teaching/learning as “courage to be as a part,149” are derived from
Kierkegaard’s disciple Paul Tillich’s rendering of concepts either explicit or implicit to
Kierkegaard’s thought. These concepts might take shape within the religious sphere to
148
149

(Tillich, The Courage to Be 113-ff)
(The Courage to Be 86-ff)
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the extent that they also occur within the broader context of grace, which Tillich calls
“the courage to accept acceptance.” 150 Both the courage to be as a part and the courage
to be as oneself encounter limitations if they are not qualified within the context of the
courage to accept that one is accepted by God. The courage to be as oneself finds its
theological correlative in the view that “every human soul has an infinite value” (The
Courage to Be 87). The individual, in faith, affirms self as “courage to be, in spite of the
threat of nonbeing” (89) by making a leap to faith that takes shape within the religious
sphere. The self however, is never a self apart from its world and thus might ideally
strive toward a balance of the courage to be as oneself and the courage to be as a part:
…The self is self only because it has a world, a structured universe, to
which it belongs and from which it is separated at the same time. Self and
world are correlated, and so are individualization and participation. For
this is just what participation means: being a part of something from which
one is, at the same time, separated…The identity of participation is an
identity in the power of being. In this sense the power of being of the
individual self is partly identical with the power of being of his world, and
conversely (The Courage to Be 87-88, 89).
Eugene Henderson faces this paradox during his journey into the symbolic underworld,
as he imitates the lioness in the lion’s den (Henderson the Rain King 262-ff). The
paradox of self and world finds its deepest expression after the leap to faith that takes
shape in the religious sphere where “courage to accept acceptance” can occur:

150

(The Courage to Be 155-ff)
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Courage [to be] is the self-affirmation of being in spite of the fact of
nonbeing. It is the act of the individual self in taking the anxiety of
nonbeing upon itself by affirming itself either as part of an embracing
whole or in its individual selfhood. Courage always includes a risk, it is
always threatened by nonbeing, whether the risk of losing oneself within
the whole of things or of losing one’s world in an empty self-relatedness.
Courage needs the power of being, a power transcending the nonbeing
which is experienced in the anxiety of fate and death, 151 which is present
in the anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness, 152 which is effective in
the anxiety of guilt and condemnation.153 The courage which takes this
threefold anxiety into itself must be rooted in a power of being that is
greater than the power of oneself and the power of one’s world. (The
Courage to Be 155).
By making the leap to faith that takes shape within the religious sphere, the Christian
attains ‘justification through faith’ (164). “Accepting acceptance though being
unacceptable is the basis for the courage of confidence” (164-65). By thus embracing
one’s self and one’s place within the world, the individual might be able to create
meaning in the world by acting confidently upon the conditions of the world in a way that
might benefit both self and others. “Self-affirmation in spite of the anxiety of guilt and
condemnation presupposes participation in something that transcends the self” (165).

151

such as that symbolized by Clarissa Dalloway identifying herself with Septimus Smith
at the time of his suicide (Mrs. Dalloway 202-03)
152
such as that symbolized by the Hemingway code hero being afraid of the dark
153
such as that symbolized by Septimus Smith’s hallucinations regarding his part in the
death of his close friend Evans (Mrs. Dalloway 100)
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Although teaching/learning from within this context is a “high calling,” there are
instances of such a calling that have exerted a strong influence upon the scholarly
community. The life and teachings of Mother Theresa and the activism and pedagogy of
Paulo Freire are two clear examples. Both Mother Theresa and Paulo Freire embraced
life with a confidence and humility that made a difference for others. In having done so,
they might serve as an inspiring example for all teachers, but for Christian
learners/teachers in particular they offer the hope that one might grow into the full stature
of Christ (Ephesians 4:13).
************************************************************************
Kierkegaard implies in his thought that God is in charge of irony, and that love of
all varieties154 and the creativeness associated with human consciousness and
personality155 arise from freedom—and in the face of the single individual’s dread—or
“anxiety” 156—in reaction to freedom. For Kierkegaard, to be human means to be a single
individual first, a member of society and the ethical sphere second, and a member of the
“crowd” 157 third—a member of the ‘crowd’ only as a consequence of the “fall of
Creation.” 158 Gatsby’s flight into a past which never really was, Hemingway’s confusing
of God and Élan—life energy—and the “ghosts” crying out to be freed and escaping only
154

See also C.S. Lewis, The Four Loves (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1988).
For more on human personality, freedom, and creativeness, see Berdyaev’s The
Meaning of the Creative Act (New York: Collier Books, 1962).
156
See The Concept of Anxiety (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992).
157
In his diary, Kierkegaard sums up nicely his mission as a satirical persona in making
the claim, “’The crowd’ is essentially what I am aiming my polemical arrow at, and it
was Socrates who taught me to do so. I want people to sit up and take notice, to prevent
them from idling away and wasting their lives” (104).
158
In his diary, Kierkegaard claims, “’The crowd’ is essentially what I am aiming my
polemical arrow at; and it was Socrates who taught me to do so. I want people to sit up
and take notice, to prevent them from idling away and wasting their lives…I will call
attention to the crowd of their ruination” (The Diary of Soren Kierkegaard 104).
155
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momentarily from the “texts” of both Woolf and Joyce all point beyond themselves—to
another implication: These novels striving to create their way in the direction of “Truth”
implies that the leap to faith (“the courage to be”) might take the form of creative selfexpression. Scholarship, criticism, pedagogy, and literature are all a part of human
creative self-expression and might thus take shape in a meaningful way that, in faith,
overcomes “anxiety,” which arises from courageously recognizing and embracing this
freedom.

As Kierkegaard thought as early as the 1850s, this is indeed both an age of irony
and an age of despair, 159 and arguably the best way escape the confines of that “reality”
within the academic world is for the individual to make a leap to faith to a new way of
being160 in scholarship and criticism. This new way of being might be one that strives to
create its way toward “Truth” in the spirit of open-ended inquiry and is thus willing to
risk being vulnerable so that it might bring into light a broadened understanding of both
self and others. The new, more individuated threads of discourse that literary
criticism/cultural studies create—in whatever forms they might take shape—might
ultimately be threads that strive to meet the shifting needs of human consciousness,
especially as this consciousness continues to become increasingly differentiated. These
more differentiated threads of discourse might also include a broader understanding of
complex multicultural influences. The artifacts of literary and cultural history take shape
as both artistic creations and tools to be appropriated by the individual who might
159

See also Kierkegaard’s essay “The Present Age.”
See also The New Being, Paul Tillich’s sequence of sermons delivered at Union
Theological Seminary in New York. Faith implies that one adopt a “new way of being,”
one that is conditioned be a new relationship with Being itself.

160
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appropriate them to arrive at a broader understanding of what it means to exist: the
responsibility—the stewardship—is ours. Humanism, in the traditional sense, might have
died, but we live on as human beings and ought thus to continually strive toward a more
differentiated view of ourselves and of the place of literature and the arts within the
broader scope of existence. As we continue to re-define ourselves, Kierkegaard’s thought
might prove to be only a passing phase of this increasingly differentiated view of
existence and culture, but it might also become a critical part of the transition to a more
differentiated view of existence. It might thus be important that learners/teachers
continue to appropriate Kierkegaard’s distinctions in order to address and perhaps even
surpass philosophical and theological inconsistencies in the lingering “Neo-Hegelian”
threads of academic discourse. In doing so, the scholar ought ideally to exercise
compassion toward others while also recognizing the limitations of scholarship, criticism,
and pedagogy confined to the aesthetic sphere of existence.
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